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 This dissertation explicates and evaluates the theological anthropology of David 
Tracy.  Through a reading of the whole of Tracy’s published theological corpus, it argues that 
Tracy’s work on theological method, hermeneutics, public theology, and otherness rests on 
an implicit and evolving understanding of the human person.  This anthropology is rooted in 
four key characteristics or “anthropological constants”: finitude, relationality, sin, and grace. 
 The methodological approach of the dissertation is genealogical and hermeneutical. 
Each of these four constants is taken as an interpretive lens through which the dissertation 
considers the development of Tracy’s thought.  This approach will demonstrate first how 
finitude, relationality, sin, and grace are interwoven in Tracy’s work, and second how the 
development of his core theological loci of method, interpretation, public-ness, pluralism, 
and otherness are rooted in these four constants. 
 The text concludes with an evaluation of Tracy’s theology anthropology in light of 
his context as a North American, late 20th century, Catholic theologian. Tracy’s work 
provides insight into the interdependence of theological method and anthropology.  However, 
while he attends to the importance of how historical, linguistic, and social context shape 
human persons, his conceptual approach to context tends to ignore particularity and 
embodiment.  Nevertheless, the four “constants” of Tracy’s theological anthropology could 
fruitfully engage contemporary currents such as ecotheology and disability theology. 
 This dissertation is the most thorough and sustained foray into the question of David 
Tracy’s theological anthropology to date, and as such provides a significant contribution to 
the field of 20th/21st century North American Catholic theology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 David Tracy is widely considered to be one of the most important American 
Catholic theologians of the twentieth century.  During a career spanning six decades, he 
has made substantial contributions through his work on public theology, hermeneutics, 
and theological method.  Sometimes called “a theologian’s theologian,” his work, as well 
as his generous spirit, has influenced theologians, philosophers, and other scholars both 
internationally and across religious traditions.   
 While his best-known and most cited works have focused on questions of what he 
would call fundamental theology, Tracy has lamented that his contributions to systematic 
and doctrinal issues have generally been ignored by his readers and interlocutors.1  Both 
his Blessed Rage for Order and Analogical Imagination feature extensive chapters on 
Christology; his understanding of public theology includes a subtle and complex 
ecclesiology; and the Christian teachings on sin and grace have permeated his work from 
very early on.  Yet by and large, these contributions have garnered limited interest in the 
wider theological community, consequently impoverishing both the understanding of 
Tracy’s theological project and the wider theological conversation in which he is 
engaged.   
 This dissertation serves as a modest contribution and corrective to this oversight.  
Its founding premise is that Tracy’s theology has a robust, if often implicit, theological 
                                                          
1 Todd Breyfogle and Thomas Levergood, “Conversation with David Tracy,” Cross Currents 44, no. 3 
(Fall 1994): 301-2.  In particular, he mentions the lack of interest that readers of Blessed Rage for Order 
and The Analogical Imagination have shown in his Christology. 
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anthropology supporting it.  The particulars of this anthropology are not always made 
manifest, with many of his explicit references to anthropology and the human person 
taking the form of offhand comments.  Nevertheless, a close examination of his extensive 
writing on both fundamental and systematic theological topics reveals a profound sense 
of what it means to be human.  In this dissertation, I will undertake such an examination 
and argue that Tracy’s anthropology is based on four anthropological “constants”: 
finitude, relationality, sin, and grace.  
 This introduction has four goals.  First, I will offer a brief biographical sketch of 
Tracy’s life in order to provide the context for the evolution of his theology.  Second, I 
will describe the genealogical method used in this dissertation.  This approach takes 
various concepts and themes and investigates how they develop over the course of his 
career.  It takes account of early influences on Tracy as well as later conversation partners 
who affect the trajectory of his career.  Third, I will consider and critique previous 
attempts to elucidate Tracy’s anthropology, demonstrating the need for a new look at his 
thought.  Fourth, I will explain the idea of “anthropological constants,” a term borrowed 
from Edward Schillebeeckx, and why “constants” provide a useful heuristic for 
interpreting Tracy.  Finally, I will provide an overview of the coming chapters.   
 
Biographical Sketch of David Tracy  
 David William Tracy was born in Yonkers, NY on January 6th, 1939, the middle 
son of John Charles Tracy, a union organizer, and Eileen Marie Tracy (née Rossell).  He 
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had an older brother, John Charles Jr., and a younger, Arthur.2  At the age of 13, he 
entered the Cathedral College, the minor (or high school) seminary for the Archdiocese 
of New York.3  He claims that he felt a very intense vocation to the priesthood, and he 
hoped to become a parish priest one day.4  Upon finishing high school, he went on to 
study at St. Joseph’s Seminary (1958-60), colloquially known as Dunwoodie.5   
 In 1960, Tracy was sent to the Gregorian University in Rome to begin his 
theological studies.  While he was there, the Second Vatican Council began in 1962.  
Although as a young seminarian he had no formal role in the two sessions he was in 
Rome for, he did attend lectures given by some of the major theologians who had been 
brought to the Council as periti (theological advisors to the bishops).  He was ordained to 
the priesthood in Rome in 1963.  He completed his Licentiate in Sacred Theology (STL) 
in 1964, and then returned to the US to a parish in Stamford, CT.  He had long wanted to 
serve in a parish, and by all accounts he acquitted himself admirably.  While he had long 
hoped for an opportunity to serve in a parish, he discovered while there that he felt called 
to the life of academic theology.  He returned to the Gregorian and studied under Fr. 
                                                          
2 He dedicated Blessed Rage for Order to his mother and Plurality and Ambiguity to his father and older 
brother in memoriam.   
3 Wendy Doniger, Franklin I. Gamwell, and Bernard McGinn.  “Tributes to David Tracy.”  Criterion 46, 
no. 1 (Winter 2008): 7 
4 Breyfogle and Levergood, “Conversation with David Tracy,” 305-6  
5 Dunwoodie was widely considered to be one of the best Roman Catholic seminaries in North America.  
Founded in 1896 when the seminary for the Archdiocese of New York was moved to Yonkers, it was home 
of the well-regarded Dunwoodie Review in the 1960’s and 70’s.  In addition to Tracy, notable alumni 
include Joseph Komonchak, John P. Meier, and Bernard McGinn.  For more on the history of Dunwoodie, 
see Thomas Shelley, Dunwoodie: The History of St. Joseph’s Seminary, Yonkers, New York (Westminster, 
MD: Christian Classics, 1993). 
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Bernard Lonergan, SJ.  He completed his Doctorate of Sacred Theology (STD) in 1969 
with a dissertation on Lonergan’s theology to that point.6 
 Tracy’s teaching career began at the Catholic University of America in 
Washington, DC, where he served as an instructor from 1967-1969.  In 1968, Pope Paul 
VI issued the encyclical Humanae Vitae, a re-affirmation of the traditional Catholic 
teaching against artificial birth control.  Charles Curran, who was then a faculty member 
at CUA, authored a response arguing that Catholics could in good conscience dissent 
from the encyclical’s teaching without calling into question their Catholic faith.7  Tracy, 
along with Bernard McGinn and 19 other members of the CUA faculty, signed onto 
Curran’s response.8  All were brought to trial by the CUA faculty senate and ultimately 
fired.  The American Civil Liberties Union represented these faculty members in a 
subsequent lawsuit against the university, and all 22 were reinstated.9   
 During this controversy, Jerald Brauer, then Dean of the Divinity School of the 
University of Chicago, invited both Tracy and McGinn to lecture and offer a seminar.  
Even before the lawsuit was settled, Brauer was confident they would get back their jobs 
at CUA.  Yet in the years following the Second Vatican Council, many Catholic students 
were coming to Chicago, so Brauer looked to expand the Catholic presence on the 
                                                          
6 The dissertation, The Development of the Notion of Theological Methodology in the Works of Bernard J. 
Lonergan, S.J., would later be revised and published as The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1970). 
7 Robert G. Hoyt, ed., The Birth Control Debate (Kansas City, MO: National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 
179-181. 
8 Beyond CUA, over 600 theologians signed Curran’s statement, including Richard McBrien, Bernard 
Häring, and Roland Murphy.  The Pontifical status of CUA made the dissent at that university particularly 
striking.  The negative response to Humanae Vitae is widely seen as the first time that lay Catholics widely 
and publicly dissented from magisterial teaching. 
9 David Gibson, “God-obsessed: David Tracy’s Theological Quest,” Commonweal 137, no. 2 (Jan. 29, 
2010): 16 
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faculty.  In 1969, Tracy and McGinn both joined the faculty at Chicago, where they 
would remain until their retirements.10  Tracy’s arrival at Chicago “was widely greeted as 
evidence of the optimistic new ecumenical and intellectual spirit infusing postconciliar 
Catholicism.”11  As part of this spirit, Tracy became involved with the international 
journal Concilium in the early 1970’s, later serving as an editor and regular contributor.12 
 Tracy authored six books and over two hundred articles and reviews during his 
tenure at the University of Chicago.  His first constructive work of theology, Blessed 
Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology, was published in 1975.  Intended to be 
the first book in a trilogy, it attempted to develop a fundamental theology in light of the 
situation of increased pluralism in theology.  BRO was greeted with acclaim from the 
scholarly theological community, but the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, who 
were concerned about the process theology-inspired notion of God in the book, requested 
some “clarifications.”13  Tracy responded to the CDF’s request, but he never heard back.  
Following the publication of this text, Tracy was elected president of the Catholic 
                                                          
10 McGinn retired in 2003 and Tracy in 2006 
11 Gibson, “God-obsessed,” 12 
12 Concilium is a journal of Catholic theology that was founded after the Second Vatican Council by 
Johann-Baptist Metz, Anton van den Boogaard, Paul Brand, Yves Congar, Hans Kung, Karl Rahner, and 
Edward Schillbeeckx.  Its mission is to “reflect on Christian tradition (supported by solid scholarship) in 
the light of cultural and religious experiences and socio-political developments” (“Our Mission,” accessed 
May 23, 2013, http://www.concilium.in/aboutus.htm).  It was later joined by the rival journal Communio, 
founded in 1972 by Hans Urs von Balthasar, Louis Bouyer, Walter Kasper, Henri de Lubac, Marc Ouellet, 
and Joseph Ratzinger.  Typically, Concilium is considered the more “progressive” journal and Communio 
the more “traditional” one.   
 In 1994, Orbis published a volume collecting many of Tracy’s contributions to Concilium under 
the title On Naming the Present: Reflections on God, Hermeneutics, and Church (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis 
Books, 1994). 
13 Typically, the CDF begins investigations into a theologian’s work when there is some concern about the 
orthodoxy of some text or texts.  The theologian in question is usually asked to clarify certain points to 
clear up any “ambiguities.”  This process may continue until there is a resolution, but if none is reached the 
theologian may receive a “notification” that the book is problematic.  In some cases, such as Roger Haight, 
the consequences may extend to the suspension of one’s teaching faculties.   
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Theological Society of America (1976-1977), and later received that organization’s John 
Courtney Murray Award in 1980.   
 Tracy followed Blessed Rage for Order with the 1981 publication of The 
Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism.  This text, 
which more clearly outlined Tracy’s claim for the three theological sub-disciplines of 
fundamental, systematic, and practical theologies, was intended as the second entry in his 
trilogy.14  Widely regarded as his most influential work, in this text he developed several 
of the concepts with which he would become most closely associated: the method of 
mutually critical correlation, the public role of theology, theology as a hermeneutic 
discipline, the classic, and the analogical and dialectical imaginations.   
 The success of The Analogical Imagination was a watershed moment in Tracy’s 
career.  In 1982, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which at 
the time was a rare honor for a theologian.  He was the subject of a New York Times 
Magazine cover story in late 1986.15  The University of Chicago named him a 
Distinguished Service Professor in 1985, and two years later he was appointed the 
inaugural Andrew Thomas Greeley and Grace McNichols Greeley Chair in Catholic 
                                                          
14 Tracy never completed the proposed third volume on practical theology.  He did offer a brief outline of 
what this work would have looked like in his article “The Foundations of Practical Theology,” in Practical 
Theology, ed. Don Browning (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), 61-82.  He followed this article with 
an examination of practical theology in global context in “Practical Theology in the Situation of Global 
Pluralism,” in Formation and Reflection: The Promise of Practical Theology, ed. Lewis S. Mudge and 
James N. Poling (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 139-154.  He later reconsidered his view of practical 
theology, calling for more emphasis on a “correlational practical theology” in David Tracy, “A 
Correlational Model of Practical Theology Revisited,” in Religion, Diversity, and Conflict, ed. Edward 
Foley, 49-61 (Berlin: Lit, 2011). 
15 Eugene Kennedy.  “A Dissenting Voice: Catholic Theologian David Tracy.”  New York Times Magazine 
136 (Nov. 9, 1986): 20-28. 
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Studies.16  Tracy’s prominence has been recognized by the number of honorary degrees 
he has received, beginning with The University of the South (Sewanee, TN) in 1982 and 
continuing with his most recent award from Loyola University Chicago in 2011.17   
 During the 1980’s, Tracy’s theological focus turned increasingly to the idea of 
conversation as a model for hermeneutics.  His 1987 book Plurality and Ambiguity: 
Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope, while highlighting the role of the interruptions of 
pluralism and ambiguity in traditions, affirmed that theology must always be open to the 
risks of genuine conversation.  Tracy’s 1988 Dondeyne Lectures, published in 1990 as 
Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue, focused on interreligious 
dialogue between Catholicism and Buddhism, thus signaling his interests beyond strictly 
Catholic and Christian debates.   
 Tracy’s place among the most influential religious thinkers of the late 20th century 
was settled when he was invited to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University 
of Edinburgh in 1999-2000.18  His lectures focused on in how the Christian tradition has 
tried to name God throughout its history.  Tracy originally planned to publish these 
                                                          
16 The chair was endowed in 1984 by sociologist Fr. Andrew Greeley in honor of his parents.  The 
endowment for this chair was made possible by Greeley’s successful side career as a novelist.  Following 
Tracy’s retirement from the Divinity School in 2006, Jean-Luc Marion was appointed to the Greeley Chair 
in 2010. 
17 Over the next thirty years, numerous institutions followed suit, including Fairfield University (Fairfield, 
CT), Catholic Theological Union (Chicago, IL), Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.), Williams 
College (Williamstown, MA), and Wabash College (Crawfordsville, IN). 
18 The Gifford Lectures on natural religion are widely considered one of the highest honors in theology and 
philosophy.  The lectures are given over the course of an academic year at one of four Scottish universities: 
University of St. Andrews, University of Glasgow, University of Aberdeen, or University of Edinburgh.  
The lectures are often revised and published, and many of these publications have become major texts in 
the field (e.g., William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience, Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and 
Reality, Reinhold Niebuhr’s Nature and Destiny of Man, and Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age).   
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lectures in 2003 under the title This Side of God as the first part of a new trilogy.19  While 
the planned trilogy seems to have been abandoned, he has continued to rework these 
lectures in the years since his retirement in 2006.  Although the publication date has been 
constantly deferred, scholarly interest in this long-awaited “God Book” has not abated. 
 
Methodology of the Dissertation  
 Given this biographical background, it is now important to outline the 
genealogical method employed in this dissertation in order to analyze Tracy’s theological 
anthropology.20  Providing a thorough examination of his thought requires accounting for 
the broad sweep of his theological career.  As with nearly all self-reflective, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible theologians, many of Tracy’s beliefs, claims, and approaches 
have evolved over the course of his career.  Any responsible discussion of Tracy’s 
theological anthropology must therefore consider these developments and their causes.   
 There are three aspects to the methodology used in this dissertation.  First, the 
scope will encompass the sweep of Tracy’s career from 1968 to 2011.  Beginning with 
his first publications in the late 1960’s up to and concluding with his most recent essays, 
in this chapter I will cover each period of Tracy’s thought as represented by the major 
publications as it relates to the topic under consideration.  Although Tracy’s current 
                                                          
19 David Tracy, “Form and Fragment: The Recovery of the Hidden and Incomprehensible God,” in The 
Concept of God in Global Dialogue, ed. Werner Jeanrond and Aasulv Lande (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2005), 98 
20 “Genealogical” in this sense refers to the concept of an intellectual genealogy, which considers the early 
influences on a particular thinker, the development of that person’s thought, and the various factors that 
lead to change and development.  It considers both the continuities and discontinuities in one’s thought.  
This is a different understanding of “genealogical” from that of Michel Foucault, who sought to oppose the 
search for origins and the problematic cobbling together of straightforward historical narratives.  In this 
sense, some might prefer the term “genetic” to “genealogical” to describe the method pursued in this text. 
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project, writing a volume “on naming God,” is expected to be the culmination of his 
theological work, this dissertation will confine itself to charting the development of 
Tracy’s anthropology as a central aspect of his overall theological project.21 
 Second, my approach to understanding Tracy’s anthropology will be 
genealogical.  Based on the hermeneutical presupposition that Tracy seems to consider 
the later developments in his thought as conveying a more relatively adequate 
understanding, key concepts and themes in Tracy’s work will be outlined and examined 
chronologically by noting important terminological changes and by suggesting the 
reasons for these changes while showing the impact of these conceptual developments on 
each other.  For example, his more widely known articulations are often superseded by 
later ones,22 thus any relevant understanding of Tracy’s anthropology must take account 
of both the enduring themes and concepts in his work and their most up-to-date 
articulations. 
 Finally, this approach will also consider Tracy’s conversation partners who have 
influenced his positions.  Those most often cited by Tracy are the theologians and 
philosophers whose tenure at the University of Chicago overlapped with Tracy’s own.23  
Since his work involves a complex appropriation of the work of other figures, it is 
important to investigate these sources.  Important shifts in his thought often correlate with 
changes in conversation partners. Tracy insists that theology is essentially an “ongoing 
                                                          
21 Because I expect to defend this dissertation prior to the publication of the “God Book,” the scope of this 
project will be restricted to Tracy’s publications and presentations through 2011. 
22 E.g., in articulating the poles of critical correlation, his shift from “common human experience” to “the 
contemporary situation.” 
23 E.g., Schubert Ogden (1969-1972), Langdon Gilkey (1963-1989), Paul Ricoeur (1970-1991), and Jean-
Luc Marion (1994-2006). 
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conversation,” so it is inevitable that doing justice to his theological anthropology 
demands an account of those persons with whom he has been in conversation. 
 
Previous Assessments of Tracy’s Theological Anthropology  
 The need for a thorough assessment of Tracy’s anthropology stems partly from 
the limitations of previous attempts to do so.  To date, only two scholars have engaged 
Tracy’s anthropology, and each has done so only to a limited extent.  The first was a 
dissertation from Harvard University by S. Alan Ray.24  Published in 1987 in the series 
Harvard Dissertations in Religion, Ray devotes three of his eight chapters to developing 
Tracy’s anthropology in light of a Foucauldian interpretation of the human sciences.  The 
second is a short section in Dwight Hopkins’ Being Human, in which he describes 
Tracy’s anthropology as paradigmatic of the “liberal progressive” model of theological 
anthropology.25  While his section on Tracy is brief,26 it offers a concise and helpful 
consideration of the role played by context in Tracy’s work.  Through a brief analysis of 
these two texts, I intend to show that a new and more thorough reading of Tracy’s 
theological career can respond to the limitations represented in these two critiques. 
 
S. Alan Ray  
 In his dissertation, S. Alan Ray places Tracy’s work in conversation with that of 
Gordon Kaufman and Michel Foucault.  Ray claims that a central problematic for 
                                                          
24 S. Alan Ray, The Modern Soul: Michel Foucault and the Theological Discourse of Gordon Kaufman and 
David Tracy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).  See especially chapters 4-6. 
25 Dwight Hopkins, Being Human: Race, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005) 
26 Hopkins, Being Human, 16-23 
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hermeneutical theologians is the growing sense that the “referents of theological 
discourse” are not actually real; rather, they are “the mirages of ressentiment, economic 
oppression, or frustrated desire.”27  By “referent” he means, at a minimum, the reality of 
God, but he suggests that this term should include “the human…and salvation history” as 
well.28  This problem is brought to bear primarily by political and liberation theologians; 
for example, he cites Dorothee Soelle’s statement that “the verification principle of every 
theological statement is the praxis that it enables for the future.”29  In Ray’s 
interpretation, the work performed by hermeneutical theologians does not satisfactorily 
live up to this test, thus raising the question of the reality of theological referents. 
 In the case of Tracy, these anthropological assumptions are located primarily in 
Tracy’s understanding of authenticity and language.  Ray describes Tracy’s view of the 
human person as “a self-transcending entity whose language and experiences 
provide…access points to depth knowledge of reality.”  For this entity, language serves 
as “an instrument at the disposal of a self-transcending subject.”30  Ray defines the 
“authentic self” in Tracy’s anthropology as the person referred to whenever Tracy 
invokes the transcendental precepts of Lonergan: “any intelligent, reasonable, responsible 
human being.”31  This person is connected to Tracy’s understanding of the three publics, 
making the individual person “the locus of intelligibility” among the variety of public 
                                                          
27 Ray, The Modern Soul, 8 
28 Ray, The Modern Soul, 5 
29 Dorothee Soelle, Political Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 77; cited on Ray, The Modern 
Soul, 7 
30 Ray, The Modern Soul, 8 
31 Ray, The Modern Soul, 93 
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discourses.32  Thus according to Ray, the “authentic self” and “genuinely public 
discourse” are “mutually referring concepts”  that serve as “purely regulative idea[s]” in 
Tracy without reference to concrete historical realities.  They are, as Tracy would call 
them, “ideal” situations that serve as a norm by which to judge reality. 
 According to Ray, central to Tracy’s “authentic self” interpretation is the claim 
that the authentic self underlies “the subject’s phenomenal manifestations.”33  The self is 
“engaged in a process of intellectual self-liberation” focused on the significance of one’s 
own existence.34  This process proceeds through the interpretation of one’s experiences of 
the two poles of Tracy’s correlational method, common human experience and the 
Christian fact.35  Through reflection on the religious dimension of human experience that 
is expressed in both of these poles, the self attempts to transcend oneself.36 
 There is much to commend in Ray’s work.  In particular, his interest in pursuing 
the anthropological assumptions of the modern human sciences is framed in terms of 
Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical method.37  By offering an interpretation of 
Tracy’s anthropology that is informed by Foucault’s “archaeology of man,” Ray is able to 
challenge Tracy on the metaphysical assumptions underlying his anthropology.   
 Nonetheless, there are several key areas where Ray’s assessment of Tracy falls 
short.  First, Ray’s analysis was performed in the early 1980’s, meaning that its 
                                                          
32 Ray, The Modern Soul, 93 
33 Ray, The Modern Soul, 115 
34 Ray, The Modern Soul, 123 
35 Ray, The Modern Soul, 102-115 
36 Ray, The Modern Soul, 199 
37 Ray distinguishes between these two methods in Foucault, with the archaeological method preceding the 
genealogical.  However, Ray’s interest in philosophical anthropology seems to emphasize the “archaeology 
of man” offered by Foucault, particularly in Foucault’s Order of Things.  See Ray chapters two and three 
for more on this. 
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limitations in scope suggest that a new look at Tracy’s work may be justified.  For 
example, Ray’s dissertation was published prior to Tracy’s Plurality and Ambiguity, 
where Tracy quite clearly rejects the instrumentalist view of language that Ray associates 
with him.  Additionally, while Ray cites The Analogical Imagination frequently, he pays 
little attention to the important distinctions in method between BRO and AI.  While Ray 
understandably focuses on the pole of common human experience given its obvious 
anthropological implications, he fails to acknowledge the ways in which Tracy’s 
methodological shift to the pole of the contemporary situation complicates Tracy’s use of 
“limits” in his anthropology.38 
 Secondly, Ray interprets Tracy’s view of the human person as overwhelmingly 
cognitive in nature.  Ray locates the category of authenticity, which is important but 
somewhat underdeveloped in Tracy, in human intelligibility.  Ray’s focus on the 
cognitive efforts of the human person to know more, to transcend limitations in 
knowledge, and to transcend oneself through self-reflection provides a very narrow 
account of the “authentic self.”  For Tracy, the self is not only finite cognitively but 
temporally/historically and culturally.  He also regards the self as finite with respect to 
one’s relationship to the divine.   
 Finally, the anthropological interpretation Ray offers is mainly a philosophical 
one.  His fifth chapter, “Revisionist Fundamental Theology and Philosophical 
Anthropology,” highlights this fact.  While Ray notes Tracy’s concern about distortions 
                                                          
38 See Chapter Two, page 10 
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in communication and the value of critical theory for responding to them,39 he does not 
deal with the role of sin in Tracy’s understanding of distortion.  Ray believes that the 
authentic self is seeking to effect its own self-transcendence without recognizing the role 
of sin in the problematic of self-transcendence nor the role of grace in making it possible.  
Thus, while Ray offers some account of the self in Tracy’s thought, his interpretation 
fails to take any serious account of Tracy’s theological anthropology. 
 
Dwight Hopkins  
 In his Being Human: Race, Culture, and Religion, Dwight Hopkins seeks to 
develop a theological anthropology from within an African-American context that takes 
the roles of race and culture seriously.  In order to establish the context of his work, his 
opening chapter offers a series of contemporary models of theological anthropology 
including paradigmatic figures representative of each model.  Tracy serves to illustrate 
the “progressive liberal” model, which Hopkins identifies as seeking to reformulate the 
“liberal individual from the European Enlightenment” who is characterized as a 
“critically thinking human subject.”40  Hopkins argues that Tracy’s theological 
anthropology centers on “conversation, interpretation, and understanding,” and that these 
three areas constitute the primary means through which human persons engage the 
world.41  Moreover, according to Hopkins, Tracy sees whatever possibilities exist for 
human liberation as being effected through these cognitive processes.   
                                                          
39 Ray, The Modern Soul, 91, 138-141 
40 Hopkins, Being Human, 16 
41 Hopkins, Being Human, 17 
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 Hopkins rightly notes that Tracy argues for the turn to “the other” rather than to 
“the self” as one of the central markers of anthropology in postmodernity.  This turn 
means that the promoters of European Enlightenment views of rationality and discourse 
now seek to include the marginalized and oppressed others within the conversation.  
While Tracy argues for pluralism as a de facto aspect of the contemporary situation in 
which these conversations takes place, Hopkins judges this approach as privileging 
European understandings of rationality.  Indeed, Hopkins’ central critique of Tracy is that 
the focus on conversation and interpretation fails to consider that “the Other (of and to 
whom the progressive liberal has begun to speak) might desire to reconfigure the very 
scaffolding of the discourse.”42  Because the “other” has been invited to participate in a 
conversation where the rules, the topics, and the languages are largely predetermined, any 
real attempt to engage the other will require more radical reconfigurations.  As a result, 
the other is invited to become an ersatz participant in a discourse that has historically 
oppressed others.43  Such an approach contrasts sharply with the orientation that Hopkins 
seeks for his own theological anthropology: “one becomes a human being by gearing all 
ultimate issues toward compassion for and empowerment of people in structural poverty, 
working-class folk, and the marginalized.”44 
 Hopkins is right to challenge Tracy on the role of context in his theological 
anthropology.  As will be argued in Chapter Six, Tracy’s employment of context in his 
description of what it means to be human tends to have a highly conceptual cast.  He 
                                                          
42 Hopkins, Being Human, 20 
43 Hopkins, Being Human, 22 
44 Hopkins, Being Human, 7 
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tends not to deal satisfactorily with the concrete particularities that define specific 
contexts, focusing instead on how the concept of context impacts and relates to other 
theological concepts.  Tracy’s commitment to a liberal progressive understanding of 
liberation ultimately does tend to overlook the particularities of the concrete situations of 
praxis that call for liberation.  Moreover, it tends to be unsatisfactory in recognizing of 
the role of the other in one’s own liberation.   
 Nevertheless, I take issue with how Hopkins defines the scope of Tracy’s 
anthropology.  Hopkins argues that “conversation, interpretation, and understanding” are 
the central aspects of Tracy’s view of the human.  While it is true that these are important 
and constitutive, they are not exhaustive.  Like Ray, Hopkins focuses primarily on the 
cognitive dimensions of Tracy’s anthropology without taking account of the role of 
human willing, decision-making, or loving.  In his interpretation of Tracy, Hopkins offers 
a relatively truncated self.  As will become clear, although Tracy’s approach to 
anthropology often uses conceptually abstract descriptions, it is an over-generalization to 
claim that he understandings the human solely in cognitive terms. 
 
Anthropological Constants  
 This dissertation’s analysis of Tracy’s theological anthropology will rely on the 
heuristic of “anthropological constants.”  The term “anthropological constant” is drawn 
from the work of Belgian Dominican theologian Edward Schillebeeckx.  Responsible for 
many significant contributions to the fields of Christology and ecclesiology, 
Introduction 
17 
 
Schillebeeckx was also one of the founders of the international theological journal 
Concilium.  It was through this journal that Tracy came to know Schillebeeckx.   
 In the second volume of his theological trilogy, Christ: The Experience of Jesus 
as Lord,45 Schillebeeckx describes “anthropological constants” as the “constitutive 
conditions…which must always be presupposed in any human action.”46  He views these 
constants as indicative of “permanent human impulses and orientations, values and 
spheres of value,” yet these constants must always be incarnated in particular places and 
times.  They do not themselves provide norms, but are rather the basis from which norms 
are developed within a given context.  Schillebeeckx identifies seven of these constants: 
1. Relationship to human corporeality, nature, and the ecological environment 
2. Being a Man Involves Fellow Men 
3. The Connection with Social and Institutional Structures 
4. The Conditioning of People and Culture by Time and Space 
5. Mutual Relationship of Theory and Practice 
6. The Religious and “Para-Religious” Consciousness of Man 
7. Irreducible Synthesis of These Six Dimensions47 
 
Schillebeeckx’s goal here is not to create an essential definition of the human person.  He 
sees such attempts as leading to a “totalitarian conception” of the human person, which 
will inevitably lead to “totalitarian action” that seeks to manipulate human beings and to 
deny the humanity of some persons.48  His argument in favor of using “constants” is that 
this provides an orientation to thinking about the human that provides “a kind of system 
of coordinates” rather than a “general substratum.”  His selection of these seven constants 
                                                          
45 Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, trans. John Bowden (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1980). 
46 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 733 
47 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 731-743.  For a more inclusive translation of these seven constants, see Susan 
Ross, Anthropology: Seeking Light and Beauty, (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 76-78. 
48 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 731 
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is rooted in their focus on “personal identity within social culture.”  His hope is that, 
through looking at these constants in the face of radical human suffering, he will be able 
to provide context-specific “norms for a better assessment of human worth and thus for 
human salvation.”49 
 
Overview of the Dissertation  
 The idea of constants provides a useful framework through which to investigate 
Tracy’s anthropology.  By outlining “permanent human impulses and orientations,” they 
suggest features that are common to all human beings without proposing a static or 
unchanging view of human nature.  In this dissertation, I propose four such constants that 
can be used to explain the key concepts of Tracy’s theology and to examine their 
development over time: finitude, relationality, sin, and grace.  Tracy did not define these 
constants; however, the major themes that I have connected to these constants (e.g., the 
“limit-to” and finitude, conversation and relationality) are recurring concerns of his 
thought.   
 In this dissertation, I argue for an interpretation of Tracy’s theology that looks at 
anthropology through the hermeneutical lens of his method.  Chapter One provides an 
overview of the field of theological anthropology and a genealogical analysis of the 
development of Tracy’s theological method.  This method, and more specifically its 
distinction between fundamental and systematic theologies, provides a framework for 
                                                          
49 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 734.  It is important to note that Schillebeeckx’s reference to “seven of these 
anthropological constants” implies that these seven constants are not exhaustive of what one might consider 
in theological anthropology (emphasis mine). 
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understanding the four focal themes or “constants” of Tracy’s anthropology: finitude, 
relationality, sin, and grace.  These four constants are not intended as an essential 
blueprint to describe the human person but rather as four “signposts” around which to 
organize and explicitate central themes, ideas, and assertions of Tracy’s thought.   
 Chapter Two will investigate the constant of finitude, which refers to the human 
experience of being limited.  Human persons encounter limits in a variety of ways, 
including birth, embodiment, the relative presence or absence of intellectual capabilities, 
and death.  For Tracy, the idea of the limit is formulated primarily in what he calls the 
“limit-to” and the “limit-of.”  Limit-to is a way of talking about a complex of questions, 
experiences, and situations that bring persons into contact with their limits.  These 
encounters take a variety of forms, including guilt, death, love, and joy.  The “limit-to” in 
turn draws our attention toward the “limit-of,” which Tracy sees as the “ground” or 
“horizon” of all existence.  His understanding of limit develops, however, as Tracy more 
fully engages questions pertaining to context, ambiguity, and otherness.   
 Chapter Three considers the constant of relationality.  Finitude and relationality 
are really intertwined concepts, since the recognition of one’s limits suggests the 
possibility of something that is beyond those limits.  Using the metaphor of horizon, this 
chapter looks at Tracy’s view of the human person as always-already embedded in a 
complex series of relationships to other persons, to one’s socio-historical context, and to 
the divine.  In particular, the topics of public theology, pluralism, tradition, and 
conversation in his thought indicate the importance of seeing the human person as a 
relational being.  As I will show, Tracy contrasts his understanding of the relational 
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human person with what he calls the autonomous ego of modernity, which views itself as 
a fully independent and cohesive self.  For Tracy, pluralism and ambiguity exist not only 
in history, language, and social context, but even within oneself.  Finally, this chapter 
looks at the various ways Tracy describes the human person as always-already in 
relationship with the divine. 
 Chapter Four examines the idea of sin in Tracy’s theology.  He advocates for a 
measured consideration of the relationship between sin and finitude, seeing the two as 
logically (if not always experientially) distinct.  While sin is in a sense a limitation on the 
human person in terms of one’s ability to know or to choose the good fully, it manifests 
and is exacerbated by one’s rejection of finitude.  Furthermore, sin infects one’s 
relationships, allowing sin to corrupt the second anthropological constant of relationality.  
Tracy organizes his view of sin into three distinct but interrelated dimensions: actual 
personal sin, habitual sin, and inherited sin.  The latter dimension, which Tracy 
frequently describes as “unconscious systemic distortion,” represents Tracy’s retrieval of 
the Christian doctrine of original sin.   
 Chapter Five examines the role of grace in Tracy’s thought.  It is in grace that 
Tracy’s anthropology largely culminates as he connects the dialectic of sin and grace 
with the more fundamental polarity of nature and grace.  The constants of finitude and 
relationality serve as keys to Tracy’s understanding of nature in the context of his 
anthropology.  These realities are already a part of the gracious gift of God to humanity, 
but the damage caused by sin can also be healed by God’s grace.  This encounter with 
grace is disclosed for Tracy in the divine self-manifestation of Christ, is mediated through 
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the church and the tradition, and is encountered in experiences of manifestation, 
proclamation, and historical action.  The encounter is ultimately seen as transformative 
and liberative, as human persons experience grace as both gift and command. 
 Chapter Six will provide a preliminary assessment of Tracy’s theological 
anthropology.  Because his anthropology is largely implicit, it has not proven particularly 
influential on other theologians.  However, his creative approach to interweaving 
theological anthropology with his theological method could serve as a useful model for 
theologians seeking to collaborate with other disciplines.  In this respect, I will briefly 
look at some developments in environmental and disability theologies and suggest these 
could be fruitful conversation partners for further development in Tracy’s anthropology.  
Despite this strength, this chapter will suggest that Tracy’s anthropology deserves more 
sustained treatment of human corporeality and the doctrine of the imago Dei.  Finally, 
while noting that Tracy has strongly emphasized the role of social, historical, and 
linguistic context in shaping human existence, I will address the criticisms that his 
abstract and conceptual approach to context tends to underplay the importance of 
particular contexts, including his own. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL 
METHOD 
 
 David Tracy’s status as one of the most influential American Catholic theologians 
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is well-established.  He has made 
major contributions to the fields of theological method, hermeneutics, public theology, 
and interreligious dialogue.  While his efforts in these areas are his best known, my intent 
in this dissertation is to illuminate the theological anthropology that Tracy assumes in the 
course of these investigations.  Despite occasional references to the field of theological 
anthropology, his understanding of what it means to be human is often implicit or 
undeveloped.  Through an investigation and exposition of significant themes in Tracy’s 
thought, I intend to explicitate his theological anthropology and to assess and to critique 
it.   
 In order to do so, however, I must begin by laying out what I mean by theological 
anthropology.  Given his historical and social context, Tracy is profoundly influenced by 
the so-called “turn to the subject” that began during the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
significant events of the 20th century, and what today is commonly called 
“postmodernity.”  More proximately, he is influenced by key figures and conversation 
partners, such as Bernard Lonergan, Karl Rahner, and Paul Ricoeur.  Explaining Tracy’s 
anthropology also requires attention to his theological method.  Method occupies a 
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central position in Tracy’s thought.  Method often provides the framework for 
understanding key Christian teachings and their interrelationships in the work of a 
theologian.  In attending to the development of Tracy’s theological method and the way 
in which it structures his thought, I will argue that it provides the key for understanding 
his anthropology.  Only after outlining the broader context of theological anthropology 
and the particulars of Tracy’s theological method can I delve into the main points that 
underlie his theological anthropology. 
 This chapter has three goals.  First, I will provide a brief survey of the field of 
theological anthropology, focusing both on the development of the Christian 
anthropological doctrines of the imago Dei, creation, sin, and grace and the implications 
of the turn to the subject in the Enlightenment.  My aim here is to provide a context for 
contemporary discussions in theological anthropology and how Tracy is situated in them.  
Second, I will examine Tracy’s theological method, looking at how it has developed and 
how it demarcates the various fields of theology.  Finally, I will conclude with a 
preliminary explanation for how Tracy’s theological method is a key to his theological 
anthropology.   
 
The State of Theological Anthropology  
 “Theological anthropology” as a foundational area in systematic theology 
basically emerged during the 18th and 19th centuries.1  According to theologian Janet K. 
                                                          
1 Regarding the difference between “theological anthropology” and “Christian anthropology,” most 
theologians tend to prefer one term or the other, even though in many cases they are referring to the same 
thing (e.g., Michael Scanlon describes “Christian anthropology” as “the articulation of the Christian 
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Ruffing, “Theological anthropology is an articulation of a vision of human existence 
within the context of Christian revelation.”2  This articulation takes into account the 
relationship human beings share with their Creator, the reality of sin and human 
fallenness, and the redemption of humans from sin through the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.3  Although revelation and tradition are the primary sources 
for Christian theological anthropology, it is also in conversation with many other fields, 
including sociology, psychology, anthropology, and biology.4  In contrast to these fields, 
which tend towards empirical approaches that describe “the human condition as it is,” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
understanding of human existence” (Michael Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian,” in New Dictionary of 
Theology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 27) while Janet K. Ruffing describes  “theological 
anthropology” as “an articulation of a vision of human existence within the context of Christian revelation” 
(Janet K. Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” in New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 47).  For some theologians, theological anthropology is a more 
comprehensive term referring to the faith claims that various religious traditions make about the human 
while Christian anthropology is a specific example of that from within the Christian tradition (cf. Mary 
Aquin O’Neill, “The Mystery of Being Human Together,” in Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology 
in Feminist Perspective (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 140).  For others, Christian 
anthropology refers to traditional teachings on the imago Dei, creation, sin, and grace, while theological 
anthropology is a broader term that includes theoretical reflection from other fields and perspectives (cf. 
Mary Ann Hinsdale, “Heeding the Voices: An Historical Overview,” in In the Embrace of God: Feminist 
Approaches the Theological Anthropology, ed. Ann O’Hara Graff (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 
22).  Pannenberg describes his work as “fundamental-theological anthropology” because it begins with “the 
phenomena of human existence as investigated by human biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, or 
sociology and examines the findings of these disciplines with an eye to implications that may be relevant to 
religion and theology” (Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. 
O’Connell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), 21).  In this dissertation I will use the term 
“theological anthropology,” primarily because it is the term David Tracy uses to describe the field. 
2 Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” 47; Hinsdale, “Heeding the Voices,” 22 
3 David Kelsey, “Human Being,” in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, eds. 
Peter Hodgson and Robert King (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 167; Ruffing, “Anthropology, 
Theological,” 47 
4 Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” 47-8; Michael Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian,” in The Modern 
Catholic Encyclopedia, eds. Michael Glazier and Monika Hellwig (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2004), 33; John MacQuarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach (New 
York: Crossroad, 1983), 3-6; Michael J. Himes, “The Human Person in Contemporary Theology: From 
Human Nature to Authentic Subjectivity,” in Introduction to Christian Ethics: A Reader, edited by Ronald 
P. Hamel and Kenneth R. Himes, OFM, 49-62 (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 57; Pannenberg, 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 17-23. 
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theological (and philosophical) anthropologies endeavor to “criticize the actual human 
condition” and to focus on “the realization of human nature as an emerging reality.”5   
 The existence of a distinct field of theological anthropology within systematic 
theology is a recent development.6  While Christianity has historically made claims 
relating to the human person, these claims have usually been made in the context of 
doctrines.  The most important of these are the doctrine of creation in imago Dei, human 
finitude and dependence on God, sin, and grace.  A brief exposition of these loci will be 
helpful to understanding both the shift that took place in the turn to the subject and 
contemporary approaches to theological anthropology. 
 The doctrine of the imago Dei refers to the Christian understanding of the creation 
of human beings.  In the first creation story in Genesis (Gen. 1:1-2:3), God creates 
humankind in God’s own “image” and “likeness.”7  Human beings are distinguished from 
the rest of creation as having a “unique capacity for communion with God.”8  Creation in 
God’s image and likeness grounds human receptivity to divine action and the human 
capacity to respond to divine action.9  The imago Dei has typically been connected to the 
spiritual, rather than bodily, character of the human person, especially in some particular 
faculty of the soul.   
                                                          
5 MacQuarrie, In Search of Humanity, 3 
6 Ruffing dates this development to coincide roughly with the Second Vatican Council and the expansion of 
interdisciplinary reflection on human existence (Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” 47), while Kelsey 
more broadly states that theological anthropology begins to develop “only in the modern period.” (Kelsey, 
“Human Being,” 167); cf. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 11 
7 “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness….So God created 
humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.” Gen. 
1:26, 27 
8 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 168 
9 Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” 47 
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 Nevertheless, Christian theology has understood the human person as being both 
spiritual and corporeal as seen in the second creation account in Genesis (Gen. 2:4-2:25).  
Here God creates the first human out of “the dust of the ground, and breathed into his 
nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being.”10  The formation of the 
human from “the dust of the ground” and “the breath of life” speaks to this dual aspect of 
the human person, grounding the claim that human beings are embodied spirits.11  Having 
a material body was not in and of itself seen as negative, at least not initially, since all 
that God created was “good.”  However, this distinction gradually led to a strict dualism 
of the two, predicated on a hierarchical ranking that denigrated or ignored the body in 
favor of the soul.12  The cognitive or rational abilities of the person were seen to be the 
distinguishing characteristic of the human, thus asserting that these cognitive skills are 
the real locus of the imago Dei.13   
 As creatures, human beings are finite and limited.  Finitude is certainly 
characteristic of the human body, which is bounded and takes up a determinate volume of 
space.  However, it is also characteristic of the human spirit, which, although not 
tangible, is nonetheless limited in its capacities for knowledge, reason, and love.  Finitude 
is characteristic of the whole person.  Because humans are created by God, finitude need 
not be considered a negative dimension of the human person but a good.  Finitude is 
                                                          
10 Gen. 2:7 
11 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 170 
12 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 171 
13 Kelly Kapic, “Anthropology,” in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and Historical Introduction, 
eds. Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 122 
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grounded in the ongoing human relationship of dependence on God, without whom 
humanity would cease to exist.14   
 In the Christian understanding, the rejection of human finitude is the heart of 
human sinfulness.  Beginning with St. Augustine and codified by the Council of Carthage 
in 418, the doctrine of original sin claimed that the imago Dei in the human person has 
been so damaged that no one is capable of not sinning.  This claim was developed 
through Christian interpretation of the Fall story in Genesis 3 in which the serpent tempts 
Eve and, in turn, Adam, to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which had been 
forbidden them by God.  For their actions, the first couple were cursed and cast out of the 
garden.  According to Augustine, the stain of this original act of disobedience has been 
passed down biologically through sexual generation or propagation and remains a fact of 
existence for all people today.15   
 The fall of humans into sin is not, however, the end of the story.  Rather, “the 
central theme of christian anthropology is the reality of grace.”  Grace is the love of God 
that reconciles humanity to God through Jesus Christ.  Grace is gratuitous.  It is a free 
gift, given independent of human activity.  Grace is also healing since through grace the 
sinner is forgiven past sins and empowered to live a more holy life.  Finally, grace is 
elevating in the sense that it effects not the elimination or overturning of nature but rather 
“the perfection and completion of creation.”  Michael Scanlon thus describes creation and 
redemption as intertwined realities, stating that “creation is for redemption; redemption is 
the fulfillment of creation.”  While grace does heal human beings of their sins, grace is 
                                                          
14 Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 29; Kelsey, “Human Being,” 169 
15 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 177; Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 30 
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not only or necessarily even primarily a response to sin.  It is fundamentally the love of 
God expressed through the gifts of creating, sustaining, and redeeming.16 
 Underlying the traditional understanding of the doctrines of imago Dei, sin, and 
grace was an emphasis on a more or less static human nature or substance.  Thus, 
descriptions of the human tended to focus on categories like intellect, knowledge, and 
nature as broad descriptors of humanity.  Scanlon explains that this focus was 
“cosmocentric,” meaning that any reference to the human person was always within the 
context of the human’s place within a larger metaphysical framework of the universe.    
While human nature might be different from the nature of rocks, flowers, and bears, the 
category of “nature” was seen as an effective to describe the order of reality.17 
 
The Anthropological Turn  
 One of the distinguishing features of the modern era is what is often called the 
“turn to the subject” or the “anthropological turn.”  Beginning in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, this turn represents a shift away from the classical focus on human nature and 
toward an emphasis on human subjectivity.  Subjectivity refers to the human person as 
“autonomous, historical, and self-constituting.”  The key categories for understanding the 
human thus became freedom, will, and reason.  In terms of freedom and will, human 
persons are seen as autonomous agents, capable of making their own decisions regarding 
right and wrong.  With respect to reason, it becomes the ground both for making moral 
                                                          
16 Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 28-30; Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [2004], 33 
17 Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 39; Ruffing, “Anthropology, Theological,” 48; Pannenberg, 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 11-12 
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determinations and for making claims about the nature of reality.  Reason thus displaced 
“revealed truth” as the highest authority and became the standard by which claims about 
revelation would be judged as adequate.18 
 The anthropological turn had its first significant development in the second 
meditation of Descartes, who posited a distinction between the res extensa and the res 
cogitans.  The former refers to any physical substance or body that can be circumscribed 
such that no other body can occupy the same space.  The latter refers to mental substance, 
which is the essence of Descartes’ cogito.  The human person has both res extensa (a 
body) and res cogitans (a mind).  In Descartes’ project of rigorously doubting all that he 
knows, he claimed to arrive at the certainty of his mind’s existence (the famed “cogito 
ergo sum”) but remains dubious of bodily existence.  The import of Descartes’ dualistic 
anthropology for the turn to the subject is that it conceived of human beings as “solitary 
                                                          
18 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 167; Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 36-39; Hinsdale, “Heeding the 
Voices,”  35 n. 1 
 Scanlon suggests that the roots of this turn might be found in the theology of Martin Luther.  
Reacting against the dominant Scholastic philosophy and theology of his time, Luther grounded his work in 
scripture.  With respect to his anthropology, this meant that Luther “replaced the scholastic notion of 
human nature with the biblical notion of personhood.”  Central to this move was Luther’s interpretation of 
the Augustinian claim that justification comes from the free gift of God’s grace.  Luther took this to mean 
that human beings are saved by faith alone, and thus what it means to be human is to be a person “who has 
found through faith in Christ a new relationship with God, a relationship of trust, confidence, and 
acceptance” (Scanlon, “Anthropology, Christian” [1991], 35).  Tied to Luther’s emphasis on faith was his 
claim that the works performed by the human person have no salvific merit themselves.  This move by 
Luther does not however mean that his theology is anthropocentric.  God alone is the source of grace, God 
alone saves, and it is through God’s action that the divine-human relationship is reconstituted as one of 
faith and trust.  Nonetheless, the understanding of the human has shifted from a focus on human nature in 
scholastic terms to human personhood in retrieved scriptural terms.  Cf. Pannenberg, Anthropology in 
Theological Perspective, 12-13.  See Martin Luther, “The Freedom of a Christian,” in Three Treatises, 
trans. W.A. Lambert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 280-89. 
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thinking things.”  This conception would in turn become dominant in other enlightenment 
figures, including Locke and Hume.19 
 Kant’s first and second Critiques further shaped the Enlightenment view of the 
human person.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claimed that the “objectivity” of 
what we experience in the world is profoundly shaped by the structures of consciousness 
of the sensing subject.  Agreement among persons over what constitutes “objective” 
reality is actually “intersubjective” and dependent upon the same cognitive processes 
taking place in other persons.  In Kant’s anthropology, the mind of the human subject 
profoundly shapes one’s perception of reality.  This fact dovetails with Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason in which he claimed that the human person is a moral agent responsible 
for following an internalized moral law (the “categorical imperative”) rather than one 
who subjects oneself to external laws.  Rigorous application of reason leads one to the 
conclusion that the only just law is that which is both completely internalized and 
completely generalizable.  The human person is autonomous both in one’s reason and 
one’s will.20 
 According to David Kelsey, by the beginning of the 19th century beliefs about 
human subjectivity had coalesced into the claim that “To be a person is to be a center or 
‘subject’ of consciousness who is at once a knower of ‘objects,’ a knower of the moral 
law, and a possible enactor of moral duties.  Both as knower and as doer, a subject is 
                                                          
19 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: A Bilingual Edition, ed. and trans. George Heffernan 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 98-117; Kapic, “Anthropology,” 124 
20 Kapic, “Anthropology,” 125 
Chapter One 
31 
 
autonomous, historical, and self-constituting.”21  The shift from a focus on static human 
nature to autonomous subjectivity had a profound influence on twentieth century 
theologians and philosophers, especially those who shaped Tracy’s theological 
anthropology.  While Tracy is notable for his diverse conversation partners, three key 
figures stand out in this area: Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, and Paul Ricoeur. 
 
Karl Rahner, SJ  
 Karl Rahner (1904-1984), a German Jesuit priest and theologian, was one of the 
most influential Catholic theologians of the twentieth century.  His theology takes the 
understanding of the human as its starting point and argues that it is impossible “to say 
something about God theologically without thereby automatically saying something 
about man and vice versa.”  According to Rahner, the anthropological turn in Western 
philosophy and theology is predicated on the recognition that “the question of the object 
of such knowledge raises at the same time the question as to the nature of the knowing 
subject.”  All theological claims make implicit assumptions about the human person who 
makes these claims.  Rahner describes this anthropology as “transcendental,” meaning 
that it involves questioning the conditions of the possibility necessary for the subject to 
be a knowing and willing subject.  He outlines five “determinations” that constitute the 
“true personhood” of human beings: transcendence, responsibility and freedom, 
orientation towards mystery, being in history and in the world, and human social nature.22 
                                                          
21 Kelsey, “Human Being,” 178 
22 Rahner, “Theology and Anthropology,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 9, trans. Graham Harrison 
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 The core of Rahner’s argument for human transcendence is the Vorgriff, the 
human pre-apprehension of infinite being or reality.  Infinite reality is the ground of 
human existence, and it is through the gratuitous freedom of this ground whereby humans 
receive their existence.  Although finite, human beings have an infinite horizon that 
expands the more and more they question.  This questioning is itself grounded in a pre-
apprehension of being, a pre-apprehension that is unthematic and ever-present but that is 
experienced in thematic and specific ways through particular instances of questioning and 
acting.  Thus the human person experiences the self as “transcendent being, as spirit” 
through pushing beyond one’s finitude and encountering the infinite ground of existence.  
Rahner characterizes this reaching as “openness” or receptivity to the infinite.23 
 Rahner connects this openness to transcendence to the second “determination,” 
responsibility and freedom.  Responsibility refers to the fact that the human subject 
experiences the self as “the subject who is given over to himself” both in terms of one’s 
knowledge and one’s action.  Freedom refers to the “fundamental characteristic of a 
personal existent” (i.e., subject) who determines one’s orientation towards the divine.  
Taken together, responsibility and freedom mean that human subjects are responsible for 
themselves, for their whole selves, and what they choose to do with their lives.  In that 
sense, there is a distinction between one’s transcendental freedom, which is this basic 
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Dych (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 26 
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“power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself,” and the concrete particular acts 
of freedom that incarnate one’s transcendental freedom.24   
 While human persons have the responsibility and freedom to decide about this 
orientation, the most basic orientation of the self is towards God.  A human person is 
always in the presence of an “incomprehensible mystery” that both reveals and conceals 
itself.  One’s experience of this relationship is rooted in the human person’s experience of 
transcendence, responsibility, and freedom.  Since mystery lies beyond the self and 
recedes from one’s grasp, the self is responsible for determining the character of one’s 
orientation to mystery and of reflecting thematically on the relationship.  Even though 
there is always some implicit awareness of the orientation to mystery, it is only through 
“explicitly religious activity and…philosophical reflection” that one has “thematic 
knowledge” of the divine.25 
 The fourth determination is that human beings live in history and in the world.  
That one’s earthly life is bounded by time and space is an essential dimension of one’s 
existence.  Human subjects experience themselves in history and the world as these 
realities “mediate the subject to himself.”  Put another way, history and the world 
constitute the context in which one finds oneself and co-determine the self.  They are, in a 
certain sense, beyond one’s control.  However, they do not eliminate one’s freedom but 
rather make up the situation in which one actualizes one’s freedom.  One’s freedom is 
therefore “historically situated.”26 
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 Finally, Rahner considers the social nature of the human person.  He closely 
connects one’s social nature with being in the world and in history and sees one’s 
sociality as descriptive of how one exists in the world and history.  The human person 
exists in relation to other persons and to creation more broadly.  The human person also 
exists in a permanent relationship to God, the transcendent mystery towards which one is 
fundamentally oriented.  Rahner uses the term “creatureliness” to describe the 
fundamental relationship between human beings and God.  Creatureliness is an “ongoing 
and always actual process…taking place now just as much as at an earlier point of time in 
his existence.”  Because the human is in the world, in history, and social, one cannot treat 
these aspects of the self as contingent predications of the human.  Rahner argues quite 
strongly that these are intrinsic to the mode of human existence.27 
 Through these five determinations, Rahner argues for an anthropology that sees 
the human person as created by and oriented to transcendental mystery.  The human is 
both responsible and free, meaning that “ultimately he does not do something, but does 
himself.”28  One’s freedom and one’s knowledge of the divine are mediated through a 
person’s historicity, worldliness, sociality, and corporeality.  Rahner’s theological 
anthropology provides an understanding of the human that privileges the human 
relationship with the divine and understands that relationship through the concrete 
determinations of one’s historical existence.  As I will illustrate, Rahner’s view of the 
human person, one who is both finite and relational, remains a strong influence on the 
development of Tracy’s theological anthropology. 
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Bernard Lonergan, SJ  
 Bernard Lonergan was Tracy’s major advisor during his studies at the Pontifical 
Gregorian University in Rome during the 1960’s.  Lonergan’s profound influence on the 
young Tracy can be seen in his dissertation, which investigated the development of 
Lonergan’s thought from approximately 1940 to 1965.29  While Lonergan made many 
substantive contributions to such topics as Christology, the Trinity, and Thomas Aquinas, 
he is perhaps best remembered today for his work on theological method.  The 
connection Lonergan made between the structures of human consciousness and the role 
of method in theology has left an enduring mark on Tracy’s theological anthropology. 
 Lonergan’s theological anthropology relies upon an understanding of four levels 
of conscious intentionality.  The first level is the empirical, in which one attends to the 
data that is presented to the conscious subject.  This data comes from the external world 
through the senses, but it also comes from one’s attending to one’s own self.  The second 
level is the intellectual, in which one interprets the received data, asks questions, and 
expresses one’s basic understanding.  Lonergan often described this level as asking the 
question “what is it” about the data one has received.  The third level, the rational, moves 
from the “what is it” question to the “is it true” question by attempting to determine 
whether one’s interpretation of the data is true, accurate, or probable.  The rational level 
makes determinations among a variety of interpretations, using the best available 
evidence and one’s own reason to seek what is true.  Finally, there is the responsible 
level, in which one takes the results of one’s rational inquiry and deliberates about 
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possible actions, makes a decision, and then acts upon them.  While these four levels can 
be distinguished from one another, they are intimately related.  They do not always 
progress chronologically, in that one might deliberate before fully comprehending the 
available data.  However, at their best, each successive level sublates the previous ones.30   
 For Lonergan, these four levels of conscious intentionality are characteristic of all 
conscious human persons.  They dynamically interact with one another as the subject 
engages the wider reality in which one is situated.  Like Rahner, Lonergan uses the image 
of the horizon or Vorgriff to explain the openness of the human person towards reality.  
Lonergan characterizes the human capacity for self-transcendence as the unrestricted 
desire to know and to question.  Pursuit of this desire to know expands one’s horizon.  
Finally, he describes “being in love in an unrestricted fashion [as] the proper fulfillment 
of that capacity.”31  For Lonergan, what we ask questions about reveals what we care 
about, thus being in love drives the subject towards the ongoing expansion of one’s 
horizon.  As such, he worked his four levels of conscious intentionality into what he 
called the transcendental precepts: “be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be 
responsible, be in love.”32  Through this wording, Lonergan encourages people to work 
towards self-transcendence precisely by adhering to these precepts and, in so doing, to 
become more authentically human.33 
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 However, Lonergan also notes that sometimes this drive towards self-
transcendence fails.  He describes moral impotence as a limitation on one’s effective 
freedom, a limitation that is beyond the capacity of the human person to correct.  
Describing one’s moral impotence in terms of evil and sin, Lonergan describes sin as 
literally unintelligible.  According to Charles Hefling, the traditional notion of evil as 
“privation” takes the form for Lonergan of a negation of intelligence: “intelligibility is 
just what there is none of to be grasped. There is nothing to be understood. 'Nothing' 
cannot be understood.”34  The fact of asking questions about evil and sin presumes that 
there is some intelligibility to be had.  This “nothing” that is evil can block or hinder the 
subject from choosing the good, but there is no intelligible reason for its doing so.  For 
Lonergan, this is the sense in which the “reign of sin” limits human freedom.   
  
Paul Ricoeur  
 A third influence on Tracy’s anthropology is French philosopher Paul Ricoeur.  A 
colleague of Tracy’s for roughly twenty years at the University of Chicago Divinity 
School, Ricoeur’s early work was a formative influence on Tracy’s understanding of 
hermeneutics and of human freedom.  I draw this conclusion from the fact that first, the 
majority of Tracy’s citations from Ricoeur are from five texts: The Freedom and Nature 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 2002), 111; Alison Benders, “Beyond MySpace: Grounding Postmodern Identity in Lonergan’s 
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trilogy, Freud and Philosophy, and Interpretation Theory.35  These texts, all completed 
by 1976, are clearly influential on Tracy’s Blessed Rage for Order and The Analogical 
Imagination.  Citations from Ricoeur’s later works, such as the Time and Narrative 
trilogy or Oneself as Another, are comparatively sparse.36 Second, Ricoeur’s time at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School began to wind down in the mid-1980’s, especially 
after his 1986 Gifford Lectures and his return to France in 1991.  Although they shared 
an enduring friendship, the decline in regular personal contact and co-teaching may have 
contributed to a lessening of Ricoeur’s immediate influence on Tracy.   
 The key aspects of Ricoeur’s early anthropology are found in the Freedom and 
Nature trilogy.  In the first of these texts, Ricoeur focuses on what he calls “fundamental 
possibilities” of the human person.  Here he refers to the basic structure of the human will 
and what it means to perform acts of the will.  Drawing then on the phenomenological 
reductions of Edmund Husserl, Ricoeur describes the first volume of his trilogy as an 
“eidetic of the voluntary and the involuntary.”  By “eidetic,” he means that bracketing 
certain issues until later (in this case, the “fault”) will enable him to describe more 
                                                          
35 Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and Involuntary, trans. Erazim V. Kohak (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New 
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developments (i.e., “narrative identity”) do not really affect Tracy in any notable way. 
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accurately the phenomena of human freedom and nature.37  The voluntary and 
involuntary can only be understood as being in tension with one another.  This is because 
while the person can make genuine acts of the will (decision, bodily movement, and 
consent), these acts occur within an embodied self who lives in a world which one cannot 
control.  Indeed, bodily movement and consent speak to this lack of complete control.  
Ricoeur thus defines consent as “the act of the will which acquiesces to a necessity,” to 
something that one cannot make otherwise.38   
 What Ricoeur calls the “fault” refers to the alienation or division one finds in 
oneself.  While the basic ability of the will is to decide about values, the fault “changes 
our fundamental relation to values and opens the true drama of morality which is the 
drama of the divided man.”  Like Lonergan, Ricoeur argues that this fault is absurd and 
lacking in intelligibility.  By bracketing it during his eidetic analysis, he is able to 
uncover the primordial possibilities of the human person, but this bracketing must always 
be followed by an empirical analysis that looks at the human person as one actually is.  
Ricoeur removes these brackets in Fallible Man, where he argues that the presence of the 
fault is a necessary result of the freedom and nature of the human person.  The fault stems 
from what Ricoeur calls the “disproportion” within the human person between one’s 
finitude and infinitude.  This disproportion means that there is a division within each 
person, an incomplete synthesis of one’s finitude and infinitude, which creates the 
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possibility for moral error.  The human being is therefore capable by one’s very nature of 
committing moral evil, but human fallibility means only possibility, never necessity.39 
 Finally, in the Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur performs a hermeneutical analysis of 
myths and symbols pertaining to the actual exercise of evil.  Focusing on the symbols of 
defilement, sin, and guilt, he argues that these symbols point indirectly to the concept of 
the “servile will.”  Because freedom and servitude are irreconcilable, Ricoeur sees these 
symbols as the indirect way people attempt to express their experience of being drawn to 
commit evil even though they know they are not supposed to.  These symbols function as 
ways of making sense of the non-intelligibility of evil.  Bringing together the reflective 
effort of Fallible Man with the “confession” of Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur develops one 
of his best known hermeneutical statements: “The symbol gives rise to thought.”  These 
two modes of thinking about fallibility and evil are irresolvable but intimately linked.40 
 The philosophical anthropology of the early Ricoeur focused on the structure of 
human freedom and its connection to the possibility and the actuality of evil.  He 
ultimately saw this anthropology as insufficient or incomplete, and eventually turned to 
the concept of narrative in order to focus on “narrative identity” as the key to 
understanding the human person.41  His earlier anthropology would exert a huge 
influence on Tracy’s own anthropology.42 
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Summary  
 Tracy’s theological anthropology has been profoundly shaped by a long tradition 
of Christian theological reflection on the human being as well as the more recent forays 
of Rahner, Lonergan, and Ricoeur.  A consideration of this background has served to 
provide an orientation to Tracy’s theological anthropology by raising key issues 
concerning the human relationship with the divine, human limitations and transcendence, 
historicity and finitude, the problem of evil and sin, and the encounter with grace.  While 
each of these figures have influenced his thought, the complex way in which Tracy 
engages with and appropriates their ideas contributes to but does not define his own 
creative and original approach to anthropology.43   
 Perhaps the most interesting influence is the relationship between method and 
anthropology that is common to Lonergan and Tracy.  The functional specialties of 
Lonergan’s theological method44 are organized according to the four levels of conscious 
intentionality.  In doing so, Lonergan posits an intimate connection between the structure 
of human consciousness and the process by which human beings come to ever more 
cumulative and progressive insights about reality.   
 Like Lonergan, Tracy also assumes a close relationship between the method that 
he proposes and his understanding of what it means to be human.  Since his theological 
anthropology is often implicit, it is necessary in this dissertation to explain this 
connection further.  Two preliminary observations regarding the connection between his 
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method and his anthropology are helpful here.  First, the development of any theological 
method relies upon implicit assumptions about the human beings who employ that 
method.  For example, Tracy’s focus on the distinct publics towards which theology is 
oriented assumes that human life is marked by public-ness and, more importantly, by a 
diversity of public commitments.  Second, Tracy’s method provides the organizing 
framework for his forays into all theological questions.  His understanding of 
Christology, the Trinity, ecclesiology, and Scripture are all deeply conditioned by the 
relationships among his three “sub-disciplines” of theology.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
conjecture that his theological anthropology will also be affected by this framework.  The 
order of the remaining chapters of this dissertation is predicated on the claim that the 
main themes of Tracy’s anthropology, his “anthropological constants” (to borrow 
Schillebeeckx’s phrase), can be intelligibly organized according to the distinction he 
makes between fundamental and systematic theology.  In order to lay the groundwork for 
this claim, the focus of this chapter will now shift to an examination of Tracy’s 
theological method. 
 
Tracy’s Theological Method 
 Although Tracy’s method is not the main focus of this dissertation, considering its 
development now will be helpful for two reasons.  First, theological method is one of the 
topics on which most theological engagements with David Tracy’s work focus.  Second, 
understanding method is necessary for illuminating the relationships among the four 
anthropological constants to be discussed in Chapters 2-5.  Tracy’s method not only 
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provides a way forward through his theology; it also offers a framework through which to 
connect the constants that are constitutive of his theological anthropology.  Before 
examining his method, it will be helpful to look briefly at two other topics, public 
theology and hermeneutics, which are themselves closely connected to his method.    
 Tracy’s articulation of public theology has been influential in certain sectors of 
theological ethics and political theology, especially in the United States.  More recently, 
his work in this area has been applied to contexts beyond the US by such figures as 
Gaspar Martinez, Andreas Telser, and Gonzalo Villagran.45  While Tracy did not create 
the idea of public theology, his work is widely seen as one of the most robust theoretical 
articulations for what makes theology public.46   
 With regard to hermeneutics and the understanding of language, Tracy was 
strongly influenced by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Bernard Lonergan, although it is clear 
that he goes beyond them.47  In particular, Tracy appropriated the Gadamerian notion of 
“play” in discourse in order to explain the risk taken by interlocutors in conversation.  
The central role of “the classic” in Tracy’s process of interpretation is developed in part 
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from Lonergan’s description of the classic.48  More recently, Tracy’s work in 
hermeneutics has been appropriated in the fields of comparative theology and 
interreligious dialogue, especially in the context of Buddhist-Christian dialogue.49  As 
mentioned above, Tracy’s use of the metaphor of conversation as the central description 
of his hermeneutics, first developed in The Analogical Imagination and later expanded in 
Plurality and Ambiguity, has served as a basis for investigating religious pluralism in a 
postmodern context.50 
 Finally, the two main features that stand out in Tracy’s theological method are the 
disciplines into which he sub-divides theology and the role theology plays in the 
conversation between religion and its context.  These two features are formulated 
somewhat differently at various points in his development, yet most interpreters describe 
his method as one of “mutually critical correlation,” particularly as articulated in The 
Analogical Imagination.  The influence of this method can be seen in the work of several 
                                                          
48 Cf. MT 161-2; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 286-291 
49 For hermeneutics in interreligious dialogue, see Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway, eds., 
Interreligious Hermeneutics (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010).  For the specifically Buddhist-Christian 
focus, see David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other: The Interreligious Dialogue, Louvain Theological & 
Pastoral Monographs 1 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1991).  See also “The Christian Understanding of 
Salvation-Liberation,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 7 (1987): 129-138; "Kenosis, Sunyata, and Trinity: A 
Dialogue with Masao Abe," in Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, eds. John Cobb 
and Christopher Ives (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 135-154; “Some Aspects of the Buddhist-
Christian Dialogue,” in The Christian Understanding of God Today, ed. James M. Byrne (Dublin: Columba 
Press, 1993), 145-153.  On the relationship between kenosis and sunyata in Buddhist-Christian dialogue, 
see Karen Bautista Enriquez, “Interrupting the Conversation on Kenosis and Sunyata: Buddhist and 
Christian Women in Search of the Relational Self” (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 2011). 
50 E.g., Werner G. Jeanrond and Jennifer L. Rike, ed., Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the 
Hermeneutics of Religion (New York: Crossroad, 1991); David Ranson, “‘Conversation: Our Only Hope’: 
David Tracy’s Response to the Presence of Otherness,” Australian eJournal of Theology, Australian 
Catholic University, Issue 15 (January 2010). 
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other theologians who have utilized it, such as Roger Haight,51 Chester Gillis,52 and 
Gaspar Martinez,53 as well as those who have critiqued it, such as Avery Dulles,54 
Rebecca Chopp,55 and Lieven Boeve.56  Yet in order to understand how Tracy developed 
his method, it will be helpful to investigate the methods of three figures who influenced 
him most in this regard: Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Bernard Lonergan 
 
Methodological Precursors  
 Paul Tillich  
 In his first volume of Systematic Theology,57 Paul Tillich claims that his theology 
follows a method of correlation in which he “tries to correlate the questions implied in 
the situation with the answers implied in the message.”58  By “situation,” he means the 
cultural context in which the theologian is working, including the variety of artistic, 
scientific, and political expressions of that culture.59  The “message” is the central truth or 
kerygma of Christianity.  While present in both the Bible and in Christian tradition, the 
kerygma cannot be identified with either.  Rather, “kerygmatic theology” attempts to strip 
away the cultural accretions of Christianity in hopes of reaching the genuine eternal core 
                                                          
51 Roger Haight, Dynamics of Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990); Roger Haight, Jesus: Symbol 
of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999). 
52 Chester Gillis, Pluralism: A New Paradigm for Theology, Louvain Theological & Pastoral Monographs 
12 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1993). 
53 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God  
54 Avery Dulles, “Method in Fundamental Theology: Reflections on David Tracy’s Blessed Rage for 
Order,” Theological Studies 37 no. 2 (June 1976): 304-316. 
55 Rebecca S. Chopp, Saving Work: Feminist Practices of Theological Education (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 107-8. 
56 Lieven Boeve, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007), 
30-49. 
57 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
58 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 8 
59 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 4 
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of the faith, even though this process can never be fully successful.60  Even if theology 
were to settle for restating the biblical witness, it would be unable to escape “the 
conceptual situation of the different biblical writers,” including their languages, their 
categories, and their worldview.61  Tillich argues that theology must respond to the 
questions and concerns of the situation, but this response must be consistent with and 
under the judgment of the truths of the Christian message.62 
 Tillich’s method of correlation served as an important starting point for Tracy’s 
method, but one that Tracy came to consider as incomplete.  When Tracy described his 
method of critical correlation in Blessed Rage for Order, he initially expressed 
appreciation for Tillich’s commitment to the two fundamental sources of context and 
message and Tillich’s hope for “an Aufhebung of both liberalism and neo-orthodoxy.”63  
However, Tracy argued that Tillich’s method is not really one of correlation at all, but 
rather of juxtaposition.  It fails to take the situation itself seriously insofar as it 
understands the answers to the situation’s questions as only coming from the message.  
Furthermore, it fails to recognize the possibility that the situation itself might offer a 
response to certain questions implicit within the Christian tradition.64  For these reasons, 
Tracy saw Tillich’s method as a valuable starting point, but inadequate on its own. 
                                                          
60 Tillich primarily has Rudolph Bultmann’s process of demythologization in mind here. 
61 Tlilich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 7 
62 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 8.  The titles of the five parts of his Systematic Theology refer to the 
situation-message dialectic: Reason and Revelation, Being and God, Existence and the Christ, Life and the 
Spirit, and History and the Kingdom of God.  While he recognizes that the questions and responses are 
mutually interdependent, the trajectory of his method of correlation is essentially univocal 
63 BRO 45 
64 BRO 46.  It is helpful here to note that Tracy recognizes there are nuanced differences between Tillich’s 
“situation” and “message” with “common human experience” and “Christian texts” (which is how Tracy 
described his two poles at the time).  While it is unclear whether Tracy would say that the kerygma even 
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 H. Richard Niebuhr  
 H. Richard Niebuhr represents another significant influence on Tracy’s method, 
especially through his seminal work Christ and Culture.65  For Niebuhr, the problem for 
Christianity is not its relationship with civilization, but the more fundamental relationship 
“between the poles of Christ and culture.”66  The attempt to relate these poles depends on 
how one defines them.  While Niebuhr recognizes that there are a variety of ways of 
understanding Jesus Christ in the Christian tradition, he argues that there is still a 
“fundamental unity” in that Jesus is a concrete “person with definite teachings, a definite 
character, and a definite fate.”67  The central insight for Niebuhr is to recall that the 
power of Jesus to draw us in stems from the double fact that he is “man living to God and 
God living with men.”68  Niebuhr offers a similarly limited definition of the pole of 
culture, arguing that one ought to look at the general notion of culture rather than any 
particular instance.  Culture is the “‘artificial, secondary environment’ which man 
superimposes on the natural,” including language, beliefs, technology, and values.69   
 Christianity is a response to and mediation of the revelation of Christ, but it 
always is such within some particular culture.  Niebuhr famously outlines a typology of 
five ways of understanding the relationship between Christ and culture: Christ against 
                                                                                                                                                                             
has questions to which the situation could respond (although my suspicion is that he would), the more 
important point is that access to the kerygma is always mediated through its historical and cultural 
accretions.  This is a point that Tillich himself recognizes, and thus to argue that his method correlates the 
kerygma or message directly with the situation seems to be problematic for Tillich’s method, even on its 
own terms.   
65 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Collins, 2001). 
66 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 11 
67 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 12 
68 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 29 
69 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 32 
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culture, Christ of culture, Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ 
transforming culture.  The first two mark the extremes of this spectrum, between a 
sectarian rejection of human society and a complete accommodation of Christ’s message 
to whatever culture one finds oneself in.  The latter three, however fall somewhere 
between these extremes.  These three use the question of the relationship between Christ 
and culture to examine further the relationship between God and the individual human 
person. 
 Niebuhr’s attempts to correlate Christ with culture reveal two important facts that 
will become characteristic of Tracy’s method.  First, correlation itself need not be 
univocal.  While Niebuhr’s text is contemporaneous with the first volume of Tillich’s 
Systematic Theology, his description of a correlational method is somewhat more 
nuanced.  Niebuhr does not claim that theological method ought to correlate answers 
from Christ to questions from culture, but rather that the mode of relation between these 
two poles is itself the crucial methodological question.70  Second, Niebuhr recognizes that 
none of his five correlations are final or definitive.71  Christianity consists of an amalgam 
of traditions rather than a single complete response to the event and person of Jesus 
                                                          
70 A helpful nuance to draw out here is that Niebuhr seeks to correlate Christ and culture, whereas Tracy 
seeks to correlate the Christian tradition with a contemporary situation.  While the differences between 
“culture” and “contemporary situation” are arguably cosmetic, the difference between “Christ” and “the 
Christian tradition” are substantial. 
71 “Yet it must be evident that neither extension nor refinement of study could bring us to the conclusive 
result that would enable us to say, ‘This is the Christian answer.’  Reader as well as writer is doubtless 
tempted to essay such a conclusion; for it will have become as evident to the one as to the other that the 
types are by no means wholly exclusive of each other, and that there are possibilities of reconciliation at 
many points among the various positions” (Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 231).  Cf. AI 376, “The phrase 
‘mutually critical correlations’ functions here to indicate that the responses may take any form in the whole 
range of classic Christian responses analyzed by H. Richard Niebuhr.  The particular form will be 
dependent upon the particular point at issue.” 
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Christ.  This acceptance of pluralism within Christianity and the need to resist totalizing 
interpretations became central to Tracy’s work. 
 
 Bernard Lonergan  
 Lonergan’s influence on Tracy is perhaps most clearly located in Tracy’s complex 
appropriation of Lonergan’s method.72  Lonergan claimed that Method was concerned not 
with theology per se but with the process of doing theology.  He defines a method as “a 
normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive 
results.”73  The operations that theologians perform when doing theology occur on the 
four levels of conscious intentionality: empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible.74  
The operations on these levels are performed by a subject who intends some object, and 
through these operations the subject is at once present to the self and to the object.  For 
Lonergan, the basic pattern of operations on these four levels constitutes a transcendental 
method because it fits his definition and it produces results that “are not confined 
categorially to some particular field or subject, but regard any result that could be 
intended by the completely open transcendental notions.”75  This primordial method is 
not restricted to the field of theological inquiry, but remains open to any field or subject 
matter that might be investigated by the human mind. 
                                                          
72 See MT.  Tracy’s first published book, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, was written in the mid to 
late 1960’s, during the time that Lonergan was both teaching regular courses and working on Method in 
Theology.  Tracy already provides an initial analysis of some of the themes of MT in the final three chapters 
of ABL. 
73 MT 4 
74 MT 9.  Yet these levels are not applicable only to theologians.  Other specialists perform operations on 
these four levels in their own fields, and more broadly these are the levels of conscious intentionality 
performed by any human person who is acting consciously.  
75 MT 14 
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 However, Lonergan does go on to apply this transcendental method to theology.  
He claims that “a theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and 
role of a religion in that matrix.”76  He adopts an empirical rather than a classicist 
understanding of culture, which he defines as “the set of meanings and values that 
informs a way of life.”77  In this approach, theology is considered “an ongoing process” 
conditioned by the continuous changes of the culture in which a given religion exists.   
 Because theology mediates between culture and religion, Lonergan distinguishes 
the process of theology into stages that correspond to the four levels of conscious 
intentionality within transcendental method.  These tasks, which he names “functional 
specialties,” break down into the two vectors of mediating theology and mediated 
theology.  Mediating theology involves research, interpretation, history, and dialectics 
within the upward trajectory of the four levels of consciousness: experience (establishing 
the data), understanding (interpreting the data), judgment (pinning down what is going 
forward historically), and decision (dialectical engagement with conflicting results 
reducible to difference in horizons).  Mediated theology, however, includes the functional 
specialties foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications, which reverses the 
direction of the four-leveled trajectory as it moves from decision (foundations) through 
judgment (doctrines), understanding (systematics), and experience (communications).78  
Mediating theology is thus indirect discourse that listens to the foregoing tradition, while 
                                                          
76 MT xi.  I think this description of theology corresponds in some ways to the correlational methods of 
both Tillich and Niebuhr, although it differs from Niebuhr’s as regards the more “religious” pole, and from 
Tillich’s in terms of the relationship between the culture and the “religious” pole within it . 
77 MT xi 
78 MT 135 
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mediated theology is direct discourse in which the theologian takes a stand in the present 
with regard to what is true, intelligible, and meaningful in the theological tradition.79 
 Functional specialization has clearly influenced Tracy’s way of subdividing the 
discipline of theology in The Analogical Imagination.  While there is not a clear one-to-
one correspondence between functional specialization and Tracy’s theological sub-
disciplines, there are obvious parallels between Tracy’s fundamental, systematic, and 
practical theology and Lonergan’s doctrines, systematics, and communications.  
Furthermore, while Lonergan separates indirect and direct discourse into two distinct 
vectors for theology, Tracy integrates both historical and constructive moments into each 
of his sub-disciplines.  For Tracy, these sub-disciplines determine the primary divisions 
of theology, while the mediating/mediated distinction is incorporated in a less prominent 
way.  This is less a dramatic divergence from Lonergan’s method, but rather a new 
appropriation resulting from Tracy’s emphasis on the distinct audiences for each of his 
theological sub-disciplines.80 
 
Method in Blessed Rage for Order  
 Although expressed in diverse ways, the methods employed by Tillich, Niebuhr, 
and Lonergan each require that theology recognize its engagement with both the central 
religious claims of the Christian tradition and the contexts in which theology is done.  
These two poles may be identified in a variety of ways (e.g., question and answer, two 
                                                          
79 MT 267 
80 Lonergan, on the other hand, was instead concerned primarily with the issue of integrating history into 
the Roman Catholic dogmatic and systematic theology that had become ahistorical.   
Chapter One 
52 
 
sources, conversation partners), and the relationship between them may take a variety of 
forms (e.g., continuity, accommodation, conflict, reconciliation).  These poles can be 
distinguished but not rigidly separated, since both the religious tradition and the 
particular context mutually shape one another. 
 An analysis of Tracy’s method must also take into account both his efforts to 
correlate the two poles that he has appropriated in an original way from Tillich, Niebuhr, 
and Lonergan, as well as account for the theological sub-disciplines that he developed.  
His first attempt to develop his theological method occurred in Blessed Rage for Order.  
As an essay in fundamental theology, it is focused on “the basic criteria and methods for 
theological argument.”81  In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy treated the question of 
theological method more thematically.  Together with more pronounced stress on the 
publics for his theology, Tracy re-articulated his understanding of fundamental theology 
in AI and revised his previous ordering of the sub-disciplines.82  Since Tracy’s method of 
correlation is intimately bound up with his outline of sub-disciplines, an adequate account 
of his method must treat both of these features. 
 
  Critical Correlation in BRO  
 In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy introduced the two poles of his critical 
correlation by describing the dual commitment of the postmodern theologian.  
                                                          
81 BRO 15 n. 8 
82 AI 84 n. 28 and AI 85 n. 31.  In each text, Tracy seems to suggest that Part I treats fundamental theology 
and Part II systematic theology (cf. BRO 237). 
Chapter One 
53 
 
“Disenchanted with disenchantment,”83 the theologian faces a pluralistic world in which 
“he can authentically abandon neither his faith in the modern experiment nor his faith in 
the God of Jesus Christ.”84  The great achievement of modern thought, particularly in the 
fields of history and science, is the emergence of a more rigorous critical thought.  Tracy 
recognized that some see such a critical thrust as a threat to Christian traditions precisely 
because it substitutes a commitment to critical inquiry for the fundamental commitment 
to the tradition itself.85  He argued that because Christian theology is oriented towards 
truth, theologians must commit themselves to a critical posture towards the tradition that 
can furnish evidence and arguments for its claims.86  Tracy did not understand “critical” 
in a strictly negative sense here, but saw it as fidelity to open-ended inquiry.  This critical 
posture is directed not solely at the theological tradition within which the theologian 
stands but is also related to the meaning and significance of the “secular faith” rooted in 
the current situation.87 
 This twofold commitment demands what Tracy called the “revisionist” model for 
theology, which depends upon two sources: Christian traditions and common human 
experience and language.88  In describing these sources, Tracy delved not so much into 
                                                          
83 Cf. BRO 33 
84 BRO 4 
85 BRO 6 
86 BRO 6 
87 BRO 8-9 
88 BRO 43.  Tracy initially identified the former pole with Christian texts, which are in fact his primary 
operative source for understanding the Christian tradition(s).  In BRO he recognized that a fuller Christian 
theology must also consider “symbols, rituals, events, witnesses,” and he developed this range of sources 
more fully when discussing the “classic” in The Analogical Imagination.  Yet he then postponed this effort, 
claiming that as of BRO his hermeneutical theory, while adaptable to non-textual sources, was not yet 
nuanced sufficiently in that direction (BRO 15 n. 5). 
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the specific sources themselves as into the best methods for investigating such sources 
adequately.   
 The primary approach to the religious pole of the Christian tradition is the 
“historical and hermeneutical investigation of classical Christian texts.”89  He advocated 
using the best of historical-critical scholarship in order to reconstruct the texts that play a 
significant role within the development of a Christian self-understanding.  The 
hermeneutical investigation then seeks to establish what those reconstructed texts mean 
for the Christian community.  Tracy’s hermeneutical method is highly indebted to Paul 
Ricoeur’s claim that a text has both “sense” and “referents.”  “Sense” denotes the internal 
structure of the text and the meaning that can be determined through “ordinary methods 
of semantic and literary-critical inquiries,” while “referents” means the world the text 
discloses to the reader.90  This hermeneutical approach marks a departure from romantic 
hermeneutics, which is concerned with emphatically re-enacting the intentions of the 
author, emphasizing instead the interpreter’s use of genres, images, metaphors, and 
symbols to appropriate the new possibilities disclosed by the text. 
 Tracy illustrated the historical and hermeneutical investigation by appealing to the 
example of the Christological claim that “Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ.”  The primary 
historical concern is to establish and reconstruct as accurately as possible the “New 
Testament christological texts,” while the hermeneutical effort is to understand the 
                                                          
89 BRO 49.  It should be noted that at this point Tracy is not yet using “classical” in the technical sense he 
developed in The Analogical Imagination. 
90 BRO 51; cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 19-22. 
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“religious significance of the proclamation that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ.”91  This 
twofold investigation must engage the historical construction of Christological 
documents, their historical appropriation by the tradition, and the existential reality they 
claim as still meaningful today. 
 The principal method for investigating the situational pole, common human 
experience, is “a phenomenology of the ‘religious dimension’ present in everyday and 
scientific experience and language,”92 assuming that there is such a religious dimension 
to common human experience.  Like Lonergan, Tracy’s view of experience accounts for 
both the subject’s sensory experience and conscious experience of the self.93  What gives 
experience its religious dimension is its “limit character,” that which discloses the radical 
finitude of human existence and acknowledges that there is something beyond the self.  
Tracy argues that this sense of “limit” is shared broadly among persons, which grounds 
his use of the qualifier “common” to describe the pole of human experience.   
 For Tracy, theological statements also necessarily have an existential dimension.  
Even though such statements might refer to God or to non-human creation, they refer 
more basically to the self who is making such statements.94  These statements also 
purport to have “universal existential relevance,” so theology must offer an account of 
how the existential claims of Christianity can have some explanatory power when it 
comes to common human experience.  Tracy argued that the phenomenological approach 
                                                          
91 BRO 50 
92 BRO 47 
93 BRO 69 
94 BRO 58 n. 18 
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is well suited to this task precisely because it mediates “the relationship of particular 
expression…to our immediate lived experience.”95 
 The task of the revisionist theologian is to correlate these two sources.  Initially, 
this means that the Christian tradition must be able to offer a substantive interpretation of 
common human experience.  Throughout history Christian texts have developed a series 
of categories and narratives that offer a vision of human existence in relationship to the 
divine, and the theologian’s task is to produce arguments showing the adequacy of these 
categories and narratives “for all human experience.”96  If the Christian faith actually 
does offer a cogent response to the basic questions and concerns of human living, then it 
is capable of reaching beyond an “inner-theological” conversation in order to engage the 
secular world.97   
 Were the revisionist model to end the project of correlation here, it would be fully 
consistent with Tillich’s efforts to respond to the questions of the situation with the 
answers of the message.  But Tracy required a more robust critical correlation, and so he 
proposed a twofold alteration of Tillich’s method.  First, Tracy claimed that Tillich’s 
method fails to take the situation seriously because it operates in only one direction: the 
questions come from one source and the answers from the other.  Instead, he argued that 
a theologian needs to risk that the past tradition in its own right might raise questions to 
which contemporary common human experience might have answers, thus making 
                                                          
95 BRO 69 
96 BRO 44 
97 BRO 44 
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correlation a bilateral enterprise.98  The second alteration was to recognize explicitly that 
each source might answer its own questions.99  For Tracy, the “critical” element in 
correlation means that both sources ought to be subjected to modes of critical inquiry.  
The questions raised by both poles ought to be articulated, and then presented with 
possibly relevant responses from both sources.  Tracy’s critical correlation thus becomes 
a more complex and rich engagement with the sources of theology than Tillich’s. 
 
 Theological Sub-Disciplines in BRO  
 While Tracy primarily regarded the critical correlation of classical Christian texts 
and common human experience as the method of fundamental theology, he believed that 
the process of correlation could also be employed in other disciplines of theology.  The 
distinct but related roles of fundamental, systematic, historical, and practical theology 
remained implicit throughout Blessed Rage for Order; however, in the final chapter 
Tracy explains each sub-discipline in a more detailed manner.   
 Fundamental theology’s chief task is the development of the criteria used in 
making theological claims.100  It performs this task through an ongoing “philosophical 
reflection” on the meanings of the religious and situational poles.  While fundamental 
theology is performed from within a faith tradition, its questions are not confined by that 
tradition.  Rather, it considers the warrants for making religious claims and the criteria 
                                                          
98 As an example, Tracy asked “why do we not find in Tillich a critical investigation of the claims that 
either Jean Paul Sartre’s or Karl Jaspers’ philosophies of existence provide a better ‘answer’ to the question 
of human estrangement than the Christian ‘answer’ does?” (BRO 46). 
99 BRO 46 
100 BRO 250 n. 1 
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used to judge those claims.101  The basic religious questions underlying fundamental 
theology concern theistic and Christological levels of meaning as well.102  Tracy 
analyzed these three distinct but related areas of meaning (religious, theistic, and 
Christological) in the context of contemporary pluralism.  The second half of BRO 
attempted a variety of revisionist analyses of these sorts of claims.    
 Systematic theology is closely tied to fundamental theology because it builds on 
the criteria of fundamental theology when it delves into doctrinal questions of a particular 
faith tradition.  Christian systematic theology inquires into such loci as Trinity, 
soteriology, ecclesiology, and sacraments.  Within Tracy’s revisionist model, traditional 
formulations of these loci are challenged and reconsidered.  They may undergo 
reinterpretation through a “hermeneutics of restoration” that takes account of our 
common experience.  The theologian must remain open to the possibility that certain 
formulations may no longer communicate meaning or truth to our common human 
experience or even to classic Christian self-understanding.103 
 The systematic theologian’s commitment to a particular faith tradition is balanced 
by the public character of systematics.  Against the “decline of religion” narrative of 
some advocates of secularization Tracy insisted that systematic theology can both inform 
public discourse and participate in the public sphere.  BRO provided the “initial 
                                                          
101 Tracy said his view of fundamental theology is roughly the same as the traditional task of “apologetic” 
theology.  The difference, however, is that apologetics was concerned primarily with arguing for the 
foundational doctrines of theology – revelation, miracles, divine revealer, creation, faith and reason – while 
Tracy’s fundamental theology focuses on the criteria used to judge these claims in light of common human 
experience (BRO 250 n.1). 
102 BRO 237 
103 BRO 238-9 
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spadework” for systematics in establishing criteria for theological conversation and 
setting forth the grounds for its participation in public discourse.104  Yet, for Tracy, 
theological reflection has been much too dominated by fundamental theological concerns: 
“The problem of the contemporary systematic theologian, as has often been remarked, is 
actually to do systematic theology.”105 
 Historical theology is the third sub-discipline of theology.  Tracy distinguished 
history from historical theology by noting that the primary task of the historian is the 
reconstruction of texts.  Theology depends on historical investigation to determine its 
sources, whether they be texts, events, symbols, or persons.  In short, historians 
reconstruct the tradition.106  The critical task of the historical theologian “qua theologian 
is to decipher how and why past Christian meanings were meaningful and true for a 
particular cultural situation, and how and why such past meanings either are or are not 
meaningful and true today.”107  Thus, historical theologians work to make the meanings 
of texts derived from the tradition available in the present.108 
 Practical theology is the fourth and final sub-discipline of theology discussed in 
Blessed Rage for Order.  The central concern of practical theology is praxis, understood 
as “the critical relationship between theory and practice whereby each is dialectically 
                                                          
104 BRO 250 n. 1.  This incipient notion of public-ness will receive its fullest development in AI (cf. Chapter 
Three, page 136-149 
105 BRO 238. Tracy would later connect this concern to Karl Rahner’s quip, “But we cannot spend all our 
time sharpening the knife; at some point we must cut” (David Tracy, “God, Dialogue and Solidarity: A 
Theologian’s Refrain,” Christian Century 107 no. 28 (Oct 10, 1990), 901. 
106 BRO 251 n. 8.  Tracy’s description of the historical task here closely parallels Lonergan’s understanding 
of research in MT, especially pages 127 and 149-151 
107 BRO 239-240 
108 BRO 240 
Chapter One 
60 
 
influenced and transformed by the other.”109  For Tracy, practical theology is concerned 
with the “possibilities of praxis” that are rooted in both the historia of the historical 
theology and the theoria of fundamental and systematic theology.  While the historical 
theologian shows how past formulations are meaningful in the present, the practical 
theologian seeks the potential future meanings in present reconstructions.110  Tracy’s 
temporal characterization gives some sense of the role of practical theology: this sub-
discipline is primarily concerned not with the future retrievals of history or developments 
of theory, but with the ongoing enactment of transformative action emerging from the 
tradition of the faith.  Instead of merely reflecting on historia and theoria, practical 
theology deploys its central meanings in the social world.  Ultimately, practical theology 
seeks to transform the society and culture in which it is developed. 
 
Method in The Analogical Imagination 
 Key facets of Tracy’s method in BRO remain in his more fully developed method 
in AI.  There, the process of doing theology continues to be one of correlation and 
theological tasks are still divided into sub-disciplines.  However, the latter work 
characterizes both the poles of correlation and the sub-disciplines somewhat differently 
than did BRO.  Although Tracy has attributed this adjustment to changing his focus from 
fundamental to systematic theology, the evidence indicates that this change is more wide-
ranging and multi-faceted.  In fact, four notable shifts distinguish this method of 
correlation from the earlier formulation: (1) he re-characterizes the poles for correlation 
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from “common human experience” and “the Christian fact” to “the contemporary 
situation” and “Christian classics;” (2) he describes his theology as “public” rather than 
“revisionist;” (3) the sub-discipline of historical theology becomes a moment within the 
other three sub-disciplines of fundamental, systematic, and practical theology; (4) and he 
re-orients each of the sub-disciplines from a temporal understanding to a public one. 
 
 Mutually Critical Correlation in AI  
 In Tracy’s reformulated method, the role of correlation in the project of theology 
continues to be central.111  In BRO, “critical” qualified his model of correlation since each 
pole needed to be suspicious of itself as well as of the other.  In AI, an additional qualifier 
is added: “mutually” (or “mutual”) emphasizes even more that the two poles in 
correlation must respond to and even correct each other.   
 First, Tracy re-characterized the poles to be correlated in mutually critical 
correlation.  The religious pole is only slightly modified, since in both BRO and AI Tracy 
used various formulations of “the Christian tradition.”  While the term the “Christian 
fact” serves as a referent for symbols and texts that are central to Christian self-
understanding, Tracy had limited the hermeneutical and historical investigation in BRO to 
texts;112 when he used the term “classic” there, the meaning tended to be colloquial, not 
technical.113   
                                                          
111 AI 59: “All theologians agree to the appropriateness, usually the necessity, of appeals to a defended 
interpretation of a particular religious tradition and a defended interpretation of the contemporary 
‘situation’ from which and to which the theologian speaks.” 
112 BRO 15 n. 5 
113 BRO 49, 59-60 n. 33 
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 In AI, Tracy’s use of the “classic” becomes more technical and expansive.  Here 
classics referred to particular expressions bearing an excess and permanence of meaning 
that arise within a tradition and shape the later development of that tradition.  Such 
expressions may take a variety of forms, including texts, images, symbols, rituals, events, 
and persons.114  By their excess of meaning classics require, or even provoke, an 
interpretation from their interlocutors that can never be definitive.  They call forth new 
questions in new contexts in light of which past responses must be re-evaluated.  By their 
permanence of meaning classics have a “permanent timeliness;” their pertinence remains 
through changing contexts.115   
 Classics are integrally related to traditions.  Produced in a specific place and time 
by persons shaped by a specific tradition, the classic expression is highly particular.116  
Shaping the classic through particular languages, beliefs, norms of beauty, etc., some 
tradition is at the heart of each classic, even as classics in turn shape the development of 
their traditions.  The classic formulation reveals central truths, and the particularity of its 
formulations offer continuing opportunity to challenge, renew, and pass on the tradition.  
Classics both shape and are shaped by the process of each tradition.117 
                                                          
114 AI 100, 108.  Tracy works primarily (but not exclusively) with texts in his theology.  For instance, he 
has at times used the life of St. Francis to illustrate what he means by the classic (AI 247 n. 27, 381).  
Similarly, the close alignment he acknowledges between the plights of religion and art in contemporary 
society suggests the importance of works of art in his thought.   
115 AI 102 
116 This is not to assert that traditions are monolithic; Tracy maintained that traditions are themselves 
internally plural.  However this does not undermine a “family resemblance” view of tradition that allows 
for the claim that particular traditions shape the classics that originate within them. 
117 Tracy contrasts this view of tradition with what he calls “traditionalism.”  The latter views tradition as 
continually repeated prior formulations that require no critical engagement from its adherents.  In this 
sense, tradition is to be conceived as tradita, a deposit to be handed on, rather than as traditio, the act of 
handing on. 
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 The classic is therefore central to the religious pole precisely because the primary 
activity of the theologian in attending to this pole is the interpretation of the classics of 
the Christian tradition.  While the form of the classic Tracy usually worked with was the 
text, he claimed that the central Christian classic is the event and person of Jesus 
Christ.118  Understood as the central classic, the event and person of Jesus Christ serves 
both as the norm for all other Christian classics and as the hermeneutic lens through 
which Christians understand “God, self, others, society, history, [and] nature.”119  The 
focal role of Christology in the development of Tracy’s method in BRO continues as 
Tracy shifted in AI from investigating the claim that “Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ” to 
interpreting the classic of Jesus Christ.  This interpretation engages the classical genres of 
narrative, doctrine, and apocalyptic as they are performed in the New Testament and with 
the classical contemporary Christological texts developed in the Christian tradition.  This 
process leads finally to Tracy’s explanation of the two classical forms of religious 
language – the analogical and dialectical imaginations – that structure this text.120 
 The centrality of the classic for the method of correlation also alters the 
situational pole in Tracy’s mutually critical correlation that AI named “the contemporary 
situation” of the theologian.  The theologian has to investigate the ways classical 
interpretations of the contemporary situation raise “fundamental questions on the 
meaning of existence.”121  Tracy’s correlation encounters not merely the classics of the 
                                                          
118 AI 131 
119 AI 233 
120 Cf. Chapter Five, pages 233-37 for Tracy’s interpretation of Christ as the central Christian classic. 
121 AI 340-1 
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situation, but the specifically religious dimension of those classics.122  According to 
Tracy, the key facet of the contemporary situation for the postmodern theologian is 
pluralism and, more importantly, the deep consciousness of that pluralism in culture.123   
 A deeper sensitivity to particularity further distinguishes this pole from its 
predecessor in BRO.  There the idea of common human experience appealed to what is 
universal among all persons, those fundamental religious questions that might occur to 
anyone.  In AI, Tracy highlighted the profound role that context plays in the 
interpretations of individual theologians.  A theologian’s experience of the event and 
person of Christ “occurs to the individual theologian in a particular situation,”124 even 
though the universal aspect does not disappear completely.  What makes some expression 
or interpretation classic, according to Tracy, is the manner in which its particularity 
enables rather than hinders the manifestation of truth for any self-reflective person.  The 
heuristic notion of the classic enables Tracy to refocus the more universal trajectory 
present in common human experience through the particularity of one’s particular, 
contemporary situation. 
 The underlying issue in Tracy’s method of mutually critical correlation is not that 
the tradition and the situation are a theologian’s two sources, but that the theologian is 
embedded in both a tradition and a situation.  Intellectual probity demands that the 
theologian recognize this and take it into account while doing theology.  This is why 
                                                          
122 AI 61, 326 
123 For example, in distinguishing the present situation from that of Tillich, Tracy argued that there is no 
longer a single dominant question – not even that elicited by “the profound sense of meaninglessness, 
absurdity, the radical threat of nonbeing” (AI 341).  It is precisely in this difference from Tillich’s era that 
Tracy described the contemporary situation as one of “pluralism.” 
124 AI 344 
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Tracy claimed that “[e]very theology lives in its own situation,” and so “theologians are 
no different from other cultural critics who bring their own orientations, questions and 
possible, probable or certain modes of analysis and response to the situation 
encompassing all.”125  However, because the theologian believes that the tradition 
expresses a truth that is in principle available to all, theology is a fundamentally public 
discipline.  This fact leads to a second major shift in Tracy’s method: the move from a 
“revisionist” mode of theology to a “public” one. 
 
 Public Theology  
 By employing the idea of the classic in The Analogical Imagination, Tracy 
dropped the term “revisionist” to describe his model of theology.  He reformulated the 
nascent references he had made to public-ness in the footnotes of Blessed Rage for Order 
and began to articulate a deeper understanding of theology as “public” theology.  This 
designation goes beyond his emphasis on the theologian’s dual commitment to critical 
inquiry and to a particular tradition and stresses more forcibly that theology as a 
discipline is concerned with questions and realities that are (at least potentially) of 
concern to anyone.   
 The focus on publicness continued the revisionist emphasis on common human 
experience as a source.  The common factor of human experience is constituted by the 
recurrent asking of fundamental religious questions throughout history and across 
                                                          
125 AI 339; cf. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the 
Modern World (1965), in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, vol. 1, rev. ed., 
ed. Austin Flannery, trans. Ronan Lennon and Ambrose McNicholl (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing, 
1996), no. 4 
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cultures.  In this sense, the universality of the constellation of questions that are 
“fundamental religious” epitomizes their public nature.  Anyone can ask and respond to 
these questions; they are not the exclusive privilege of the few.  However, in digging 
deeper, Tracy wanted to ground the publicness of theology in terms of its existence as the 
logos about theos whose very reality makes theology public.  The theologian’s 
fundamental faith is in “the all-pervasive reality of the God of love and power disclosed 
in Jesus Christ.”  Thus, any talk about God that is segregated or quarantined into private 
pens lurches towards a privatistic, even individualistic (and thus eventually idolatrous) 
understanding of the divine.126  Not only our questions about the divine, but the 
universality of the divine itself necessitates that theology be a public discipline. 
 Publicness is expressed through certain discursive concepts that provide practices 
and frameworks for doing theology as a public discipline.  Publicness demands “criteria, 
evidence, warrants, disciplinary status,” for making claims that can be defended based on 
broadly acceptable premises.  The development of criteria for public theology means 
developing standards by which theological claims can be assessed that are not already 
begged by the theological claims themselves.  Tracy developed several such criteria, the 
most central being (1) adequacy to personal experience, (2) appropriateness to the 
tradition, and (3) internal coherence.  If a theological assertion can be shown to resonate 
with human experience and a particular tradition while still making sense on its own 
terms, then that assertion has a strong claim to publicness. 
                                                          
126 AI 51 
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 Generally, publicness in theology is always instantiated for Tracy in three specific 
publics.  Theology speaks to the publics of society, academy, and church.  While I will 
attend to the specific characteristics of these three publics later,127 the central point for an 
understanding of Tracy’s theological method is that these publics represent distinct 
audiences, each with its own mode of discourse.  As a result, the role of faith, the ethical 
commitments of the theologian, and the understanding of meaning and truth that are 
operative in each public will vary.128  The fact that these elements are distinct to each of 
the three publics does not mean that they are mutually incompatible; rather, the three 
publics and the modes of theology they engender are integrally related to each other.  For 
Tracy each public features a more or less primary discursive or practical mode.  Chief 
among the tasks which fall to the theologian then is to “explicate the basic plausibility 
structures of all three publics through the formulation of plausibility arguments and 
criteria of adequacy.”129 
 
 Theological Sub-Disciplines in AI  
 Perhaps the clearest difference in the theological methods proposed by Tracy in 
BRO and in AI is the more intentional organization in terms of the sub-disciplines of 
theology.  In BRO, Tracy focused on fundamental theology, but the description of its 
relationships with the other sub-disciplines was given scant treatment.  In AI, the sub-
disciplines form a relatively coherent schema in which the process of mutually critical 
                                                          
127 See Chapter Three, pages 136-49 
128 AI 56 
129 AI 31 
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correlation occurs within each sub-discipline even though the specific sources, criteria, 
and audiences for those sub-disciplines differ.  Each sub-discipline, therefore, is at its 
core a hermeneutical exercise in the interpretation of the classics of the tradition and of 
the contemporary situation.  As a result, Tracy’s method in AI is more robust and 
comprehensive than that of BRO. 
 The three sub-disciplines in AI are fundamental, systematic, and practical 
theology.  Five characteristics orient these sub-disciplines and indicate the important 
distinctions among them.  The first and most important is that each sub-discipline has a 
primary reference group.130  Fundamental theology is oriented to the public of the 
academy, systematic theology to the public of the church, and practical theology to the 
public of society.  The qualifier “primary” is significant here because although each sub-
discipline is focused on a particular audience, it is capable of engaging the other two 
publics.  The connection between the sub-disciplines and their respective publics 
determines the four remaining distinguishing characteristics: the modes of argument, the 
ethical emphases, the role of the theologian’s faith in that mode of theology, and the 
formulations of “meaning” and “truth.”131  The significance for Tracy’s theological 
method becomes even more evident when he explains their distinguishing characteristics. 
 
 Fundamental Theology    
 Fundamental theology is the sub-discipline oriented to the public of the academy, 
which formulates norms for academic disciplines.  Based upon an agreed understanding 
                                                          
130 AI 56 
131 AI 56 
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of what constitutes criteria, evidence, and good argumentation, all disciplines have 
previously accepted methods as well as procedures for assessing new approaches.  While 
the internal conversations among the members of these disciplines (“intellectuals”)132 
about norms and methods are central to the academy, the demand that these disciplines 
are able to make claims about reality broadly construed means that they engage publics 
beyond their disciplinary boundaries.  Disciplines must be able to converse with other 
disciplines and provide grounds for their criteria, evidence, and methods.  Tracy regards 
such interdisciplinary conversations about the underlying intellectual commitments and 
assumptions as essential to the academic enterprise. 
 As oriented primarily to the academic public, fundamental theology determines 
the disciplinary status, norms, and methods of theology.  Tracy describes the mode of 
argument here as being public in “the most usual meaning” of having to be open to any 
reasonable person.  Interlocutors should neither be privileged nor excluded based on 
religious commitments (or lack thereof) because the claims made in fundamental 
theology should appeal to that interlocutor’s experience, intelligence, rationality, and 
responsibility.133  What is indispensable is an ethical commitment to the process of 
                                                          
132 The terms used here for members of the academy (“intellectual”) and society (“citizen”) are drawn from 
Tracy, although he does not use them consistently.  See Chapter One of BRO for “intellectual” and David 
Tracy, "Freedom, Responsibility, Authority," in Empowering Authority: The Charisms of Episcopacy and 
Primacy in the Church Today, eds. Gary Chamberlain and Patrick Howell, 34-47 (Kansas City: Sheed and 
Ward, 1990) for “citizen.”  The choice of “believer” for a member of the church is suggested by Tracy’s 
occasional use of “non-believer,” but “believer” is not itself clearly used.  I have decided to use it here in 
order to parallel the other two terms. 
133 Note here Tracy’s continued indebtedness to the transcendental precepts of Lonergan. 
 Jürgen Habermas critiques Tracy on his description of fundamental theology as “public.”  
Habermas argues that if one aims to provide warrants and arguments that are available to all reasonable 
persons without the explicit faith claims of a particular tradition, then it’s not clear that “theology” is 
actually adding anything to the conversation.  Rather, it seems that fundamental theology would be 
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critical inquiry and to following where that inquiry leads, even if it challenges one’s 
religious, philosophical, political, and other commitments.  The fundamental theologian 
cannot (and should not) shirk these commitments but should attempt to distantiate oneself 
from them.  As a result, the question of meaning and truth focuses on the “adequacy or 
inadequacy of the truth-claims, usually the cognitive claims, of a particular religious 
tradition” and of the contemporary situation.134  The question of adequacy is argued not 
on the basis of the tradition’s own criteria but by using the criteria and methods of 
another discipline.  Tracy notes that typically and traditionally the other discipline 
theology employs has been philosophy, or at least the philosophical aspect of some 
discipline in the social sciences or humanities.135  Fundamental theology is therefore the 
sub-discipline of theology that works out the basic methods of making theological claims 
and adjudicates the adequacy of particular claims.  Because the success of theology on 
this level depends to some extent on its engagement with other disciplines, it is also the 
sub-discipline that primarily deals with concepts that are significant for, but not limited 
to, the task of theology. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
stripping away whatever might actually be “theological” about it.  However, Habermas’ critique 
misunderstands Tracy’s point here.  It is not that the religious tradition can make no claims, but rather that 
it must demonstrate the grounds by which those claims might be considered reasonable.  Fundamental 
theology tries to show how these claims are reasonable according to accepted standards of argument, not to 
prove these claims purely on reason alone.  It is this distinction that allows Tracy to name what happens in 
fundamental theology “theology.”  See Jürgen Habermas, “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence 
Within This World,” in Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology, ed. Don Browning and Francis 
Schüssler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 230-233. 
134 AI 58, 62 
135 AI 62 
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 Systematic Theology  
 Systematic theology is the sub-discipline oriented to the public of the church.  
Tracy offers two lenses through which to view the church as a public.  Sociologically, it 
is a voluntary association, both communal and institutional in character, that mediates 
between individuals and the larger society.136  Theologically, the church is a gift from 
God and the principal mediator of the human experience of Jesus Christ in the world 
through word, scripture, and action.137  The sociological reality of the church serves to 
witness to, build up, and pass on the theological reality, in accord with its own public 
criteria, warrants, and methods construed as fidelity to the tradition and the community.  
Either through the efforts of the individual members (“believers”) or through the moral 
stature of the institution/community, this public exerts influence on the academy and 
society. 
 Systematic theology’s orientation to the public of the church takes seriously the 
central claims of that particular faith tradition.  Its primary purpose is the reinterpretation 
of a particular faith tradition – especially its founding religious event – in relation to the 
believing community’s current context.  Systematic theology’s arguments are not as 
public as fundamental theology’s since they are not as outwardly focused,138 but 
systematics is concerned with mediating its religious tradition within any new contexts 
                                                          
136 AI 21 
137 AI 50, 236.  Elsewhere, Tracy will describe the “tradition” as the primary mediator of this experience 
(AI 237).  In so doing, I do not think he is being inconsistent, but rather suggesting the deep interlinking 
between church and tradition. 
138 This is not to say that they are not fully public, however.  For Tracy, publicness is rooted in the idea of 
the classic in the sense that something is public when it can speak intelligibly to those beyond the particular 
tradition of its origin.  Thus some concrete expression of systematic theology might be public if it “has 
found the right mode of expression to become public for all intelligent, reasonable and responsible persons” 
(AI 233). 
Chapter One 
72 
 
that the church enters, in the belief that the revelation to which it witnesses has an “ever-
present disclosive and transformative power.”139  Thus the systematic theologian needs to 
be acutely aware of one’s own finitude and historicity as well as that of the tradition in 
which one works.140  Operating in traditions and communities that are embedded in 
history and that change as time passes, systematic theologians must seek to propound 
their fundamental truths by taking seriously their historical contexts.  Their ethical stance 
primarily involves fidelity to a particular tradition.141  Instead of a rote reiteration of 
traditional formulations, what is needed is a “critical and creative fidelity” that grapples 
with the development of the tradition in light of new circumstances.142  The theologian’s 
religious stance should become actively engaged and should express a strong 
commitment to this tradition which one faithfully reinterprets.  In contrast to the 
fundamental theologian, the personal religious beliefs of the systematic theologian are not 
only valid sources of argument but necessary ones.143  Lastly, based on the work of 
fundamental theology, systematic theology can for the most part assume “the truth-
bearing character of a particular religious tradition,” and then seek to re-appropriate those 
claims within the contemporary situation.144  As a result, Tracy thinks systematic 
                                                          
139 AI 57 
140 AI 100 
141 Here one might recognize a parallel between the relationship Tracy casts between fundamental and 
systematic theologies with Lonergan’s general and special categories.  Matthew Lamb suggests that 
Tracy’s method of critical correlation constitutes Tracy’s appropriation of Lonergan’s distinction between 
“general and special foundational theological categories” (Matthew L. Lamb, “David Tracy,” in A 
Handbook of Christian Theologians (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1984), 681).  The general categories 
correspond to the human concerns embodied in the contemporary situation while the special categories 
correspond specifically to Christian tradition.  Cf. MT 271-281. 
142 AI 57 
143 AI 67 
144 AI 58 
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theology is distinctively hermeneutical in character vis-à-vis fundamental and practical 
theologies, inasmuch as its role is the reinterpretation of a tradition rather than the 
defense or social application of the tradition.145 
 
 Practical Theology  
 Finally, practical theology is the sub-discipline whose public is the wider society.  
The public of society is comprised of three distinct but related realms: the techno-
economic, the political, and the cultural.  The first realm has to do with the production 
and distribution of goods and services in society, chiefly satisfied by the application of 
instrumental forms of reason.  The second realm focuses on issues of justice and power 
and aims at rightly understanding those social issues using practical reason.  The third 
and final realm, culture, concerns more symbolic questions and expressions, especially 
the basic existential questions raised by the members of society and the community at 
large.  Tracy locates questions about religion and art within this realm since they are 
central to the larger symbolic system that animates that culture.  These three realms are 
interconnected, and Tracy thinks that, ideally, symbolic reflection in the cultural realm 
ought to influence the practical wisdom of the polity, and that both should in turn judge 
and guide the instrumental reason proper to the techno-economic realm.  However, he 
acknowledges that this is not always the case in contemporary cultures which have 
achieved tremendous success techno-economically, but have atrophied in the other two 
                                                          
145 AI 104.  It should be reiterated here, however, that as of AI, Tracy understood all sub-disciplines of 
theology to be hermeneutical as each interprets classics of the tradition and of the contemporary situation. 
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realms.146  The social public manifests great complexity with respect to how reason is 
employed, the relations among its diverse values, and the appropriate means by which to 
pursue those values.   
 As the sub-discipline oriented to this public, practical theology has to negotiate a 
complex matrix of rationalities, values, and means under the heading of praxis.  Tracy 
understands praxis as practice (generally, concrete and programmatic action) informed by 
and informing theory.  In theology, practical theology takes account of the theoretical 
claims of fundamental and systematic theologies, but more importantly it grounds and 
transforms this theoretical work.147  The praxis of practical theology is therefore less a 
mode of arguing than of responding to specific issues in particular contexts that are 
deemed religiously significant.  It engenders an ethical commitment to be in solidarity 
with those affected by such issues.  This commitment is grounded in the faith tradition of 
the practical theologian, and so, like the systematic theologian, the religious stance of 
practical theologians is crucial for the practical theology they develop.  While in principle 
anyone can practice solidarity, the work of practical theologians is specifically rooted in 
their social location as members of particular faith traditions and communities.  Tracy is 
also aware that the practical theologian might be committed as well to a particular praxis 
movement.148  The emphasis on praxis further shapes the understanding of meaning and 
                                                          
146 Although not explicit about it, Tracy seemed to suggest that the United States of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries falls into this “technocratic” trap (AI 8). 
147 AI 57.  See also AI 69, where Tracy described praxis as “theory’s own originating and self-correcting 
foundation, since all theory is dependent, minimally, on the authentic praxis of the theorist’s personally 
appropriated value of intellectual integrity and self-transcending commitment to the imperatives of critical 
rationality.” 
148 Here he cites Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, Gustavo Gutierrez, James Cone, Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, and Juan Luis Segundo as examples of those who are committed to both a faith tradition 
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truth in practical theology, especially since Tracy describes truth in this context as a 
“praxis-determined, transformative” notion that acknowledges the priority of 
involvement over theory.  Practical theology explores whether particular situations of 
systemic distortion149 require theological analysis and a religious response.  The truth 
claims validated in fundamental theology and re-interpreted in systematic theology are 
used in practical theology to demonstrate the theological relevance of particular 
situations. 
 AI’s outline of the three sub-disciplines of theology brings out two significant 
differences from BRO’s approach.  First, historical theology is not a sub-discipline of its 
own but rather a constitutive aspect of fundamental, systematic, and practical theologies.  
In order for each of these sub-disciplines to be faithful to Christian tradition, they have to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and a praxis movement (AI 57).  This suggests that Tracy sees what are commonly called contextual 
theologies as practical theologies, not fundamental or systematic theologies.  In this respect, Tracy is often 
criticized for not adequately acknowledging the theoretical contributions of political, liberation, and 
feminist theologies, considering them as playing a prophetic role within the larger, more normative 
Western theological tradition.   
 While I think this critique is an important one in that Tracy could certainly do a more adequate job 
of considering the theoretical contributions of these theologies, I will note two ways in which this critique 
is not entirely fair.  First, Tracy does mention that fundamental and practical theologies intersect for some 
of these figures, writing that “For many theologians of liberation, for example, it follows that the major 
problematic of most forms of fundamental theology, the problem of the truth-status of the cognitive claims 
of both Christianity and modernity, cannot in principle be resolved by better theories” (AI 70).  Here he 
draws on the Lonerganian parallel that intellectual, moral, and religious conversion are the foundation of 
constructive theology (what Lonergan refers to as “mediated” theology in Method) in recognizing the 
correctness of these “praxis” theologians’ effective advocacy for the priority of lived experience to 
theoretical reflection.   
 Second, although Tracy could be more consistent about recognizing that his own theology is a 
contextual theology, he does develop a conceptual basis for doing so.  Tracy regularly argues that the 
finitude and historicity of the particular theologian is a determinative aspect of one’s theology.  He also, 
albeit infrequently, notes his own social location as a “white, male, middle class, and academic” person 
(DWO 6).  While this does not excuse his insufficiently nuanced references to “political, liberation, and 
feminist theologies,” he exhibits a far greater awareness of the contextual nature of theology than he is 
often given credit for. 
149 E.g., sexism, racism, classism, elitism, anti-Semitism, environmental catastrophe, etc (AI 58).  For more 
on systemic distortion, see chapter four of this dissertation. 
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build on the historical development of the tradition and the community’s past claims, so 
that each sub-discipline has both historical and constructive moments in their mutually 
critical correlations..150  Tracy claims that in making this shift he neither intended to 
diminish the importance of historical theology nor to offer a substantive change in his 
method.  While I agree with the former claim, based upon his later description that this 
move is a “more relatively adequate formulation” that places the historical moment 
within each sub-discipline, I do see this as a development in his method.151  In any case, 
AI’s account of the tasks of theology remains his dominant paradigm for the remainder of 
his theological career thus far and  indicates that he found this formulation to be more 
satisfactory. 
 Second, the three sub-disciplines of theology are distinguished by their primary 
reference groups—their publics—rather than the eras to which they principally refer.  
The publics which are engaged are more significant for the sub-disciplines than the 
temporal stage of the tradition they happen to deal with.  For example, the claim in BRO 
that practical theology was aimed at the future tended to undermine the here-and-now 
character of the praxis situations to which practical theologians respond.  Tracy’s modest 
suggestion that AI offered just an “alternative formulation” belies the enduring 
importance of “publicness” as a theme in his work and confirms his conviction that it 
                                                          
150 AI 56 
151 AI 84-5 n. 28.  Matthew Lamb is even more emphatic in his insistence that this reorganization of the 
theological sub-disciplines in AI increases the significance of history in Tracy’s theological method; he 
connects this to Tracy’s increased reflections “on the diverse social contexts in which theology is 
practiced” (Lamb, “David Tracy,” 689). 
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provides a better understanding of the task of theology.152  The notion of publicness not 
only better explains the importance of theology in the contemporary world, but it also 
attests to the universal relevance of both the fundamental questions about existence and 
the universal reality of God that theology proclaims and seeks to understand.153 
 
Theological Interpretation as Conversation in Plurality and Ambiguity  
 The emphasis on the interpretation of classics in the method of mutually critical 
correlation illustrates the hermeneutical orientation of Tracy’s theology.  While he 
emphasized the hermeneutic character of systematic theology because of its role as 
reinterpreting the tradition in light of new contexts, each of the other sub-disciplines also 
enacts a complex process of interpreting both the classics from the religious tradition and 
the classical expressions of the contemporary situation.  As each type of theology 
develops, it is always interpreting these two sources as they interact with one another. 
 Once Tracy finished his considerations on theological method in AI, he became 
less and less explicit about his understanding of mutually critical correlation or of the 
three sub-disciplines.  While he maintained an essential agreement with this formulation 
of theological method and continues to reiterate it today,154 his attention in the late 1980’s 
turned toward more explicitly hermeneutical matters, especially the model of 
conversation as a way of analyzing the process of interpretation.155  Although this model 
                                                          
152 AI 84-5 n. 28 
153 AI 52 
154 Most recently during his public lecture at Loyola University of Chicago entitled “The Necessity and 
Character of Fundamental Theology” (NCFT). 
155 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 356-371 
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is already prominent already in AI (e.g., his outline of the four moments of 
interpretation), conversation has remained his typical way of speaking about method right 
up to the present. 
 In his 1987 text Plurality and Ambiguity, Tracy spoke of conversation as a 
“game” in which the flow of a conversation takes place through un-self-conscious 
questioning.156  Wherever conversation partners place themselves at the mercy of the 
conversation itself, they risk at least some challenge to their usual ways of thinking and 
living, and possibly even a radical reorientation of the self.  Conversation partners might 
include individuals, communities, and traditions, or texts, paintings, and other 
distanciated expressions.  These conversations have the potential to reveal some truth, 
understood primarily as manifestation or disclosure, in the interaction between partners.   
 In PA the description of conversation is fairly consistent with Tracy’s previous 
attempts.157  But where PA and later works158 really advance his position from that 
articulated in AI is in relation to the notion of “interruption.”159  The realities referred to 
in the title of this text—plurality and ambiguity—characterize the interlocutors who 
participate in a conversation.  Tracy is fond of claiming that the classics that we interpret 
are not innocent since they come from traditions that are both plural and ambiguous.  
These traditions may have played an emancipatory role historically, but they inevitably 
                                                          
156 PA 18 
157 See especially AI 99-107, 154-167, and 345-352. 
158 See especially David Tracy, “Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," in Habermas, 
Modernity, and Public Theology, ed. Don Browning and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza (New York: 
Crossroad, 1992), 19-42; David Tracy, “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue,” in 
Interreligious Hermeneutics, eds. Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2010), 1-43.  In the latter text, Tracy recapitulates this Gadamerian understanding of conversation 
as his fundamental model of hermeneutics.   
159 PA 32 
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possess oppressive and violent dimensions as well.  Plurality and ambiguity affect both 
the classics produced and the individuals who interpret them.  Therefore as much as 
conversation requires its participants to expose their own vulnerability to critique, it also 
requires them to be suspicious of their interlocutors.  Above all, one is called to be 
suspicious of oneself and one’s own ambiguities. 
 If conversation is Tracy’s basic model for hermeneutics, then his method of 
mutually critical correlation is a specific way of enacting this model.  Broadly speaking, 
the two poles of correlation are in conversation with one another through the particular 
theologians who are employing that method.  There is a correspondence between Tracy’s 
insistence that in mutually critical correlation the two poles can critique one another and 
disclose new possibilities and the importance of “truth as manifestation” in 
conversation.160  This correspondence arises because plurality and ambiguity enter into 
the constitution of both the religious pole of the tradition and the situational pole of the 
contemporary situation.  Recognizing this, the process of mutually critical correlation is 
not always easy or continuous.  Rather, it is fraught with argument, disagreement, and 
suspicion.  Nevertheless, for Tracy, conversation remains the fundamental model for 
theological method. 
 
 
 
                                                          
160 PA 28-29.  Here Tracy means that in manifestation, there is a dialogical process between “the object’s 
disclosure and concealment and the subject’s recognition.”  In other words, the way in which one 
appropriates truth as manifestation is through a conversation between the self and whatever it is that 
discloses that truth. 
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The Relationship between Anthropology and Method 
 The importance of using Tracy’s method as the lens through which to interpret his 
anthropological constants becomes clearest in relation to the distinctions he draws 
between fundamental and systematic theology.  For Tracy, fundamental theology does 
not require that its practitioners exist within or act upon any prior commitments to a 
particular faith tradition.  Rather, its topics and arguments are in principle open to any 
intelligent, reasonable, responsible person.  Even so, fundamental theology’s topics, 
although not primarily or exclusively theological, do have theological relevance.  This is 
why I am proposing that the anthropological constants of finitude and relationality fit best 
into his view of fundamental theology.  Both of these constants can be and have been 
investigated by disciplines other than theology, such as biology, ecology, sociology, and 
philosophy.  Insights from these fields can illuminate theology, opening the possibility of 
fruitful interaction among them.  In Tracy’s theology, then, finitude and relationality are 
anthropological constants within fundamental theology. 
 For systematic theology, on the other hand, the faith commitments of its 
practitioners are indispensable.  While systematic theology draws upon and engages the 
work of other disciplines, it can only operate genuinely by fidelity to a particular faith 
tradition and its characteristic pursuit of truth.  Even when systematic theology engages 
other traditions, as Tracy has in Jewish-Christian and Buddhist-Christian dialogue, it does 
not prescind from the theologian’s own faith commitments.  Sin and grace, then, are the 
anthropological constants most proper to systematic theology precisely because Tracy’s 
Chapter One 
81 
 
account of them constitutes a faithful and creative retrieval of what the Christian tradition 
means by them..   
 Using the framework of Tracy’s theological method to organize, explain, and 
analyze his theological anthropology will be effective for two key reasons.  First, his 
method contains implicit assumptions about the human person who will employ this 
method.  Theology is performed by human beings, and the values that guide doing 
theology are values relevant to human persons.  In developing his method, Tracy both 
reveals and conceals key aspects of his theological anthropology.  By looking first at how 
he distinguishes the main disciplines of theology, I intended to lay the groundwork for 
understanding how he understands the person. 
 Second, Tracy’s method is the organizing principle for the broad sweep of his 
theology.  It frames what he has written on Christology, the Trinity, ecclesiology, ethics, 
and various other fields of theology.  It thus would be counterproductive to leave the 
question of method out of his theological anthropology.  Theological method has been the 
central contribution of his career to the larger field of theology, and it is through his 
method that all his other contributions are most effectively considered.   
 Therefore, in the following four chapters, the anthropological constants will be 
treated according to Tracy’s theological sub-disciplines of fundamental and systematic 
theology.  The anthropological constants of finitude and relationality are dealt with 
according to Tracy’s understanding of fundamental theology.  These concepts are not 
limited to any particular religious tradition; rather, they are terms that might be 
considered by a wide variety of disciplines (philosophy, anthropology, sociology, etc.).  
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They are nevertheless relevant for theology, and through interdisciplinary engagement 
the theological significance of these anthropological constants becomes clearer.  Sin and 
grace, on the other hand, will be approached according to Tracy’s understanding of 
systematic theology.  They are specific to and draw their meaning from the Christian 
tradition.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINITUDE 
 
 This chapter will investigate the anthropological constant of finitude in Tracy’s 
work.  Early in his career, Tracy was concerned with providing a transcendental analysis 
of common human experience that focused on the idea of limits.  He began to recognize, 
however, the ever-greater diversity of human experience, and as he did so he shifted 
further away from transcendental analysis.1  While he does not completely drop the idea 
of limit, he does begin to recognize that there are other markers of what might be 
considered “religious.”   
 Following again the genealogical method, this chapter proceeds through the 
various stages of Tracy’s career that roughly correspond to a major text, either book or 
articles, in which each stage culminates.2  Each stage has several themes that develop, 
change, or give rise to one another.  This chapter will chiefly investigate the various 
meanings of the concept “limit” in Tracy’s thought and the ways in which “limit” 
implicates his sense of the divine, of pluralism, and of otherness.   
 
                                                          
1 This shift is part of Tracy’s theological development from student of Lonergan’s to respectful but critical 
interlocutor of Lonergans’s.  This is already apparent in David Tracy, “Method as Foundation for 
Theology: Bernard Lonergan’s Option,” The Journal of Religion 50, no. 3 (July 1970): 292-318; David 
Tracy, “Lonergan’s Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and a Critique,” in Foundations of Theology: 
Papers from the International Lonergan Conference, 1970, ed. Philip McShane (Dublin: Gill & 
MacMillan, 1971), 197-222; and David Tracy, “Foundational Theology as Contemporary Possibility,” The 
Dunwoodie Review 12 (1972): 3-20. 
2 In some cases it will include articles published shortly after a particular volume as many of these were 
written at roughly the same time. 
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Blessed Rage for Order  
Transcendental Method in BRO  
 In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy outlines five distinct models for contemporary 
theology: orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, radical, and revisionist.  In his presentation of 
these models, Tracy is concerned with the “subject-referent” (i.e., the person who does 
this form of theology) and “object-referent” (the subject matter the theologian is 
concerned with) of each.   
 First, theologians in the orthodox model seek to uphold the “perennial truths of 
traditional Christianity” against the claims of modernity and postmodernity.3  Orthodox 
theology is concerned with promoting a reasoned defense of traditional claims and tends 
to reject the possibility that other academic fields might have something meaningful to 
contribute to theology.  The subject-referent is the believing member of the church 
community while the object-referent is an organized understanding or explanation of 
their beliefs.4 
 Second, liberal theology accepts the claims of the modern period, necessitating 
that theology account for the truths and ethical demands proposed by the modern secular 
enterprise.5  While the liberal theologian still maintains commitment to Christian 
teaching, the emergence of conflict between the two tends to result in qualifying or even 
abandoning traditional Christian beliefs.  Theology thus adapts itself to modernity 
without making any serious demands in return.  Thus the subject-referent is the 
                                                          
3 BRO 24 
4 BRO 24-5 
5 BRO 25 
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theologian’s “own modern consciousness as committed to the basic values of modernity,” 
while the object-referent is the beliefs of a particular community rearticulated in light of 
the modern project.6   
 Third, the neo-orthodox model is both a development of and a reaction against the 
liberal model.7  The neo-orthodox theologian critiques liberal theology first for 
insufficiently considering the sinfulness of the world and second for inadequately 
maintaining the justification by faith that comes through Jesus Christ.8  This account of 
the human person, as fallen and in need of God’s grace, was seen as a more adequate 
response from the Christian tradition to the contemporary world in which the neo-
orthodox theologians lived.9  By advocating for a dialectical understanding of the 
relationship between humanity and God, the neo-orthodox model proposes as its subject-
referent “the more radical model of the human being of authentic Christian faith” who is 
focused on the object-referent of God as wholly other.10 
 Fourth, the radical model focuses on the liberation of human beings through an 
application of the dialectical approach to the Christian tradition itself.  Represented most 
clearly by the “death of God” movement of the 1960’s and 70’s, this model views the 
God represented in these other models as alienating “the authentic conscience of 
the…liberated contemporary human being.”11  It thus proposes a subject-referent who is 
                                                          
6 BRO 26 
7 E.g. Tracy names Friedrich Schleiermacher as paradigmatic of the liberal model while Karl Barth is his 
exemplar of the neo-orthodox model. 
8 BRO 28 
9 E.g., Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Friedrich Gogarten 
10 BRO 29-30 
11 BRO 31 
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“committed to post-modern, contemporary, secular intellectual and moral values” and an 
object-referent of restated Christianity that jettisons God but retains Jesus as a moral 
exemplar.12 
 Tracy argues that the most adequate among these is fifth model, “revisionist 
theology,” which is rooted in a mutually critical correlation between the Christian fact 
and common human experience.13  This method intends to correlate two sources for 
theology using three distinct but related approaches.  As was stated previously,14 Tracy 
claims that the two sources of theology are the Christian fact and common human 
experience. Analysis of these sources relies on three distinct but interrelated criteria.  
First, the interpretation of the tradition must be appropriate to that tradition, as mediated 
by both the Christian scriptures – the “fundamental although not exclusive expression” of 
this tradition – and also by the doctrines, symbols, and rituals derived from these 
scriptures.15  Second, the theologian’s interpretation of common human experience must 
be adequate.  According to Tracy, this criterion is not only a demand of modern theology, 
but integral to the “universalist, existential assumptions of the New Testament self-
understanding itself.”16  If the Christian claim is that its beliefs and practices have 
universal validity, then they have to give an “understanding of authentic human 
                                                          
12 BRO 31 
13 Cf. David Tracy, “Task of Fundamental Theology,” Journal of Religion 54, no. 1 (January 1974): 14 n. 
3; where Tracy argues for “fact” over “tradition” or “kerygma” because he thinks the latter two options 
imply “that the fundamental theologian need be a believing member of the Christian community.” 
14 Chapter 1, pages 52-7 
15 BRO 44.  Cf. AI 309 
16 BRO 44.  Tracy is drawing on Bultmann and his sense of the “contemporary scientific world view” in 
this claim.  Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 1-8. 
Chapter Two 
87 
 
existence.”17  Third, any mutually critical correlation of these sources must possess 
internal coherence, so that it must achieve a logically coherent articulation of the 
experience or ideas in question.  Tracy claims that although some symbols, images, 
myths, metaphors, etc., may resonate with the authentic lived experience of the human 
person, they may not be susceptible of internal conceptual coherence.18 
 The three approaches Tracy uses in the revisionist model are phenomenological, 
hermeneutical-historical, and metaphysical-transcendental.  The phenomenological 
method investigates common human experience in order to thematize the existential 
meaning revealed in the Christian tradition.  Tracy argues for the phenomenological 
method because the historical trajectory from Edmund Husserl to Langdon Gilkey shows 
that the phenomenological approach is best suited to illuminate the religious dimension of 
common human experience.19 
 The hermeneutical-historical approach focuses on a reconstruction and 
interpretation of central Christian texts.  Such an approach uses historical-critical 
methods to investigate and reconstruct these texts and to provide a more relatively 
adequate rendering of the metaphors, symbols, and ideas to be interpreted by the 
theologian.  Of the two important recent developments in hermeneutics, Tracy notes the 
recognition that the text under consideration has been distanciated from both the author 
                                                          
17 BRO 44 
18 BRO 70 
19 BRO 47-48.  The specific influence of Gilkey on Tracy’s development of a phenomenological approach 
is partly a result of their being colleagues at the University of Chicago Divinity School during the years that 
Tracy was preparing Blessed Rage for Order.  Cf. the extensive citations of Gilkey’s Naming the 
Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) throughout the footnotes of 
BRO. 
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and the text’s original audience.  Thus the interpreter should not be restricted to 
understanding the text in terms of the author or original audience, but concentrate more 
on the meaning disclosed by the text itself.  Secondly, the interpreter has to determine 
both the sense and the referent of the text.20  The sense concerns the internal structure of 
a text, which governs and frames its meaning, while the referent indicates the meaning 
and possibility disclosed by the text in the world of the interpreter.21   
 Tracy claims that his metaphysical-transcendental approach is the most 
controversial element of the revisionist method.  Both the phenomenological and 
hermeneutical-historical approaches retrieve the religious and the theistic bases of 
common human experience and the Christian tradition.  Yet this initial stage of 
correlation, while satisfying the criteria of adequacy and appropriateness, still does not 
settle the more fundamental issue of the truth of these claims.  These claims must instead 
be assessed on their coherence and their basis in common human experience.22 
 The relevant theological truth claims have a fundamentally religious character that 
provides an “ultimate or grounding dimension or horizon” for the broader human 
experience.   Therefore the status of the truth claim pertinent here does not have to do 
with mere correspondence or adequation because while it is one thing to verify or falsify 
these claims, the further task here is to clarify the necessary conditions of possibility for 
                                                          
20 For the distinction between sense and referent, see Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 19-22.  The 
importance of “sense” and “referent” will re-emerge when Tracy distinguishes between the limit-to and 
limit-of dimensions of experience.   
21 BRO 49-52 
22 BRO 53-55 
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these claims.  Tracy insists on going beyond the traditional version of metaphysical 
analysis to the more contemporary transcendental analysis.23   
 The transcendental analysis of both common human experience and the Christian 
tradition is grounded in phenomena that have certain a priori conditions that must be 
fulfilled in order to appear.  Hence, the phenomenological analysis that describes these 
experiences remains necessary but not sufficient for Tracy’s mutually critical correlation.  
Fully reflective philosophical analysis of the sources of theology investigates “the 
conditions for the possibility of the primordial experience of the self.”24  Transcendental 
analysis validates particular truth claims by demonstrating how specific beliefs either 
function as fundamental to or comprise the horizon of all human experience.25   
 
Common Human Experience  
 The “experience of the self” that Tracy has in mind in Blessed Rage for Order is 
one that is common to all humanity.  In the chapter on the criterion of adequacy, Tracy 
describes the “common sense” understanding of experience, in which one assumes that 
others share similar experiences on sensory, emotional, and physical levels, so that we 
experience a sort of resonance in appealing to another’s experience.  For Tracy this 
appeal to common experience is imprecise yet still has a certain accuracy.26 
 Here Tracy makes use of his appropriation of the fourfold structure of human 
consciousness he learned from his mentor, Bernard Lonergan.  Scrutiny of one’s 
                                                          
23 BRO 55-56 
24 BRO 71 
25 BRO 71 
26 BRO 64-66 
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conscious operations reveals four levels: empirical (experience, attentiveness), intelligent 
(understanding), reasonable (judging), and responsible (deliberating, deciding).  The level 
of attention garners the data both of our senses and of conscious operations, which are 
necessary but not sufficient components for knowing.  We not only experience objects in 
the world through sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch, but we are also able consciously 
to experience our experiencing the world, understand our experiencing, understanding, 
judging, deliberating, and deciding; we judge our experiencing, understanding, judging, 
deliberating, and deciding, and so forth.  Human experience is thus not limited to sensory 
experience.  Tracy agrees with Lonergan’s opposition to a narrow “empiricist” concept of 
experience that is taken for granted by many philosophers and social scientists.  The 
appeal to human experience intends something more than “what I can scientifically verify 
through controlled experiment.”27  Indeed, for Tracy this appeal includes the much more 
fundamental question “what is meaningful in human life?” 
 For Tracy, the term “meaningful” indicates “that intrinsic relationship between a 
mediating symbol, image, metaphor, myth, or concept and the immediate lived 
experience of the self.”28  In order to be considered meaningful, such an expression must 
disclose authentic lived experience.  Responding to the question of what is meaningful in 
common human experience requires a “phenomenological-transcendental” approach 
because this combined method investigates not only the relationship between mediating 
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28 BRO 66 
Chapter Two 
91 
 
expressions and the relevant immediate experience but also the conditions of possibility 
of that experience itself.29 
 Based on this analysis, Tracy argues that religious experience is not 
incommensurable with common human experience.  Thus, he typically prefers to speak 
about the “religious dimension of experience” rather than “religious experience.”30  Put 
another way, when one asks “how and in what senses is the religious interpretation of our 
common human experience and language meaningful and true?”31 one cannot reflect 
upon religious experience unless one reflects on common human experience.  The most 
important specification of experience as religious experience is what Tracy names the 
“limit.”32 
 
Limits and the Religious Dimension of Human Experience  
 According to Tracy, the religious dimension of human experience can be 
described as the “basic faith in the worthwhileness of existence, in the final graciousness 
of our lives in the midst of absurdity.”33  This idea of a basic faith or trust, felt but not 
necessarily based on personally verified facts, helps one to grasp Tracy’s sense of limit.  
His analysis of the concept of “limit” is largely motivated by his sense that the debate 
over the meaning of the term “religion” is unproductive.  Tracy recognizes that 
descriptions of the “religious” have recourse either implicitly or explicitly to the limits of 
                                                          
29 BRO 69 
30 Emphasis mine 
31 BRO 91 
32 BRO 93 
33 BRO 119 
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common human experience, thus affirming that there is a “family resemblance” among 
descriptions or explanation of the religions and religious phenomena.34 
 Tracy draws his understanding of limit from Søren Kierkegaard through the 
interpretation of Karl Jaspers.  Tracy attributes the postmodern concern for becoming an 
authentic self in the face of radical limits to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.35  Kierkegaard 
provided early existentialist analyses of the bounded-ness of the human person, which 
pointed to inability of human person’s to exercise total control over one’s fate.36  The 
human is free but experiences anxiety in the face of this freedom.  Unlike fear, anxiety 
has no specific object; rather, it is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”37  
At first, humans experience anxiety precisely because they are free.  Freedom does not 
necessitate sin, but it makes it possible, and so human beings become sinners through 
their exercise of freedom.38  This brings about a second sense of anxiety, in which the 
individual feels trapped by one’s sinfulness. Much as Kierkegaard characterizes one’s 
entry into sinfulness as a “leap,” so too is the individual’s return to God through faith a 
leap.39  Thus Kierkegaard’s understanding of anxiety points to the reality of the free 
human person who experiences radical limitations in the exercise of that freedom.40 
 Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety influenced Jaspers in his development of 
boundary situations.  Jaspers claims that human beings are always in a situation, and the 
                                                          
34 BRO 93 
35 BRO 11 
36 BRO 107 
37 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. and ed. Reidar Thomte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 42 
38 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 22 
39 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 112 (this is where the term “leap of faith” comes from). 
40 BRO 106-7 
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only way to change one’s situation is by moving into another one.  Boundary situations, 
then, are “like a wall we run into” because while there is something beyond these 
boundaries, the boundaries themselves do not change.41  Suffering, guilt, and death are 
boundary situations that are general – “they never change, except in appearance” – but 
that are encountered in the particular historicity of the concrete situation in which one 
lives.42  The self encounters these boundary situations through several “leaps” by which 
one moves from “mundane existence” to “real Existenz in boundary situations.”43  The 
encounter with boundary situations enables the self to become “aware of being,” both in 
one’s immediate situation and ultimately in the “universal boundary situation of all 
existence.”44  These boundary situations help the self to become aware of one’s limits.  
Only through reflection on one’s situation can one come to an awareness of the limits of 
existence. 
 Having learned from Kierkegaard and Jaspers, Tracy emphasizes that the 
experience of the limit indicates the sense that there is something beyond one’s finite 
human experience.  Indeed, it is only in the context of reaching the limit of the everyday, 
mundane engagement with the world that one becomes aware of the limits of human 
experience.  In order to examine more deeply how Tracy develops this idea of limit, we 
need to make three important distinctions: first, the reinterpretation of Ricoeur’s sense-
                                                          
41 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, Volume 2, trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 
178-9 
42 Jaspers, Philosophy, Volume 2, 178, 184 
43 Jaspers, Philosophy, Volume 2, 181-2.  By “Existenz,” Jaspers means the ground or source of the self that 
is characterized by one’s freedom and spontaneity through which one can realize possibilities.  Cf. Karl 
Jaspers, Reason and Existenz (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), 60-63. 
44 Jaspers, Philosophy, Volume 2, 179, 184 
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referent distinction; second, the differences among limit concepts in relation to language, 
experience, situation, and question that follow from this reinterpretation;45 third, Tracy’s 
fundamental distinction between the “limit-to” and “limit-of.” 
 As was noted above, Tracy’s hermeneutical method in theology involves 
understanding both the sense and referent of an expression.  As regards interpreting 
religious expression, Tracy interprets the term sense to mean limit-language, and the term 
referent to denote the limit-experience of a given religious text.46  Tracy uses sense to 
convey that the internal structure of religious expressions consists in some form of limit-
language.  For instance, Tracy investigates the language forms of the New Testament 
(proverbs, eschatological statements, parables) in order to find an “authentically Christian 
limit-language.”47  Such modes of writing and speaking enable the religious expression to 
disclose an authentically human way of living.   
 The term referent means that the limit-experience disclosed in the particular 
expression of itself renders this disclosure of possible ways of living.  Limit-experience 
represents what Tracy calls the “final realm of meaningfulness in our lives” that resides 
in an experience of ultimacy.48  This experience, which is not reducible to either 
supernaturalism or moralism, manifests the profound otherness that enables one to realize 
the limit in one’s life, so that in this sense the limit-experience is the referent of religious 
                                                          
45 This list, though not exhaustive, covers the most important types.  Tracy also applies the “limit” in 
relation to character, concept, and dimension, which are really variations on the four terms listed above.  
Furthermore, the more crucial distinction for Tracy is between “limit-to” and “limit-of.”  In a preliminary 
way, each of the terms applies effectively to the “limit-to,” while the “limit-of” provides the ground or 
horizon of all limit-to.  For more on how the concept of the “horizon” factors into this, see the beginning of 
chapter three below. 
46 BRO 78 
47 BRO 124 
48 BRO 132 
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expression.  Limit-experience discloses newly possible ways to live in a genuinely 
religious and human way.   
 If the distinction between sense and referent establishes the basis for 
distinguishing limit language from limit experience, how does Tracy understand limit-
questions and limit-situations?  Limit-questions deserve an essentially religious 
response.49  Put another way, such questions arise at the limits of particular fields of 
endeavor as questions shift from “how?” and “what?” to the more penetrating “why?”  
 Tracy investigates two examples of limit-questions in the fields of science and 
morality.  With respect to science, Tracy uses Lonergan’s analysis of self-transcendence 
to move beyond the common assertion that religion and science speak in distinct 
languages and instead seek grounds for a religious dimension of science.50  For Lonergan, 
the operator of self-transcendence is the human ability to ask questions.  These questions 
promote the subject from a world of immediacy to a world mediated and constituted by 
meaning.51  Tracy applies this insight to the role of questioning and analyzes the 
scientific process in terms of the levels of intentional consciousness in order to reveal the 
broader horizons of scientific inquiry.  Thus, on the level of questions for understanding, 
Tracy argues that actual scientific questioning implies the “very possibility of fruitful 
inquiry,”52 because were the created universe not in and of itself intelligible, then what 
would be the value of a scientific investigation of it?  If it is intelligible, why is it?  What 
is the origin of that intelligibility?  On the level of judgment, the scientist must consider 
                                                          
49 BRO 94 
50 BRO 95-96 
51 Cf. MT Chapter Three, especially pages 76-81 
52 BRO 98 
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the grounds of or the evidence that warrants one’s scientific and factual judgments.  
Lonergan describes these judgments as “virtually unconditioned” when hypotheses 
specifying conditions that must have been fulfilled in order to be verified are grasped to 
have been actually fulfilled.  These virtually unconditioned judgments, however, depend 
on prior judgments, which themselves depend on prior judgments, and so on.53  Tracy 
insists that the scientist needs to question whether there exists some grounding formally 
unconditioned fact (which has no conditions whatsoever) that ultimately grounds these 
judgments.54  Finally, at the level of deliberation scientists would need to assess the 
ethical import of their scientific judgments by reflecting on whether the “goals, purposes, 
and ideals are themselves worthwhile,” as well as whether there is a ground or horizon of 
worthwhile-ness itself.55 
 Tracy closes his analysis of limit-questions in science with two key points about 
the trajectory outlined here.  First, this trajectory is not imposed by a religious mode of 
thinking.  Rather, he argues that these three levels of questioning are integral to the 
scientific project itself.  Indeed, the self-transcending characteristic of questioning directs 
scientists to ask these sorts of questions about their horizon.  Second, Tracy claims that 
Lonergan’s approach is not the only satisfactory one, but rather one possible avenue.  
Moreover the transcendental approach does not undermine the validity of 
phenomenological, process, and linguistic modes of analysis.56 
                                                          
53 For the “virtually unconditioned,” see Lonergan, Insight, 305-6. 
54 In other words, a “necessary existent.”  
55 BRO 98 
56 BRO 99 
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 The second field that Tracy analyzes with respect to limit-questions is morality.  
He starts by asking whether there is a clear distinction between religious discourse and 
moral discourse.57  Shifting from the Lonerganian account of science, he investigates the 
possibility of limit-questions in morality by referring to Schubert Ogden’s appropriation 
of Stephen Toulmin.  Ogden notes that there are diverse uses of argument among 
aesthetic, moral, religious, and scientific modes of discourse.58  From this perspective, 
moral argument should bring together “our feelings and behavior” for the sake of 
fulfilling the needs and goals of everyone,59 but with the recognition that there is “no 
moral argument for being moral.”60  Indeed, the question of the goal is a limit-question 
that emerges at the boundaries of moral argumentation.   
 While Tracy does consider the fields of science and morality in his handling of 
limit-questions, he concentrates on ordinary, everyday experiences of limit-situations.  
He defines the limit-situation as one in which “a human being ineluctably finds manifest 
a certain ultimate limit or horizon to his or her existence.”61  The idea of the limit-
situation, which developed out of existentialist philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries,62 
is divided between those construed negatively (so-called “boundary” situations) and those 
construed positively (“ecstatic” situations).  The boundary set includes experiences of 
                                                          
57 BRO 101 
58 Schubert Ogden, The Reality of God: And Other Essays (Dallas: SMU Press, 1992), 27-30.  Cf. Stephen 
Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958); Stephen Toulmin, An 
Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
59 BRO 102 
60 BRO 102; cf. Ogden, The Reality of God, 30 
61 BRO 105 
62 See the discussion of Kierkegaard and Jaspers previously on pages 92-3. 
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guilt, anxiety, sickness and death, and their power forces people to recognize their own 
finitude as they confront the stark boundaries of their horizon.63   
 Ecstatic situations also manifest the individual’s finitude in “moments of self-
transcendence”: “When in the grasp of such experiences…we can and do transcend our 
usual lackluster selves and our usual everyday worlds to touch upon a dimension of 
experience which cannot be stated adequately in the language of ordinary, everyday 
experience.”64  Situations of intense joy, authentic love, and even creation can be ecstatic 
situations that indicate one’s finitude.65  So boundary experiences bluntly force the 
individual to question the meaningfulness of existence, while ecstatic experiences gesture 
toward a reality beyond human limitations that may ground an affirmative answer to that 
question.   
 The various kinds of limit outlined above – limit-language and limit-experience as 
the sense and referent of religious experience; the limit-questions of science and morality 
and the limit-situations of everyday life – are based on Tracy’s underlying distinction 
between limit-to and limit-of.  Limit-to refers to human encounters with such limits, while 
limit-of refers to what grounds those limits.  Rather than describing the range of human 
encounters with human limits (such as the differences among limit-experiences, limit-
questions, etc.), the limit-to and limit-of distinction regards limits on the one hand and the 
horizon of these limits on the other.66 
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65 By way of a musical analogy, boundary situations seem to be the minor key while ecstatic situations are 
the major key. 
66 BRO 132-3 
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 To elaborate more concretely, the limit-to refers to those experiences, situations, 
questions, and so forth that indicate the bounds of our human condition.  In a limit-to 
experience, such as death, guilt, or joy, the individual encounters the finite character of 
his/her reality.  Similarly, the limit-questions regarding either the worthwhileness of 
scientific inquiry or the reasons for being moral expose the boundaries of ordinary life.  
All these limit concepts Tracy names “limit-to” insofar as they run into the finite human 
condition. 
 The “limit-of” type indicates or discloses the fundamental reality that grounds all 
of existence and “functions as a final, now gracious, now frightening, now trustworthy, 
now absurd, always uncontrollable limit-of the very meaning of existence itself.”67  The 
limit-of question wonders about the basis for asserting worthwhileness itself or for 
grounding any moral inquiry.  Interestingly, Tracy understands Lonergan’s concept of the 
formally unconditioned in terms of the “limit-of.”   
 Tracy does not venture at this point to refer to the limit-of as “God,” but he leaves 
open a variety of possible ways of naming and encountering this limit-of reality.68  Given 
the centrality of the concept of the limit for distinguishing the religious dimension of 
experience, for Tracy the religious person’s relationship to the limit-of reality is one of 
“basic trust” or “confidence.”69  Basic faith is the reality to which “the religions” bear 
witness, and Tracy thinks it is the most “authentic mode of being in the world.”70 
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Summary  
 In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy primarily interprets finitude in terms of limit.  It 
is crucial for his method’s correlation between common human experience and the 
Christian tradition, and it has significant anthropological implications for his theology.  
This common human experience, while pluralist and broad-ranging, is also universal as 
regards common structures and conditions of possibility.  The encounter with one’s limits 
is the key common human experience Tracy discusses because the limit distinguishes 
religious experience without separating it from a universal sense of experience.  Indeed, 
Tracy is convinced that all people have limit experiences, and so broadly in this sense 
there is a religious dimension to all human lives even though some would not name it that 
way.   
 Tracy uses the limit character of human experience to describe both human 
experiences of the limit and the language people use to express limits, the limit situations, 
and the questions occasioned by or giving rise to their limits.  Further, Tracy’s 
articulation of the limit also encompasses the horizon beyond all limits, so that besides 
something limiting, human limitation indicates a reality beyond the limit-of our 
experience.  Thus the finite human person is inseparable from and related to a reality that 
is both beyond and fundamental to human existence.   
 
The Analogical Imagination  
 The idea of the limit, so central to Tracy’s understanding of finitude in Blessed 
Rage for Order, remains an important concept in The Analogical Imagination.  But 
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Tracy’s understanding of limit evolves with respect to its context and its role in his 
theology.  In exploring how his idea of limit and his understanding of finitude is enriched 
in The Analogical Imagination, there are several key developments to consider.  First, 
Tracy reformulates the method of mutually critical correlation by speaking of the 
contemporary situation instead of the pole of common human experience.71  Second, this 
change in the method of correlation enables him to clarify the difference between 
fundamental and systematic theology, particularly as they involve the reality of the limit.  
Third, Tracy rearticulates his notion of “limit-of” by placing it in the context of “the 
whole.”  Fourth, Tracy’s ongoing investigation into pluralism leads to a more fully 
developed notion of the pluralism internal to the individual.  Together these 
developments deepen Tracy’s understanding of finitude in his second constructive book. 
 
Methodological Shift I: The Contemporary Situation  
 As was noted above, in Blessed Rage for Order Tracy’ method of correlation 
explains the interplay between the two poles of the Christian fact and common human 
experience, the latter of which brings out the anthropological implications of this method.  
This reciprocal interaction is the basis from which Tracy explores the religious dimension 
of common human experience, which is marked primarily by its limit character.  
However, in The Analogical Imagination, Tracy substantially re-thinks this pole 
inasmuch as he clarifies and conceives the mutually critical correlation in terms of the 
poles of the Christian tradition and the contemporary situation. 
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 The contemporary situation expands on what he previously called “common 
human experience.”  His concern with “fundamental questions of the meaning of human 
existence” remains operative in this pole,72 and it continues to be a reality that demands 
interpretation by the theologian.73  Tracy also describes the interpretive process in the 
same language he uses in Blessed Rage for Order, claiming that the theologian must ask 
“first, whether the situation is accurately analyzed (usually this proves an extra-
theological discussion); second, why this situation is said to be a religious dimension 
and/or import and thereby merits or demands a theological response.”74  The distinction 
between an experience or situation and its religious dimension is still part of the structure 
of Tracy’s thinking. 
 Of the significant differences between the ideas of contemporary situation and 
common human experience, the most important has to do with the situation, which places 
the accent on context.  In the case of theological method, he is specifically concerned 
with the context—defined by culture, time, history, and tradition—in which the 
theologian works.75  For example, Tracy compares the situation in which he wrote The 
Analogical Imagination with that of Paul Tillich: “our situation poses no one dominant 
question,” so that Tillich’s concerns “may now be viewed as one fundamental and 
permanent question in the present postexistentialist situation.”76  Tracy in fact wonders if 
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the most basic issue in his situation is whether there are any valuable fundamental 
questions at all – and if so, what might those questions be and for whom.77   
 According to Tracy, the situation is co-determined by a range of different factors, 
including economic, political, social, technological, and cultural forces.  In his own 
situation, Tracy observes that the theologian’s ability to make meaningful claims is 
undermined by the situation’s post-Christian and post-modern character.78  Other factors 
include the decline of the Enlightenment myth of progress, the development of nuclear 
energy and weapons, and the growth of scientific positivism.   
 The depth and breadth of this array of forces significantly modify Tracy’s 
situational pole in the method of mutually critical correlation.  He felt compelled to move 
beyond Lonergan’s understanding of human consciousness and a preoccupation with 
existentialist concerns about meaning.  The concept of the contemporary situation 
sublates those concerns into the broader context of social location and historicity, both of 
the human person and of the human race.  Tracy’s mutually critical correlation has 
become less existential (i.e. focusing on limit experiences of individuals) and more 
contextual.   
 This shift in method further is clearly registered in Tracy’s understanding of 
finitude in theological anthropology because the context of the individual person is 
constitutive of who that person is.  Tracy himself became more aware of how his own 
socio-economic location as a white, male, middle-class, North American Catholic priest 
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had influenced his understanding of theology.79  Furthermore, he now attended more to 
how the cultural context of language – one of the most fundamental milieus – conditions 
the ways one experiences, understands, reasons, and deliberates about the world.  These 
and other forms of conditioning set the limited context through which an individual 
person engages the wider world.  Of course these factors, which define the contemporary 
situation, are also constitutive of human finitude. 
 
Methodological Shift II: The Limit in Fundamental and Systematic Theology  
 After noting how the idea of “the limit” is one of the central categories in Blessed 
Rage for Order, we turn to how the limit category continues to be useful (if less 
important) in The Analogical Imagination.   AI re-contextualizes the limit in two 
particular ways: first, as a result of the shift discussed above, the distinction between the 
“limit-to” and “limit-of” now enters into Tracy’s distinction between fundamental and 
systematic theology; second, his new focus on “the whole” reframes the “limit-of.” 
 In the first chapter, I characterized the distinction between fundamental and 
systematic theology by saying that fundamental theology examines generalizable 
warrants for truth claims while systematic theology is concerned with the commitment to 
particular truth claims within a certain theological community.80  The discourse of 
fundamental theology, though influenced by specific traditions, employs arguments that 
                                                          
79 This particular clarification is arguably only incipient in The Analogical Imagination with later texts 
better developing this point (cf. DWO 6).  However, the basic thrust here is already evident in AI in the way 
he particularizes the historical context of contemporary theology. 
80 “…the move from fundamental to systematic theology is logically always a move from the abstract, 
general, universal, necessary features of a ‘religious dimension’ in all reality to the particular, concrete 
reality of an ‘explicit religion’” (AI 162). 
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should be accessible to all intelligent, reasonable, responsible people even without any 
prior faith commitment.  Arguments in systematic theology do presuppose that the 
interlocutors share some degree of fidelity to a particular tradition.  Therefore, while 
Tracy argues in AI that both discourses have their own classics, systematic theology 
primarily focuses on religious classics that both generate and develop particular 
traditions.81   
 Tracy explains the relationship between fundamental and systematic theology by 
recalling the distinction between the limit-to (those experiences or situations that 
manifest the finite character of human existence) and the limit-of (the horizon that 
grounds these limit-to experiences).  Tracy explains that theologians “can and must move 
from an analysis of the limit-to experiences proper to fundamental theology and risk an 
interpretation of the reality of a limit-of disclosure in the explicitly religious classics of 
our own tradition.”82  At the level of the limit-to “fundamental questions, needs and 
desires” arise in which all intelligent, reasonable, and responsible persons can engage 
without prior faith commitments.  At the level of the limit-of individuals make 
commitments to a particular “religious revelation” that “should resonate to the ‘limit-to’ 
questions and situations” that they experience.83  Systematic theology not only responds 
to these fundamental questions but also transforms them.  Systematic theology attempts 
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to interpret and articulate the classic formulations of the limit-of reality and must 
therefore speak to the questions and issues raised by fundamental theology.84   
 
The Limit-of and the Whole  
 In addition to using the limit-to/limit-of distinction in order to differentiate 
fundamental from systematic theology, Tracy re-thinks the limit-of concept in relation to 
the “whole.”  In a trajectory like that in Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy introduces the 
idea of the “whole” in the course of reiterating his academic hesitancy to define religion.  
Tracy says this results from wanting to resist the claim that religion is just one of the 
many possible ways of perceiving the world because he is convinced that, far from being 
a perspective from which to interpret some part of human experience, it instead 
“articulates some sense of the whole” and it embraces no less than a total and basic 
horizon.85   
 In his revision of the limit-of as “the whole,” Tracy enhances his notion of 
finitude in an important way.  First, he is able to maintain that “the limit” is the 
distinguishing feature of the religious dimension.  The limit-of had previously been 
characterized as the ground or horizon of human limit-experiences.  Whenever human 
persons encountered experiences that revealed their finitude, this sense of the limit was 
always confronted by the limit-of.  By “the whole” as another way of talking about this 
facet of the limit concept, Tracy again means the basic reality that grounds human 
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experience, a ground encountered in the most profound and revelatory way in limit 
experiences and situations.   
 Second, the concept of “the whole” affords Tracy a more effective way to explain 
the relationship between culture and religion.  In Tracy’s earlier analysis of the three 
publics, culture is the highest level of the public “society” that, according to Clifford 
Geertz’s definition of culture, passes on an ethos and a worldview over time that 
constitutes a population’s “knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”86  According to 
Tracy, an ethos is “the tone, character and quality of life—its ‘style,’” and a worldview is 
“the picture people have of the way things in actuality are.”87  The religious perspective 
on the whole unites the ethos and worldview88 so that one of the most basic religious 
assertions is to the effect that the way people ought to live and the reality in which they 
do live are not incompatible or antagonistic but are in fact profoundly interrelated. 
 Once he shifted to the whole, Tracy started to abandon the terminology, but not 
the meaning, of “the limit.”  Besides improving his conceptual clarity regarding the 
meaning of the “ground” or “horizon” of human experience, this shift expands his 
understanding of human finitude in the more contextual dimension of culture as one of 
the factors that conditions human living.  The methodological shift from common human 
                                                          
86 AI 7; Geertz defines culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
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Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89). 
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88 AI 164.  Here Tracy is relying on Geertz’ definition of religion: “a system of symbols which acts to 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [ethos] by formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence [worldview] and clothing these conceptions with such an aura 
of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, “Religions as a Cultural 
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experience to the contemporary situation in mutually critical correlation brings with it a 
greater awareness of how one’s culrutral location sets the limits of one’s existence.  If 
Tracy once stressed that individuals come to grips with a sense of finitude in limit 
situations such as death or joy, he now dwells on how language, concepts, rituals, and 
symbols guide our understanding of how those situations now are understood as directed 
by culture.  The ethos and worldview of the culture, united within a religious perspective, 
are still unique and historically situated for any person’s experience.  In short, recasting 
“the limit-of” as “the whole” helped Tracy recognize the role of culture in understanding 
human finitude. 
 
The Internal Pluralism of the Self  
 Finally, deeper understanding of one of the dominant themes in Tracy’s theology 
– pluralism – in The Analogical Imagination is expressed in the idea of the internal 
pluralism of the individual.  In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy was not unlike many of his 
interlocutors in emphasizing the plural, social, historical, and intellectual context of 
theology.  He urged a deeper consideration of the pluralism among and within the various 
religious perspectives and traditions, but his anthropology focused on the “universal and 
elemental features of human existence” that recur throughout the various religions.89  
BRO regarded pluralism as pervasive in the world but only considered the persons who 
make up this pluralistic world as unitary and rather isolated selves. 
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 In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy’s idea of internal individual pluralism starts 
to emerge.  He focuses in this regard initially on the three publics of the theologian: the 
academy, the church, and the wider society.90  The theologian, as an intellectual who 
participates in a faith tradition, has a responsibility to engage all three publics 
discursively.   In AI Tracy draws attention to the fact that these publics are not merely 
three external audiences but are also internalized discourses.91  The academy is 
internalized in the ethical demand for honest, rational inquiry the church in the faith and 
truth commitments of the tradition, and the wider society in the expression of authentic 
social concerns and modes of argument proper to the economic, political, and cultural 
realms.92  Each of the publics, both as external audience and as internal commitment, has 
specific issues regarding meaning and truth to which theologians must respond.93   
 There are two points that follow from Tracy’s formulation of internal pluralism.  
The first is that not only theologians but also other intellectuals have to negotiate internal 
pluralism.  While theologians’ work bears explicit meanings pertaining to the church 
public, like other intellectuals they also speak to multiple publics.  A chemist, for 
                                                          
90 In addition to the basic description of the publics here and in chapter one, there is a more in depth 
examination of them in the following chapter. 
91 AI 3 
92 AI 29 
93 One underdeveloped question in Tracy is the potential for conflict among the theologian’s commitments 
to the three publics.  In general, Tracy seems to see the “plausibility structures” of the different publics to 
be complementary, not conflictual, and thus any sense of conflict seems to be more methodological than 
substantive.  While he hints at the “complexity” of the situation, he does not go into the possibility that, 
both methodologically and substantively, these commitments might conflict with each other.  His 
understanding of the discourses in which especially the academy and the church participate tends to be 
idealistic, since it scarcely accounts for obscurantism in either public.  For instance, what happens when the 
academy’s commitment to authentic inquiry crashes into the academic demands of “publish or perish”?  Is 
it possible that the academy’s requirements to attain legitimacy in a field (e.g., tenure) can hinder 
thoughtful and sustained investigation? 
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instance, would need to speak to the academy and the wider society.94  The demands of 
both inquiry and social concern would have to animate this chemist’s work.  The 
internalization of the requirements of public discourse does not apply only to theologians.  
Furthermore, even though the church as a public may not have to be engaged by fields 
outside theology, by no means does this mean that representatives from the other publics 
should never speak to the church as an authentic public.95 
 The second point Tracy handles with some subtlety.  At the heart of his 
description of the three publics is their status as communities of discourse.96  Both the 
academy and the church are voluntary communities whose membership and pursuit of 
intellectual inquiry are freely chosen.  While these publics provide audiences for 
intellectuals, many of the members associated with them may not speak or even identify 
themselves.  This is perhaps most obviously the case in the church, whose members are 
not only religiously-minded intellectuals but also those “in the pews” who participate in 
the communal and liturgical life of the church in ways that do not require a public 
voice.97  Yet even if people are not engaging in public discourse within the academy or 
the church, they internalize the commitments and demands of these publics by reason of 
their voluntary association with these communities. 
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95 For example, the recent explosion of literature on science and theology is evidence that among the most 
widely read authors in this conversation, many have been scientists speaking with varying degrees of 
success on issues of theology and religion.  For example, see Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2006); Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for 
Belief (New York: Free Press, 2006). 
96 AI 21 
97 In the case of the academy, one could plausibly argue that the academy includes not only students, whose 
participation in the academic conversation is often limited in various ways, but also professors who are 
largely disengaged from academic research and publication. 
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 On the other hand, the public of society at large is not really a voluntary 
association.  Rather, most individuals belong to society without expressly choosing to do 
so.98  Indeed, human finitude entails that elements in the contemporary situation – 
including the society – are not under the control of the individual person.  Society 
includes both voluntary connections (e.g., political affiliation) and involuntary ones (e.g., 
family or ethnicity).99  These multiple associations involve multiple and often conflicting 
commitments.  The individual can be pulled in different directions as a result of this 
internal pluralism.  The resultant attempt to reconcile these differing commitments further 
demonstrates the finite and limited capacity of the human person.  Thus, while Tracy 
approaches the idea of internal pluralism in the context of the intellectual situation of the 
theologian, I contend that it applies more broadly as a general feature of finite human 
experience. 
 
Summary  
 In many ways, Tracy’s Analogical Imagination is a re-interpretation of his earlier 
work.  He re-contextualizes and expands upon many of the themes from Blessed Rage for 
Order.  Most dramatically, he clarifies and strengthens the methodology of mutually 
critical correlation by thematizing the contemporary situation and subsuming common 
human experience into it.  Moreover, by adjusting his distinctions among the sub-
                                                          
98 This claim may also be true in many cases for members of the public of the church, who might be 
initiated as children prior to any decision on their part.  While this adds an important nuance to my claim 
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membership in the church or to leave it.  This decision is not however feasible for most individuals with 
respect to the public of society. 
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disciplines of theology (particularly fundamental and systematic theology) he was able to 
re-work the idea of the limit in a manner more consistent with his methodology. 
 As I have sought to demonstrate in this section, Tracy thinks out the role of 
finitude in anthropology more subtly as he takes a more contextual approach to theology.  
The shift from common human experience to the contemporary situation, using limit-to 
and limit-of to differentiate fundamental from systematic theology, the explication of the 
“limit-of” in relation to “the whole,” and the thematization of individual internal 
pluralism are all indications that Tracy maintains the stress on the limit while also 
showing hoe importantng other aspects of finitude are.  Limits to human experience 
encountered at the extremes (e.g., death, guilt, intense joy) continue to be significant for 
understanding human finitude.  For Tracy, there is an unmistakable sense that there is 
something beyond human life constraining or even bordering it in these experiences and 
in the questions people ask about the genuinely mysterious aspects of life. 
 Tracy gives much greater consideration to social context as he thinks about 
human finitude in The Analogical Imagination.  Both the factors that co-determine the 
human situation and the commitments that affect one’s own experience of internal 
pluralism demonstrate that social context is a dominant aspect of our experience of 
finitude.  Each individual is born in a particular time and place, grows up within a 
particular language (or set of languages), and is shaped by particular cultural, political, 
and economic forces.  During a specific arc of history, every person makes specific 
commitments to various communities within a unique constellation of forces that 
condition, set boundaries for, and limit their lives.  These limiting factors condition but 
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do not determine people so that a person can learn new languages, form new 
commitments (or break old ones), or even move to a different place or a new culture.  
Rather, human finitude means that an individual is shaped by one’s historicity, as the sum 
of contingent particularities that enter somehow into the constitution of one’s reality.  The 
person, for Tracy, is finite not only in relation to but also in relation to their social 
context. 
 
Plurality and Ambiguity  
 Tracy follows The Analogical Imagination with the shorter Plurality and 
Ambiguity.  In this text he examines the topic of conversation in three main moments.100  
First, conversation is a useful model for interpretation since interpretation is most 
basically a conversation with the text.101  Second, there are “radical interruptions” to 
conversation that are discussed under the headings of pluralism and ambiguity.102  
Finally, religion is capable of helping us to resist our vulnerabilities vis-à-vis those 
interruptions.103 
 A description of what ideal conversation would be frames Tracy’s argument.  
Such conversation is a game in which the participants in the interaction are not self-
conscious about their participation.  Those who play the game let both the object and as 
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well as the rules of the game take over.104  In conversation, this object or focus is the 
question or questions that evoke the conversation.105  By allowing questions to take 
control, the participants in the conversation open themselves to the possibility of 
authentic communication undistorted by ego or ideology.  Sincerity on the part of the 
participants, equality among them, and openness to shared understandings of what 
constitutes a valid and coherent argument are among the marks of such ideal 
communication.106   
 Nonetheless, such conversation is ideal and something rarely achieved since, in 
fact, “we never find ourselves in the ideal speech situation.”107  Both plurality and 
ambiguity interrupt this ideal.  Pluralism as a recurring theme in Tracy’s theology 
includes pluralism among traditions, within traditions, and within individuals.  Now 
Tracy turns his attention to plurality among and within languages, traditions, and 
histories.108  Such plurality is a fact that can lead to conflict.  Yet, precisely because 
pluralism is a fact, it must be engaged, not by genial toleration, but rather by renewed 
conversation.  “Ambiguity” refers to the complicated mix of good and evil present in 
those languages, traditions, and histories.  As an example, Tracy claims that the dominant 
metanarrative of progress in modernity is no longer compelling because it conceals the 
                                                          
104 Tracy has also used the phrase “in the zone” to describe this experience (NCFT).  Cf. Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, 102-108; Paul Ricoeur, “Appropriation,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and 
trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 185-190; Jacques Derrida, 
“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 289-293. 
105 PA 18 
106 PA 26.  Tracy thinks of argument as a subset of conversation for Tracy, and he deems it most effective 
when it is a part of a larger conversation (PA 23) 
107 PA 26 
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destructive and oppressive events and themes within.109  Ambiguity requires the 
recognition that there “is no innocent interpretation, no innocent interpreter, no innocent 
text.”110   
 In relation to conversation and the interruptions of pluralism and ambiguity, Tracy 
continues to explore the human experience of finitude.  First, in relation to the role of 
social context elaborated in AI, he analyzes the human person as an interpreting and 
knowing person.  Second, he expands upon the language of the limit-of and the whole 
vis-à-vis the growing engagement with religious pluralism.  Finally, his growing attention 
to otherness affects understanding of internal pluralism.   
 
Human as Interpreting and Knowing  
 Tracy’s reflections on conversation in Plurality and Ambiguity begin with a 
consideration of the French Revolution.  He uses this historical event because the widely 
divergent interpretations of it add depth to his analysis of the process of interpretation, 
which he considers one of the most ubiquitous aspects of human living.  Drawing again 
on Lonergan’s transcendental precepts, Tracy claims that whenever “we act, deliberate, 
judge, understand, or even experience, we are interpreting.”111  In interpreting, the person 
engages with some phenomenon that needs to be understood, whether a text, an event, or 
another person.112  Tracy describes the phenomenon as having both the stability of some 
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constant or repeatable meaning and the instability of its susceptibility to ongoing and 
divergent interpretations.113  Tracy wishes to disabuse the reader of any doctrines of 
autonomous texts or readers because ambiguities also inhabit those phenomena already 
so that they require interpretation. 
 As a human activity, interpreting is marked by finitude.  First of all, 
interpretations, especially those regarding what is meaningful or important, are not final; 
they can only be more or less adequate given the phenomena available.  Achieving an 
interpretation with relative adequacy114 is certainly “worth striving for,” but it is never 
definitive or complete.115  Moreover, since knowledge is only relatively adequate, human 
knowing is never absolutely certain.  Thus one can, at best, only know when there are 
“no further relevant questions…to know when [one knows] enough.”116 
 Secondly, the finite character of these interpretations derives from the finite 
character of those doing the interpreting.117  Even interpretations of those “who have 
encountered the [infinite] power of Ultimate Reality” are interpretations by “finite and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
necessary when we encounter some phenomenon worth interpreting is a willingness to “risk our present 
understanding” (103).  Moreover, with respect to the “preferential option for the poor,” Tracy understands 
this to mean not that the interpretations by the poor are the only valid interpretations to be “passively 
receive[d]” by all others, but that “the oppressed are the ones most likely to hear clearly the full religious 
and political demands of the prophets,” and thus theirs are the interpretations “the rest of us most need to 
hear” (103-4). 
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114 The notion of relative adequacy in Plurality and Ambiguity is largely an extension of that in The 
Analogical Imagination.  Perhaps the only notable difference is that in AI, the question of relative adequacy 
primarily revolves around religious expressions and their greater or lesser ability to explain religious 
experience and phenomena.  This meaning certainly persists in PA, but it is more explicitly expanded to 
include interpretations beyond those of religious expressions (e.g. the French Revolution). 
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contingent” human beings.118  Interpretation is not only an act that issues from particular 
people; it also emerges from particular communities and contexts.  These communities 
and contexts in definite moments in history are “bounded by a particular sex, race, class, 
and education.”119  They are limited by the very language used then by these people at 
this place in conversation and interpretation.  Because interpretation and knowledge are 
rooted in the conversational character of the human person, they are limited by the others 
with whom the conversation takes place.  In the end, human knowledge is “embodied, 
communal, finite, discursive,”120 so that interpretation and knowledge are finite precisely 
because human existence is finite. 
 Finally, in Tracy’s understanding, interpretation as marked by human finitude 
must take interruption into account.  Perhaps Tracy’s finest description of interruption 
occurs in his 1984 Concilium piece on the Holocaust, where he says that theology must 
retrieve “the sense of history as interruption, as rupture, break, discontinuity in 
apocalyptic, the retrieval of liberation over easy announcements of reconciliation, the 
retrieval of the social systemic expression of sin over individual sins, the retrieval of the 
concrete praxis of discipleship.”121  Such interruptive events and histories disrupt the 
easy, often self-valedictory narratives of human history.  Interruptions force the 
theologian to recognize that the contemporary question for theology is not about the non-
believer, but the non-person.122  An interruptive understanding of history depends on 
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previous intellectual gains in the ideas of historical consciousness and historicity,123 but it 
pays greater attention to the hitherto often ignored realities embedded in history.  For 
Tracy, only authentic recognition of interruption can uncover the contingent, limited 
aspects of human history so often concealed by grander narratives that belie the finite 
character of human living.  Facing these interruptions allows the theologian (among 
others) to see not only the conditioning role played by historico-social contexts in one’s 
interpretations, but also the incongruous, pockmarked, and contradictory elements that 
constitute our contemporary situation and history. 
 
The Limit-of, the Whole, and Ultimate Reality  
 In the course of Tracy’s examination of finitude, which has included ever more 
factors such as social context, historicity, and language, the role of the “limit-of” or the 
ground remains important in his thought.  In Plurality and Ambiguity, his terminology on 
this theme changes to “Ultimate Reality.”  Its qualities are familiar: believers have a 
fundamental trust in Ultimate Reality;124 religions develop out of revelations and 
manifestations of this Ultimate Reality;125 and this reality is fundamentally mysterious 
and beyond human grasp.126  Although there is less emphasis on the limiting role of 
Ultimate Reality in human existence, Tracy’s new term is in line with his previous 
attempts to choose language that refers to God while still being sufficiently distinct from 
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blatantly Christian speech about God to be universally accessible.127  For instance, limit-
of, the whole, and Ultimate Reality connote the aspects of mystery, ultimacy, and 
relatedness characteristic of traditional Christian ways of talking about God, yet his use 
of them, although open to Trinitarian and (to a lesser extent) Christological discourses 
about God, does not necessarily entail such beliefs.128   
 Tracy’s change to Ultimate Reality seems related to his early engagement with 
certain strands of Buddhism.129  If Christians and Buddhists cannot encounter one 
another’s traditions in a context-free manner, this calls for a genuine openness to change 
in order for that conversation to happen.  Tracy warns that “even the most refined 
concepts of theism can function as fatal evasions of Ultimate Reality.”130  This issue, 
among other topics in interreligious conversation, can enable traditions to rethink their 
own understandings, beliefs, and terminology.  Absent Tracy’s own explicit justification 
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128 This claim is somewhat qualified because in The Analogical Imagination, Jesus Christ is not only a 
Christian classic, but the Christian classic par excellence.  This means that Jesus is the most perfectly 
adequate manifestation of “the whole” by the power of “the whole.”  Tracy’s construal of Christ as the 
Christian classic effects a strong conceptual connection between Jesus and “the whole,” a connection that is 
much stronger than any connection between Jesus and either the “limit-of” in BRO or “Ultimate Reality” in 
PA.  Therefore, Tracy’s use of “the whole” in AI has implications for Christological discourse. 
 In Plurality and Ambiguity, all the references to Jesus are offhand, usually an example of 
difficulties in interpretation.  In a contemporaneous article, however, Tracy makes a more specific 
connection between “Ultimate Reality” and Christology.  As for the risk of an understanding of Christian 
salvation too exclusively focused on its existential qualities, Tracy writes “At least this is so unless the 
distinctively Christian understanding of the nature of Ultimate Reality as the God who Loves as manifested 
in Jesus Christ is not kept clearly and consistently in view in any discussion of Christian salvation” 
(emphasis author’s) (Tracy, “The Christian Understanding of Salvation-Liberation,” 131).  Tracy’s 
emphasis indicates that the terminology of “Ultimate Reality” is not a specifically or exclusively Christian 
one, but rather that this term can be “baptized” in the sense of reading it through the lens of Christian 
convictions about Jesus.  Thus the term “Ultimate Reality,” though not mutually exclusive with 
Christological discourse, is also not inherently or necessarily related to it.  
129 PA 94.  Tracy’s active involvement in interreligious dialogue begins around 1984 (the lectures DWO is 
based on were given in 1988, and he refers to his “four-year experience of Buddhist-Christian dialogue 
(DWO 73)), but it begins to decline in the mid-1990’s.   
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for his shift in terms in PA, it seems plausible to suppose that he sought more 
recognizably pluralistic language in order to foster such conversation.131 
 Connected to this change in terminology is the fact that Tracy appeared to regard 
fundamental trust as also more ambiguous.  Previously, Tracy had ascribed “trust” to the 
basic attitude or disposition of a person towards “the limit-of” and “the whole.”  After 
clarifying the power of interruption, especially in the forms of plurality and ambiguity, he 
now realizes that this sense of trust “is not immune to either criticism or suspicion.”132  
This critical or suspicious posture is not necessarily directed at the Ultimate Reality itself 
but rather becomes more nuanced in relation to the historically mediated interpretations 
of Ultimate Reality by religious traditions.  In this text, Tracy refuses to accept that on 
their face religious traditions are unambiguous and innocent.  Thus, he calls for a critical 
attitude in the face of their ambiguities.  If religious traditions can resist lazy pluralism or 
ignored ambiguities, for Tracy this is due to fundamental trust in Ultimate Reality, which 
empowers human liberation.  Nonetheless, for the first time Tracy also makes a real 
demand for a critical attitude towards one’s own fundamental trust. 
 The use of the term “Ultimate Reality” also has two specific repercussions for his 
understanding of finitude.  First, as always for Tracy, finitude means that sees the human 
                                                          
131 It seems clear that Tracy’s adoption of the term “Ultimate Reality” occurred under the influence of John 
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Ambiguity (See David Tracy, “Hermeneutics as Discourse Analysis: Sociality, History, Religion,” Archivo 
di Filosofia 54 (1986): 279 and “Christianity in the Wider Context: Demands and Transformations,” in 
Worldviews and Warrants: Plurality and Authority in Theology, eds. William Schweiker and Per M. 
Anderson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987)8). Indeed, Tracy’s student, Chester Gillis, 
completed his dissertation on Hick  (later published as A Question of Final Belief: John Hick’s Pluralistic 
Theory of Salvation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989)) in 1986, a work that Tracy cites in PA 137n23.  
Further, see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 9-11.  
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person is finite in relation to the infinite, i.e., Ultimate Reality; now his basic definition of 
sin in this text is the denial of one’s finitude and dependence on Ultimate Reality.133  
Secondly, the development of Tracy’s critical lens required a more thorough analysis of 
the cultural and contextual aspects of human living.  Tracy’s use of “the whole” in AI 
depended on Clifford Geertz’s definition of culture, which implied that in a religious 
tradition that emphasizes the whole, both ethos and worldview are indissolubly linked.  In 
Plurality and Ambiguity, Tracy is much more prone to challenge such a union, to 
question whether this is the case, and to call on believers to examine whether their 
traditions have failed to act in accord with the concrete implications of such a union.  The 
socio-cultural context that places constraints upon human living demands a hermeneutics 
of suspicion for the sake of a genuine, finite, and contingent human existence.  Thus, the 
shift to the language of Ultimate Reality corresponds to the emergence of a heightened 
critical perspective of history as interruptive because for Tracy, it is precisely the 
relationship to and dependence on Ultimate Reality that grounds and sustains the human 
ability to face and to resist the distortions and ambiguities, not only in religious traditions, 
but in broader cultural systems as well.  
 
Internal Pluralism and Otherness  
 In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy expanded his understanding of pluralism in 
three ways: among traditions, within traditions, and within individuals.  Individual 
internal pluralism is a facet of human finitude brought about both by the different publics 
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to which theologians respond and by their various individual commitments.  Possessing 
different attachments and responsibilities inherently risks conflict that may force people 
to recognize their limitations even when relating with others.   
 In Plurality and Ambiguity, internal pluralism is still an aspect of finitude, but 
Tracy adds significant nuances to the notion.  Beyond the divergent factors pulling an 
individual in different directions, the specifically modern philosophical claim of a 
coherent self is called into question.  Tracy’s critique of the coherent self begins with the 
development of linguistics and the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, 
which renders obsolete the once prevalent idea that language is an instrument wielded 
intentionally by the self.  In this view, language is merely secondary in relation to the 
primary, pre-linguistic phenomena it signifies.134  Tracy acknowledges that language is 
prior to the individual who is born into it.  One is “talked into talk” by talking, and comes 
to understand the world through “play” with language.135  Human experience is mediated 
through language, and each language is public, shared, and particular.  We are, for Tracy, 
linguistic beings, not beings who can choose or not choose to use language to engage 
reality.  Every encounter is linguistically mediated.136 
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135 Cf. Gadamer on the idea of play in language: Gadamer, Truth and Method, 102-138.  For the paraphrase 
“talked into talk” as it applies to Gadamer, see Fred Lawrence, “Gadamer, the Hermeneutic Revolution, 
and Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert J. Dostal (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 185. 
136 PA 50.  Tracy examines other models of language – structuralism (Saussure, Levi-Strauss), differential 
non-system (Derrida), and discourse (Benveniste) – in order to arrive at a more relatively adequate model 
(discourse analysis).  See PA chapter 3 for his account of how language relates to the interruption caused by 
plurality.  For his more thorough examination of discourse analysis, see Tracy, “Hermeneutics as Discourse 
Analysis,” especially pp 261-271.  Chapter 4, “Sin,” of this dissertation will discuss how his understanding 
of language relates to sin and systemic distortion. 
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 Historicity is tied indissolubly to the linguistic character of the human person.  
Besides being concerned with a person’s historical situation as providing one set of 
boundaries to one’s finite existence, Tracy also confronts the radically ambiguous nature 
of human living based on the fact that histories are not just simple narratives of progress 
and grace, but rather deeply problematic stories in both positive and negative ways.137  
This means that we not only belong to and participate in histories and in the interruption 
to those histories.138  Our personal histories too are riddled with ambiguity.   
 These two basic interruptions by the plurality of language and by the ambiguity of 
history underlie Tracy’s decisive new concern with the question of otherness in relation 
to internal pluralism and finitude.  “The other” is the partner in conversation, and when a 
question takes over in conversation, one may recognize the other as other; one may see 
what real difference, not only as suggestive of possibilities beyond one’s experience, but 
also as harboring similarities to one’s own experience.139  In the measure that 
conversations are authentic, then partners are opened to possible transformations elicited 
by the encounter with difference.  Indeed, in engaging with others as other makes one 
aware of alternative external and internal possibilities. 
 Based on the recognitions to which conversations give rise, Tracy claims that the 
“most radical otherness is within.”140  This confirms once again his recurrent challenge to 
the modern autonomous self, inasmuch as the postmodern understanding of the self “is 
caught between conscious activity and a growing realization of the radical otherness not 
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only around but within us.”141  Thus beyond the possibilities that emerge from outside us, 
Tracy alerts us to the unconscious parts of our selves that are not entirely under our 
control.  As a result, he insists that human knowing is limited to relative adequacy and 
our self-understanding and self-control are ultimately limited by the lack of “transparency 
of consciousness to itself.”142  It follows that interruptions of plurality and ambiguity 
profoundly affect traditions, texts, and conversations as well as our very selves.  And so, 
Tracy concludes that “at best” the coherence of the self in the postmodern context “will 
be a rough coherence: interrupted, obscure, often confused, self-conscious of its own 
language use and, above all, aware of the ambiguities of all histories and traditions.”143   
 
Summary  
 The theme of Tracy’s Plurality and Ambiguity is conversation together with the 
conditions that favor and thwart it.  Authentic conversation according to this text depends 
upon the degree of awareness on the part of those involved concerning their own 
pluralities and ambiguities, as well as their openness to transformation as the 
conversation is driven by its questions.144  Yet these pluralities and ambiguities, as well 
as those inscribed in the wider histories, traditions, and languages explain why Tracy’s 
“ideal speech situation” is always actually derailed.  As worth striving for the ideal is a 
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standard for judging real conversations; Tracy, however, is convinced that the ideal 
speech situation always be unattainable. 
 Whether as ideal or as falling short, Tracy’s treatment of conversation adds 
further depth to his understanding of finitude.  Our experience of conversation is finite 
because its participants are finite, and their interpretations and knowledge are limited and 
at best relatively adequate.  The more self-aware interlocutors are, the more likely they 
will be to recognize how their socio-historical contexts co-determine their conversations 
as well as the effects of pluralities and ambiguities upon situations and experiences.  
Tracy also confronts the potentially negative and even destructive factors that limit 
human existence.  Having brought the masters of suspicion to bear as important 
correctives in The Analogical Imagination, in Plurality and Ambiguity he emphasizes 
even more starkly the relevance of the hermeneutics of suspicion.145   
 Lastly, a further advance in this text is evident in Tracy’s distinction between 
finitude vis-à-vis the rest of creation versus finitude in relation to the infinite.  In the first 
case, finitude is experience in terms of the aspects of one’s life that distinguish one 
individual from others.  One’s context, which is conditioned by race, gender, class, creed, 
location, and era, provides a significant constraint on one’s existence.  Moreover, it is not 
only those factors beyond one’s control (e.g., race, era) that affect the particularities of an 
individual person but also those factors over which the person exercises some degree of 
control (e.g., creed, location).  The encounter with otherness, within one’s self externally, 
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Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud as “[t]hree masters, seemingly mutually exclusive, 
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discloses limitations and also genuine and real alternative possibilities to the self.  For 
Tracy, there is a basic analogy between the encounter with the other and the encounter 
with the Other, the Ultimate Reality that grounds all of reality. 
 
Dialogue with the Other  
 Not long after publishing Plurality and Ambiguity, Tracy gave the Dondeyne 
Lectures at the University of Leuven in Belgium, which were later published as Dialogue 
with the Other.146  The topic was the relationship between prophetic and mystical forms 
of religious language, especially as they contribute to Christian dialogues with Judaism 
and Buddhism.  Tracy analyzes prophetic and mystical language by way of referring to 
the psychoanalytic approaches of Freud and Lacan, the thought of William James, the 
work on the “ancient other” of Mircea Eliade, and the encounter with the other in 
Buddhist-Christian dialogue, and then offers a “mystic-prophetic construal of Christian 
freedom” in light of suffering.147  Tracy’s synthesis of these different themes flows from 
the question of what mystical and prophetic traditions within Buddhism and Christianity 
might teach us about the self or, as the case may be, the “no-self.” 
 These lectures revisit Tracy’s opposition to the modern understanding of the 
human person as an autonomous self or ego by way of displacing the modern self by the 
postmodern other, which involves meeting the growing demand to regard the other as real 
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and not just a projection of oneself.148  Tracy claims that Christian thought runs the risk 
of such projection when it engages in dialogue with Judaism and Islam because the 
similarity of these traditions’ beliefs about God tempt members of these faiths to regard 
the others and no different from themselves.  Tracy demands that adherents of these 
religions be recognized as “remain[ing] profoundly other.”   As a matter of fact, each of 
these three faiths has been guilty projecting an “other” when they describe members of 
non-monotheistic faiths as “pagans.”  For Tracy, the postmodern understanding of the 
self has to take the other into account.149 
 The “other” lies at the heart of both prophetic and mystical language.  The 
prophet actually speaks on behalf of the other; and the word the prophet hears “is not his 
own.  It is Other.  It disrupts consciousness, actions, deliberations.”150  In the case of the 
biblical prophet, this other is clearly understood as Other – as God – yet God is not the 
only other the prophet speaks for; the prophet also speaks for the marginalized, the 
oppressed, and the voiceless, calling all to the “prophetic struggle for justice.”151  It is in 
this sense that Tracy affirms that the Gospel understands freedom as “responsible 
agency.”152  Although in a different way, Tracy also describes Freud’s rhetoric as 
prophetic because it enabled the other of the unconscious to speak.153  On Tracy’s 
interpretation, prophetic language reveals the other of the divine, of those different from 
oneself, and of one’s inner life. 
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 The other is also crucial for mystical language.  Mystics, too, are “driven by an 
Other who speaks,” but the mystic aims in some sense to go beyond what the prophet 
says.154  According to Tracy, mystics begin by stripping reality down grammatically “to 
its most basic elements (God, world, soul)” in order to understand the relations among 
them.155  The language of the “love-mystics” (as Tracy refers to one group) reveals both 
“the self’s freedom-in-love and God-as-love-manifesting-Godself in the sign Jesus 
Christ.”156  Uncovering the fundamental relations among the elements with the help of 
the grammatical-structuralist approach reveals the role of love (particularly love for the 
other) in mystical thought.   
 Yet Tracy also notes that some other forms of mysticism use a second, apophatic 
approach.  Elements of negation problematize both the belief that there is an unrelated 
other and the sense that there is such a thing as a self at all.  This motif resonates with a 
key aspect of Western Christianity’s contemporary situation, namely the pervasive sense 
of possessive individualism: “the self-deceptive belief in a unified, coherent, non-
relational ego.”157  However, the orientation of possessive individualism can be resisted 
by letting go of the notion of the autonomous self, which harmonizes with “the Buddhist 
analysis of our inevitable clinging to the ego.”158  Tracy holds this displacement of the 
self in tension with the radical grammatical approach to mystical thought, so that he can 
claim that the mystic wants both to free the other to speak for the other’s self and to 
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understand “freedom beyond empiricism and rationalism.”159  Once the self is freed from 
bondage to possessive individualism, then the apophatic move enables the self to love the 
other more fully and more responsibly. 
 For Tracy, the prophetic call to acknowledge and struggle on behalf of the other 
and the mystical call to love mutually mediate each other.160  In both cases, the self faces 
the other as a genuine other, not as a projected other.  Indeed, the self achieves real self-
understanding only in face of the other.  In fact, the encounter with the other in its 
otherness actuates the kind of experience that Blessed Rage for Order called a limit-
experience.  The other reveals differences both as possibility and as an expression of 
historicity and uniqueness of the self.  The self faces the real and particular other, who is 
at once a real and particular self.  The very presence of the other helps one recognize the 
self’s finitude.  Thus Tracy’s Dialogue with the Other argues for the necessity of 
authentic encounter with the other, and in doing so shows how sheer otherness is yet 
another marker of human finitude. 
 
Conclusion  
 Finitude is a central and pervasive theme in Tracy’s theological anthropology.  
The question of finitude has brought to light several key motifs of his thought.  Early in 
his career, Tracy treated finitude in relation to the infinite or transcendent.  His notion of 
“limit-to” referred to questions, experiences, and situations that highlight the boundaries 
of human existence, among which Tracy includes guilt, death, and anxiety as well as joy, 
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love, and reassurance.  The “limit-to” indicated without fully disclosing the “limit-of,” 
which Tracy called the fundamental reality that grounds human existence.  He calls the 
human orientation towards the limit-of “basic trust.”  He explained that the “limit-of” is a 
way of talking about God.  Thus, his early work explained human finitude primarily in 
light of the human relationship with the divine.161 
 This understanding of finitude reappears throughout Tracy’s work, but in The 
Analogical Imagination a second motif emerged where he differentiated finitude with 
respect to the divine from finitude with respect to one’s socio-historical context.  As 
Tracy’s method gradually clarified the role of the contemporary situation in human 
experience, he explained that understanding the human person required more serious 
attention to the particularities of personal existence.  One’s unique time, place, ethnicity, 
gender, class, and so forth condition and to some extent define one’s life.  Strictly 
speaking, these conditioning factors do not determine like a fate, because the individual 
still has freedom and responsible agency in their regard.  Nonetheless, they locate the 
individual in a context over which one has little control, but which provides boundaries 
for people’s life and experience.162  For Tracy, no contextual condition is more central 
and enduring than language, which cannot be adequately conceived as a tool for 
                                                          
161 While the use of limit language steadily decreases over the course of Tracy’s work, it does not disappear 
completely.  For more, see David Tracy, “Theology and the Symbolic Imagination: A Tribute to Andrew 
Greeley,” in The Incarnate Imagination: Essays in Honor of Andrew Greeley, ed. Ingrid H. Shafer 
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1988), 242. 
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communication because it is the medium through which all understanding occurs from 
the time one learns one’s native tongue.  Learning a second language, even somewhat 
later in life, begins by translating that language’s vocabulary and grammar into one’s first 
language.  Any factors that contribute to an individual’s specific context mark the 
finitude of all human existence.163 
 Third, Tracy’s engagement with the question of the self in postmodernity reveals 
a third motif: finitude with respect to the other.  The finite human person is not an 
autonomous, separated individual, but a person who encounters “the other” in three 
senses.  First, there is the divine Other, which essentially reformulates Tracy’s first motif 
of finitude in the context of the question of the other.  Second, there is the other of 
individuals, groups, and cultures who are different from oneself in important ways.  In 
their difference, they disclose authentic possibilities for the self and heighten the 
awareness of the particularity of the self.  Third, there is the internal otherness, namely of 
one’s own unconscious, which prevents the individual from being simply an autonomous, 
coherent ego.   
 Each of these three motifs permeates Tracy’s thought, with some motifs beings 
more dominant at certain times in his career in accord with the different questions he’s 
responding to at any given time.  Yet each also instantiates the human experience of 
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among many other factors.  The fact that these are shared by two people does not mean they are not finite, 
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boundedness.  A human person encounters limits in one’s encounter with the divine, 
within one’s context, with others, and also within one’s internal life.   
 Finally, this examination of finitude makes it clear that finitude itself is a 
fundamentally relational concept in Tracy’s theology.  The experience of limits may raise 
such questions as Why are those limits there?  What sets or creates those limits?  To what 
are those limits related?  Perhaps the most profound experience of human finitude is the 
human encounter with the divine.  But this finitude is grounded precisely in the limit-of, 
the whole, the Ultimate Reality, which is responsible for human existence.  Finitude for 
Tracy, rather than being ultimately about human autonomy or about how such limits 
place obstacles between the human and the other (or Other), is about how these limits can 
only be understood relationally.  To comprehend what this means, the question of 
relationality will be our guide in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RELATIONALITY 
 
 The previous chapter explored the role of human finitude in David Tracy’s 
theological anthropology.  Analysis of his concepts limit, particularity, and historicity 
demonstrates the importance to him of the finitude of the human person.  Yet it also 
reveals that the concept of finitude does not stand on its own; the fact of human finitude 
raises the question of how such a limit comes to be.  Since Tracy writes about human 
finitude vis-à-vis the divine, the social context, and the other, it is clear that he sees 
finitude as essentially relational.   
 To explore the connection between finitude and relationality, this chapter will 
examine some of the same material and themes as the previous one but from a different 
perspective.  Here, I focus upon what it means for the human person to be in relation.  
How does Tracy distinguish human persons’ relations to one another from their 
relationships with God?  Furthermore, what central themes in Tracy’s work are rooted in 
the relational character of human life? 
 The themes pursued in this chapter follow their development and importance in 
different periods of Tracy’s work.  The first is horizon, both as indicative of the early 
influence of Lonergan on Tracy’s theology as well as its function as a transitional concept 
from finitude to relationality.  Next, public theology is a topic that Tracy began to tinker 
with in BRO and then developed more fully in AI.  Then tradition and conversation as 
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increasingly prevalent themes become both more dominant and more precise in Tracy’s 
hermeneutical efforts.  Finally, this chapter closes by looking at the underlying theme of 
the human relationship with the divine, which is best clarified in light of the human 
relationship with the rest of creation.  These five themes unfold the profound importance 
of relationality in Tracy’s anthropology. 
 
Horizon as Transitional Concept between Finitude and Relationality  
 The notion of “horizon” is apt for understanding the movement from the focus on 
finitude to that of relationality.  Tracy’s use of the term stems in part from the influence 
of Lonergan, especially in the early stages of Tracy’s thought.  In his extensive study of 
Lonergan, Tracy defines horizon as “a maximum field of vision from a determinate 
viewpoint.  It possesses both an objective and a subjective pole, each one of which is 
conditioned by and conditions the other.”1  More simply, one’s horizon is the limit of 
what one can experience and consciously engage.  In the case of the human individual, 
the subjective pole is the embodied consciousness, while the objective pole is the range 
of phenomena that person encounters.  When the term is used more abstractly to refer to 
the horizon of a discipline like theology rather than to an individual, the subjective pole 
consists of the methods and procedures in that discipline while the objective field refers 
to the phenomena, events, and elements on which they operate.2   
 It is important to understand that the structure of horizons is not static.  Rather, 
one’s horizon might be constantly in flux, both expanding and contracting; it depends 
                                                          
1 ABL 14 
2 ABL 87 
Chapter Three  
135 
 
mostly on how much one asks questions.  Tracy says that, for Lonergan, what is beyond 
my horizon are “questions that are meaningless and insignificant to me.”3  Significance, 
however, is determined in large measure by the individual: “One lives authentically 
insofar as one continues to allow oneself an expanding horizon,” and this drive for 
ongoing self-transcendence is fundamental to human living.4   
 The notion of horizon helps us to think about the connection between finitude and 
relationality.  First, the language of horizon recognizes that there is a limit or boundary of 
one’s knowledge, and more fundamentally of one’s caring – of what one loves.  Because 
the boundary is not fixed, but can be transformed even radically, one’s limits are open to 
change. 
 Second, within one’s limited horizon, one exists in relationships.  One’s horizon 
includes both the subjective self and the objective world one interacts with.  The 
operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding take place not in a 
vacuum but in a world of persons, concepts, and objects.  If operations occur with respect 
to the world, then horizons are formed within a relational context.   
 Finally, the edges of one’s horizon constitute the liminal space within which a 
creative dialectic between one’s subjective pole and objective field opens upon all of 
reality beyond the horizon.  The limit of one’s horizon is also a threshold where one 
encounters what is “other,” so that we can recognize our existence as in relationship to 
what is beyond us.  What Tracy names “limit-to experiences” may compel the individual 
to reach beyond the limits of one’s horizon, to expand the realm of one’s loving, and to 
                                                          
3 ABL 10 
4 BRO 96 
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engage with what is beyond the self.  He also speaks of the “limit-of” as the horizon of 
human existence, which is a horizon that can only be hinted at, touched upon, even 
glanced at.  Tracy refers to this wider horizon as all that may be encountered in limit-to 
experiences.   
 
Public Theology  
What is “Public” about Public Theology  
 In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy argues that theology is public discourse  
because of the “fundamental existential questions it asks” and because of the very reality 
of God.5  Facets of theological reflection which include arguments, criteria, evidence, and 
warrants for theological claims demand that they be public, not private.  In this way 
theological claims are open to any member of the public, allowing for conversation about 
and possible challenges to the elements that constitute any particular discourse.  
Ultimately, Tracy argues that public discourse “discloses meanings and truths which in 
principle can transform all human beings in some recognizable personal, social, political, 
ethical, cultural or religious manner.”6  This transformative power of public discourse is 
manifested at the personal, communal, and historical level. 
 
The Two Publics  
 While Tracy’s public theology is most amply formulated in The Analogical 
Imagination, its kernel already exists in Blessed Rage for Order.  The first chapter of 
                                                          
5 AI xi 
6 AI 55 
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BRO describes the pluralist context of contemporary theology as one in which historic 
appeals to tradition as tradition are insufficient for establishing the cogency of 
theological claims.  Rather, the challenge to theology by scientific modes of argument 
pushes theology to use more scientific methods and criteria in making claims.  The 
traditional theologian had to be loyal both to the “church-community of which he was a 
believing member” and “to whatever community of inquiry…[that] aided him to defend 
and to reinterpret the tradition’s beliefs.”7  Historically, the central discipline in this latter 
commitment was philosophy.  More recently, however, “philosophical method” has been 
broadened to mean “ethical commitment to the morality of scientific knowledge.”8 
 Today’s theologian therefore has to be committed to both the “community of 
religious and moral discourse exemplified but surely not exhausted by his own church 
tradition” and the “community of inquiry exemplified but surely not exhausted by the 
contemporary academy.”9  Tracy’s theological method, specifically his method’s demand 
for evidence, warrants, and criteria, enables the theologian to render a “service” to both 
of these communities.  Although he did not formulate these demands as central to public 
theology nor develop the two communities in depth, Tracy’s idea of the church and the 
academy as public spaces for theological conversation is clearly incipient in Blessed Rage 
for Order.   
 
 
                                                          
7 BRO 6 
8 BRO 7 
9 BRO 239 
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The Three Publics  
 The two publics of Blessed Rage for Order become three publics in The 
Analogical Imagination.  There, Tracy argues that in addition to the academy and the 
church, the theologian is also responsible to the wider society.  He differentiates three 
parts within society.  First is the techno-economic realm, which is comprised of social 
structures responsible for the allocation of goods and services.10  Besides broader 
structures, it includes the technological developments that have enabled modern 
developed economies to achieve an increasingly efficient process for production and 
distribution.11  In the techno-economic realm, an instrumental form of reason – the “use 
of reason to determine rational means for a determined end” – prevails.12  Instrumental 
reason is meant for deliberating about the means for attaining society’s goals, not for 
determining what those goals should be. 
 The second realm of society is polity, which inquires about the use of power to 
achieve some understanding of justice.  Polity is the public sphere in which members of 
society are most likely to engage one another in the public discussions about the relevant 
political issues that Tracy says are necessary “for any humane polity.”13  In the realm of 
polity people use practical (or “ethical”) reason in order to converse with one other about 
                                                          
10 AI 7 
11 It is important at this point to note the generally Western bias of Tracy’s early formulation of the publics.  
In describing the public of society, Tracy begins by specifically referencing “Euro-American” and 
“advanced industrial, technological societies with democratic polities and capitalist, socialist or mixed 
economies” (AI 6).  This is not to say that Tracy’s thought on public theology is inapplicable outside of a 
Western context.  Cf. Felix Wilfred, Asian Public Theology: Critical Concerns in Challenging Times 
(Delhi: ISPCK, 2010); Edward P. Wimberly, “Unnoticed and Unloved: The Indigenous Storyteller and 
Public Theology in a Postcolonial Age,” Verbum et Ecclesia 32 no. 2 (2011). 
12 AI 8 
13 AI 9 
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a shared understanding of justice and  the most ethical ways to pursue that justice.  
Practical reason is thus quite distinct from instrumental reason. 
 The third realm of society is culture, which focuses on the symbolic expressions 
of the society that “express the meaning and values of individual, group and communal 
existence.”14  As mentioned previously in Chapter Two, Tracy relies on Geertz’s 
definition of culture as consisting of both ethos and worldview.15  Culture is 
predominantly a matter of art and religion, the two premiere mediators of symbolic 
expression in society, and so it is less involved with an explicit form of rationality than 
with participation in and reflection upon the symbol systems of the culture.  By 
contributing the resources of culture to the ongoing conversation about values, such 
reflection can have significant repercussions on the practical reason relevant to polity.16   
 For Tracy, the idealized form of interaction among these three realms would be a 
sort of hierarchy or cascade with culture at the apex and techno-economy at the bottom.  
The symbolic reflection of culture contributes to practical reason’s determinations of 
value in polity, and the values determined by polity would then orient the instrumental 
reason of the techno-economy.  Tracy is aware that this ideal structure has at times been 
undermined.  First, the success of instrumental reason in the techno-economic realm leads 
many to think that instrumental reason should be the dominant form of reason.  
Whenever instrumental reason prevails over public discourse about the values of a polity, 
                                                          
14 AI 7 
15 See Chapter Two, pages 107-8 
16 AI 13 
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it turns a “technological society” into an “emerging technocracy.”17  Second, Tracy 
argues that the spirit of the age fosters a genial ignorance about questions of value.  Tracy 
laments the ongoing malaise of practical reason that “demand[s] professional competence 
in every major area of our communal lives except value issues.”18  As regards symbolic 
reflection in public discourse, a lazy form of secularism has led many to accept ignorance 
about religion (and, to a lesser extent, art) and its alleged decline into complete 
privatization.19  This willful oversight about the need to deliberate about values, 
combined with the rise of instrumental reason, pushes society down a thoroughly amoral, 
consumerist path. 
 The second public is the academy.  While Tracy analyzes this public with respect 
to the place of theology as an academic discipline, he also makes more general comments 
about it.  This public has its own norms for determining what constitutes legitimate 
criteria, evidence, and argument, setting standards for any discipline which seeks 
academic status.  Tracy notes that because intellectual pursuits fall into different 
disciplinary understandings, not all disciplines are identical in method and structure.  
Nonetheless, all such disciplines must still pursue publicness in the sense that their 
scholarly work should be capable of defending its particular methods and criteria in the 
broader academy.   
 Tracy is particularly concerned with the question of the disciplinary status of 
theology in the academy.  Adopting Stephen Toulmin’s distinctions among compact, 
                                                          
17 AI 8 
18 AI 10 
19 AI 13 
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diffuse, and would-be disciplines,20 Tracy concedes that theology suffers from both a 
“lack of a clear sense of disciplinary direction” and “a lack of adequate professional 
organization for the discussion of new results.”21  As such its disciplinary status is not 
“compact” like the natural sciences, but it must be categorized as either “diffuse” or 
“would-be” (Tracy does not finally come down on either side).  He posits the need for an 
ongoing consideration of the disciplinary status of theology.  Theology’s continuing 
search for both meaning and truth in the interaction between the Christian tradition and 
the contemporary situation both benefits from and contributes to the academy as a public, 
as it continues to understand its own disciplinary status more deeply and tries to meet the 
demand for genuine publicness. 
 The third public is the church.  Sociology and theology provide two distinct but 
complementary lenses through which to analyze this public.  Sociologically, Tracy 
defines the public of the church as a voluntary association whose communal and 
institutional aspects mediate between individuals and the larger society.22  The church’s 
influence on society is predominantly felt through the activities of its members, although 
it can occasionally use its “institutional weight” and moral stature more directly.23  
Furthermore, as a public, the church has its own criteria, warrants, and evidence, which 
are related to a profound underlying fidelity and commitment to the church’s tradition.  
                                                          
20 Cf. Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding Vol. 1: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 379 
21 AI 18.  The latter claim is especially telling since Tracy was president of the Catholic Theology Society 
of America, one of the foremost professional organizations in contemporary Catholic theology. 
22 AI 21 
23 AI 21.  The ability of churches to leverage their moral stature, however, depends heavily on their moral 
credibility.  Within the Catholic Church, the ongoing revelations in the sex abuse scandal have heavily 
damaged this credibility.   
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These need not conflict with similar criteria et al. in society or the academy, but rather 
require that anyone engaged in all three publics to balance and adjudicate these 
competing factors authentically.  According to Tracy, this responsibility falls especially 
to the theologian, who is a member of all three publics as “citizen,” “intellectual,” and 
“believer.”24   
 In Tracy’s initial sociological description of the three publics as broad, generally 
voluntary groups, they encompass a large number of people.  Although each public has 
modes of reasoning and argument appropriate to its own sorts of questions and criteria, 
there is a large degree of overlap among the three, with society as a public including the 
academcy and church.  In a Venn diagram, the large circle of society would engulf the 
two smaller overlapping circles of the academy and the church.  Thus from the 
perspective of the people who make up the publics, society is surely predominant.   
 Yet there are two further perspectives on the publics that must also be considered.  
First, besides understanding the publics primarily in terms of their membership, for 
Tracy, the publics are communities defined largely by the types of conversations that take 
place within them.  Many conversations and research programs within the academy do 
not simply fall under the broader concern of promoting the common good sought by 
instrumental reason, practical reason, and symbolic reflection.  For example, Plurality 
                                                          
24 This is not to say that only the theologian has a responsibility to all three publics.  As an example, a 
devout biologist is also a member of all three publics and as such has a responsibility to engage each one in 
an authentic manner.  However, the biologist will be less likely to speak to the academic practitioners of 
theology or to formulate a creative and faithful retrieval of the church’s tradition in the contemporary 
context. (Less likely, but not impossible; cf. Collins, The Language of God. 
 For the explanation of these terms for the members of the three publics, see Chapter One, page 69 
n. 132. 
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and Ambiguity begins with a reflection on what the history of the French Revolution can 
teach us about the process of interpretation.  If certain facets of this conversation might 
have an effect on the conversations within society, they are not simply reducible to 
society’s concerns.  Similarly, the Catholic Church’s intra-church debate over the 
ordination of women both informs and is informed by social debates about justice and 
gender-equality and conversations about liturgy, scripture, tradition, Catholic 
demographics, and numerous other relevant aspects.  That the conversations of society 
and the church overlap and influence one another is not in dispute; nonetheless, neither of 
the two can be reduced to the other.  Clearly, the academy and the church as publics are 
not strictly speaking included within the public of society. 
 Second, for Tracy the publics should also be considered in theological terms since 
the church is not only a social institution, but also a gift “participating in the grace of God 
disclosed in the divine self-manifestation in Jesus Christ.”25  The church is “the primary 
mediator of…the gift of God in Jesus Christ,” thus making it an “an object of faith, of 
trust in and loyalty to its reality.”26  This description of the church as gift precedes any 
particular model (institution, mystical communion, herald, sacrament), but Tracy himself 
favors “sacrament of Christ and eschatological sacrament of the world.”27  The church, 
then, is not only a sociological reality but also a theological one. 
                                                          
25 AI 23 
26 AI 50 
27 AI 43 n.90.  Cf. Karl Rahner, “Membership of the Church According to the Teaching of Pius XII’s 
Encyclical ‘Mystici Corporis Christi’,” in Theological Investigations vol. 2 (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 
1963), 1-87; Karl Rahner, “The Church and the Sacraments,” in Inquiries (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1964), 191-257; Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1963), 47-89; Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Image Books, 2002), 55-
67 
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 Furthermore, it is not only the public of the church that is relevant to theology.  
Tracy’s statement that the church is the eschatological sacrament of the world indicates 
“the world” as distinct from the church.  In fact, “the world” includes the publics of the 
society and the academy.28  Even though the focus of conversations in these publics may 
not be theological, and even though many – even the majority – of the members of these 
publics may not be believers, for Tracy the wider society and the academy are 
“expressions of the theological reality ‘world.’”29   
 If sociologically the believer is a member of society (and possibly of the 
academy), how is this relationship construed theologically?  First, Tracy opposes both 
outright rejection of the world by the members of the church and simple assimilation into 
the world.  The world is both contingent, in that it has been created freely by God, and 
ambiguous, in that it is both sinful and expressive of God’s grace.  Yet even in its 
contingency and ambiguity, the world is “loved by God and by the Christian.”30   
 Second, in loving the world yet also recognizing that it is not an ultimate object of 
loyalty, the Christian, the believer, the member of the church, is “released (the violence 
of the imagery is exact) from the world, for the world.”31  Tracy claims the believer is 
released from the world because of the dramatic power of God’s Word to reveal the 
                                                          
28 AI 23.  “The world” includes more than the academy and society (e.g., nature), but in thinking about his 
publics, Tracy sees the academy and society as central to “the world.” 
29 AI 23 
30 AI 48 
31 AI 48.  Tracy seems to be drawing on John 15:19 (“If you belonged to the world, the world would love 
you as its own. Because you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world—therefore 
the world hates you”), John 17:6 (“‘I have made your name known to those whom you gave me from the 
world”), and Romans 12:2 (“Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of 
your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God—what is good and acceptable and perfect”) in 
this description of the believer’s relationship with “the world.” 
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radical contingency of the cultures, institutions, and other created facets of the reality of 
the world.  In seeing that the world could be otherwise, and thus that the God who reveals 
is all that is absolutely necessary, the believer is no longer beholden to any particular 
interpretation of the world.  In being released for the world, the freed believer can fulfill 
the requirement to love the world as God does.   
 Thus the proper understanding of the relationships among Tracy’s three publics 
depends greatly on perspective.  The society, the academy, and the church each have both 
sociological and theological aspects.  When considered in relation to the status of the 
particular individuals who are members of particular publics, the academy and the church 
are subsets of the wider society.  If considered according to the types of conversations 
that take place within them, the publics have different but overlapping foci.  Finally, 
when examined theologically, the wider society and the academy are constitutive of the 
theological reality of the world, a reality for which the church is ultimately a sacrament. 
 
Public Theology and Relationality  
 Whether considered as overlapping communities of people, as distinct audiences 
for particular discourses, or as different sides in the dialectic between the world and the 
church, Tracy’s account of these three publics helps to illuminate his emphasis on the 
relational character of the human person in three key ways.  First, individuals cannot be 
understood apart from the communities of which they are part.  Second, human 
relationships themselves must be understood both sociologically and theologically.  
Third, conversation is the touchstone for understanding human relationality. 
Chapter Three  
146 
 
 Recall that each of the three publics represents a community of discourse and 
reflection.  Each consists of a wide body of members who actively engage one another 
about issues pertinent to that public.  Since each public, beyond being a collection of 
individuals, is defined by a unifying focus, the very idea of a public implies that these 
individuals are in relation to one another.  Sharing common questions, methods, and 
criteria, when they disagree they resort to prior shared presuppositions.  It follows that the 
different sub-disciplines of theology are in part defined by the types of relations they 
have.  In fundamental theology, for example, theology engages other disciplines, based 
on shared concerns over disciplinary status, criteria, method, evidence, etc.  
 Tracy’s three publics, as general patterns of relationships, have been abstracted 
from particular instances.  The church as a public includes the particular churches and 
faith traditions that directly shape their members.  The academy would include the 
particular institution of which one is a member or even an alumnus/a as well as the 
diverse academic societies one participates in, the conferences one attends, the audience 
for which one writes.  Similarly, the wider society encompasses both human society in 
general and one’s particular societies (e.g., the United States, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, or the Boston metropolitan area).  The public of the society, with its 
techno-economic, political, and cultural realms, also involves class distinctions and 
political and artistic affiliations.  For example, David Tracy himself is a member of the 
publics of the society, the academy, and the church through being a citizen of the United 
States and the city of Chicago, an intellectual as a faculty member emeritus of the 
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University of Chicago Divinity School, and a believer and priest of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Diocese of Bridgeport, CT. 
 Therefore human relationality in Tracy’s theological anthropology involves the 
way in which one’s participation in particular communities shapes who one is.  The 
previous chapter’s discussion of Tracy’s idea of internal pluralism cited the potential 
conflict of multiple commitments as an indication of the finite character of human life.  
Under the aspect of relationality, commitment to overlapping (and at times partially 
opposed) communities is another indication of how the finite individual necessarily exists 
within a web of relations, some of which are voluntary (e.g., political and religious 
affiliation), some involuntary (e.g., one’s culture and era), and some are arguably a mix 
of both (e.g., one’s social class and geographical location).  Nonetheless, each 
relationship influences who the finite individual is.  Thus, while the sum of communities 
and demographics helps to comprehend the concrete finite individual, the fact that these 
various factors contribute to the individual’s existence and self-understanding is because 
the human individual is a relational being. 
 A second way publics make Tracy’s understanding of relationality manifest is 
related to the distinction between the sociological and theological dimensions of the 
publics, since relationality is both sociological and theological.  Having sketched an 
essentially sociological view of relationality thus far, the idea must also be understood 
theologically within Tracy’s schema of public theology.  His theological analysis of 
publics engages the dialectic between the church and the world, within which the 
Christian believer is one who is released from the world for the world.  The believer’s 
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release from the world, far from severing the believers’ relationship to the world, re-
contextualizes it vis-à-vis their responsible agency in the world.  The believer lives in 
relation to the world as one called to regard it as loved by God, as revelatory of God’s 
work, and so as an object of one’s own love.  Thus for Tracy, the theological dialectic of 
church and world underscores believers’ relationship to that world as an ambiguous, 
contingent, yet beloved reality. 
 This argument raises the important question of where non-believers fit in this 
arrangement.32  The implication is that the non-believers’ stance vis-à-vis the world is not 
one of releasement from and for that reality because the non-believers remain a part of 
the world, and thus would belong to the realities for whose sake the believers are 
released.  In Tracy’s theology, believers are not called to proselytize, but to act 
responsibly and lovingly towards non-believers.  Indeed, believers must resist any and all 
attempts to treat non-believers as non-persons, denied their own agency or integrity.  
Thus, the heart of the believers’ ongoing relationship with the world is genuine openness 
to “the other” of nonbelievers. 
 Yet this response is not entirely satisfactory either, since it does not explain how 
to understand the nonbeliever’s relational character theologically.  If the only theological 
                                                          
32 The “nonbeliever” is a category Tracy does not explicitly reflect on in the context of public theology.  
Indeed, the only real mentions of the “nonbeliever” in Tracy’s theology are usually in reference to his 
agreement with theologian Gustavo Gutierrez that “‘Progressive’ theology seeks to answer the questions of 
the nonbeliever; liberation theology confronts the challenge of the nonperson” (Gustavo Gutierrez, The 
Power of the Poor in History, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983), 92).  See Tracy, 
“God, Dialogue and Solidarity,” 902. 
 In the context of this chapter, nonbeliever is not intended as a judgment, nor should it be read 
specifically as non-Catholic or non-Christian.  Rather, it seems to me that the “nonbeliever” simply means 
any individual who is part of the public of the wider society but not part of the public of the church 
(however those publics might be thematized).   
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aspect of relationality in public theology occurs within the connection between the world 
and the church, then that would seem to exclude the non-believers’ relations with one 
another.  However, in a more fundamental sense, relationality is theological because the 
human exists in relation to God.  Indeed, as already noted, Tracy claims that any and 
every person is already a potential hearer of God’s revelation.  Nor is this possibility 
limited to those who are members of the church; it also holds true for those who remain 
members of the world alone.  While Tracy does not have recourse to an alleged 
anonymous Christianity, arguing a more pluralist than inclusivist position, he does 
nonetheless insist that all humans are in relation to God. 
 Finally, relationality in Tracy’s anthropology is further amplified in his public 
theology’s emphasis on conversation.  The reality of conversation demands that one be 
engaged with another, whether that be with an individual, a public, or even a text.  
Indeed, that conversation is central in terms of method and of substance to Tracy’s 
theology will be the focus of a later section of this chapter. 
 
Tradition  
Anticipatory Elements in BRO  
 As a focal concept, tradition is not a major theme in Tracy’s earlier work.  He 
does mention it in his initial foray into fundamental theology when he simply asserts that 
tradition is a fact that the contemporary theologian must critically examine in light of 
other modes of inquiry.  In Blessed Rage for Order, the “traditional” understanding of 
Christianity and its primary cognitive claims are said to exist in a state of ongoing 
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challenge.  The rise of modern history and science that understand themselves as 
rejecting (or at least subverting) tradition as a legitimate warrant for believing particular 
cognitive claims present both a threat and opportunity for theology.33   
 Accordingly, Tracy claims that the growing rigor of these alternative modes of 
reasoning as well as the fact of the theological discipline’s location in the academy force 
theologians to reconsider their self-understanding.  Theologians must effectively balance 
their commitments to a community of faith with their commitments to a community of 
inquiry so that “the Christian theologian’s basic loyalty to his church tradition can be 
formulated as his honest resolve to study that tradition critically and thereby aid its self-
understanding.”34  This posture leads theologians to pursue a critical retrieval of their 
own tradition. 
 This critical stance is part of his early correlation model of theology.  If tradition 
is one of the two poles of correlation, theologians have to confront the dominant themes, 
questions, and symbols of the tradition.  In Tracy’s revisionist model of theology, this 
critical stance requires the Christian tradition and the “reinterpreted post-modern 
consciousness” to question and to respond to one another.  However central the cognitive 
content of the tradition is in BRO, Tracy does not reflect on what it means to live within a 
tradition or on what gives a tradition its authority. 
 
 
                                                          
33 BRO 6.  Later on in The Analogical Imagination, Tracy will expand these forms of critical inquiry to 
include “three general methods (historical-critical, literary-critical, social-scientific)” as important 
correctives for theology as a public enterprise (AI 237) 
34 BRO 7 
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Development in AI  
 As Tracy’s theological method evolves in The Analogical Imagination, the 
Christian tradition remains one of the two poles of his mutually critical correlation, even 
after the second pole is nuanced from “common human experience” or “re-interpreted 
post-modern consciousness” to the “contemporary situation” more broadly conceived.  
Theologians still have to critically correlate the questions and responses between the 
poles.  Since the argument in AI is intended to be a systematic theology, it interrogates 
what the term “Christian tradition” means.  In particular, Tracy expands his reflection on 
traditions from their status as sources of cognitive content to include contexts in which 
communities interact over time. 
 As dynamic, tradition is conceived in AI as a developing historical reality that 
preserves some core principles, beliefs, or expressions that provide the tradition a sense 
of unity.  The word “tradition” comes from the Latin “tradere,” meaning “to hand 
over,”35 as when communities hand over traditions to their younger generations over 
time.  Traditions include ritualized action (the sign of the cross during liturgies, throwing 
one’s hat in the air at graduation) as well as beliefs and attitudes (Jesus is the Son of God, 
the ideal of free speech).  These actions and beliefs are considered traditional precisely 
because they are passed on through the history of a community. 
 Acknowledging that our contemporary self-understanding is intimately linked 
with the tradition within which we live, Tracy says that whenever a new understanding or 
interpretation of some expression or phenomenon emerges, “we constantly mediate, 
                                                          
35 Cf. Yves Congar, OP, Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and Theological Essay, trans. Michael 
Naseby and Thomas Rainborough (New York:  Macmillan, 1966), 237-270 
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translate, from our past understanding to our present one.”36  The past understanding is 
not simply repeated verbatim, since the context of the original formulation has changed 
(different time period, different culture, different language, etc.).  In the context of 
theology, therefore, interpretation provides “a retrieval (including a retrieval through 
critique and suspicion) and always, therefore, a new application of a particular religious 
tradition’s self-understanding for the current horizon of the community.”37  
Contemporary interpretations of traditions are always new, yet they also retain the core 
insights that guide that tradition. 
 For Tracy, tradition is the milieu in which both the individual and the community 
exist.  One is born into a community and a tradition so they shape one’s initial 
understanding of self, the world, the other, and God:   
As ‘thrown’ into this world—this language, this history, this tradition—my 
understanding is situated by a past which inevitably involves me in the ‘effective 
history’ of an ambiguous heritage of funded meanings.  My understanding must 
appropriate these meanings as possibilities for the future which I project.38 
 
There is no privileged place outside of tradition or history.39  Rather, the tradition into 
which one is born and in which one is raised constitutes in large part one’s horizon.  The 
trajectory of one’s own history may be altered, as in radical conversion or transformation, 
but such a change never completely severs the self from his or her past.  No 
transformation of one’s horizon can eliminate the history of effects of one’s past horizon. 
                                                          
36 AI 101 
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 Therefore any encounter with or interpretation of another tradition depends in part 
on the tradition from which one comes.  Just as there is no objective point of view outside 
of one’s own tradition, one can also not claim a presupposition-less objectivity with 
respect to any other tradition because one engages this other tradition from within one’s 
own horizon.  So, the encounter might change one’s horizon, even profoundly, yet the 
horizon remains operative within the encounter. 
 Perhaps the most helpful example of Tracy on tradition as dynamic and contextual 
is his account of the role of language in theology.  Language has rules (syntax, grammar) 
and content (vocabulary, idioms) that develop and evolve while remaining reasonably 
consistent.  Moreover, human beings are immersed in language so that we can only 
communicate with one another and understand through language.  As was noted in the 
previous chapter, Tracy opposes the instrumentalist notion of language that views it as a 
tool for comprehension in favor of regarding language as the medium through which 
comprehension and communication occur: 
We find ourselves in Christianity as we find ourselves in the English language: an 
incredibly dense forest of syntax, grammar, history; a forest which grew not in the 
manner of the gardens of Versailles—the manner of theory—but in the manner of 
history itself into ever-changing, ever-stable possibilities of meaningful 
communication.40 
 
This “forest” is language as the dynamic medium through which we understand one 
another and ourselves.41   
 Tracy’s understanding of tradition contrasts with interpretations of “tradition” as 
rigid, unchanging, or permanent.  He distinguishes between traditio (the ongoing process 
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of handing on the tradition) and tradita (specific formulations of the tradition).  
Whenever theologians, or of anyone within a tradition, are kept from critically interpting 
and translating such formulations in new and different contexts, tradition becomes a 
collection of “‘fundamentals’ to be externally accepted and endlessly repeated.”42  
According to Tracy, traditions within such a fundamentalist trajectory cease being 
genuine traditions and become ideologies instead.   
 In the Christian tradition, as a dynamic context through which meaning is 
mediated through time, the central reality mediated is Jesus Christ.  Indeed, that tradition 
cannot be neglected by theological reflection precisely because “the immediate personal 
response to the Christ event becomes a communal response as soon as the Christ event is 
recognized as the event of Jesus Christ.”  Such recognition only makes sense through the 
tradition’s mediation of the “original apostolic witness.”43  The church as the community 
in which such recognition takes place is understood in this case as both a “gift from God, 
primary mediator of the church-remembered Jesus Christ” as well as a sinful community 
that repeatedly fails to live up to the very person it is called to remember.44  Because the 
church is both graced and sinful, theology must always retrieve tradition’s sacred 
symbols, expressions, rituals, and beliefs, while critically identifying and counteracting 
distortions embedded in that tradition.45 
                                                          
42 AI 99-100.  See also AI 323: “A respect for tradition grounded in the recognition of its mediation to us of 
the Christ event and the memory of Jesus, its very formation of our capacity to experience that event, does 
call for a faith in the church.  It does not call for, or even allow, the familiar distortions of that faith into 
ecclesiolatry and traditionalism.” 
43 AI 237 
44 AI 321 
45 AI 322 
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Distortions within a Tradition  
 The reality of distortions within traditions is a central concern in Plurality and 
Ambiguity.  First and foremost, this text continues Tracy’s ongoing confrontation with 
pluralism within traditions, a focus underlined by the titles and subtitles of his major 
books.46  Living traditions always feature significant disagreements, competing 
interpretations, and often multiple irreconcilable strains within them.  Tracy argues that 
pluralism within Christianity is evident already in the New Testament, attested to by the 
distinct genres of doctrine, apocalyptic, narrative, proclamation-confession, and symbols-
images.47  These genres are employed in diverse ways, such as the apocalypticism of the 
Gospel of Mark and the early letters of Paul,48 the more historical narrative focus of the 
Gospel of Luke,49 or the symbolic-reflective emphasis of the Gospel of John.50  The 
pluralism characteristic of the New Testament continues throughout Christian history, 
even though the tradition still maintains a family resemblance by consistently focusing on 
“the Jesus remembered as the Christ by the tradition and its fidelity to the original 
apostolic witness.”51   
 However, in tandem with the question of pluralism, AI also highlights Tracy’s 
growing stress on the ambiguity of traditions.  As for traditions being both formative of 
individuals and communities and also passed on by individuals and communities, Tracy 
                                                          
46 BRO: The New Pluralism in Theology; AI: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism; Plurality 
and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. 
47 AI 264 
48 AI 266 
49 AI 278 
50 AI 281 
51 AI 237 
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invokes Gadamer’s account of the way traditions generate a “history of effects.”52  At any 
stage people will contribute to and pass on that history of effects, even though these 
traditions are never unambiguous or innocent.53  Traditions always include and transmit 
problematic or even oppressive modes of thought and action.54   
 Tracy demands that we face and then resist the distortions and ambiguities in 
traditions.Religious traditions in particular tend to be ambiguous,55 and so Tracy notes 
how historically religions have been domesticated by oppressive power structures.  At the 
same time, religious traditions can also provide profound sources of resistance by 
heightening awareness of the “sin and ignorance” both  within themselves and in the 
wider culture.  This empowers religions to “resist all refusals to face the radical plurality 
and ambiguity of any tradition, including their own.”56  While the ambiguities within a 
given tradition cannot simply be ignored or willed away through some kind of Pelagian 
view of moral integrity, they can offer “liberating possibilities to be retrieved, errors to be 
criticized, [and] unconscious distortions to be unmasked.”57 
 
                                                          
52 PA 66 
53 PA 36.  See also DWO 62: “The recognition of tradition means that every interpreter enters into the act of 
interpretation bearing the history of the effects, both conscious and preconscious, of the traditions to which 
we ineluctably belong.  As Gadamer insists, we belong to the history of these effects of our traditions—that 
is, we belong to history and language far more than history or language belong to us.”  Cf. Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, 299-306 
54 PA 36-7.  See also DWO 5-6: “There is no escape from the insight which modernity most feared: there is 
no innocent tradition (including modernity), no innocent classic (including the scriptures) and no innocent 
reading (including this one).” 
55 See in particular Tracy’s chapter on Mircea Eliade in DWO (pp 48-67).   
56 PA 83-4.  See also AI 100: “…the route to liberation from the negative realities of a tradition is not to 
declare the existence of an autonomy that is literally unreal but to enter into a disciplined and responsive 
conversation with the subject matter—the responses and, above all, the fundamental questions—of the 
tradition.” 
57 PA 112.  The question of distortion more generally as well as ways in which to respond to distortion will 
be covered more fully in the following two chapters. 
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Traditions as Relational  
 Tradition plays an important role in Tracy’s understanding of human relationality 
by connecting persons not only to their contemporaries but also to past members of that 
tradition, so that members of a tradition are thus related both synchronically and 
diachronically.  Synchronically, each human person is formed within a tradition through 
his or her relations with both contemporary members and the symbolic resources of that 
tradition.  Traditions are not private enterprises with singular languages,58 but rather 
wide-ranging dynamisms that mediate core sets of meanings in time.  Indeed, according 
to Tracy “no one…escapes the reality of tradition,” since we are all in fact “radically 
finite and social selves embedded in this language, this culture, this history.”59  Even if 
one is repulsed by the distortions or injustices of one’s tradition, one must be a hopeful in 
interpreting and interacting with that tradition in order to reveal and face these 
ambiguities.   
 Diachronically, we are also related to those members of our tradition who have 
gone before us.  The individual human person is “thrown” into a particular language, 
history, and tradition, and is embedded in a past with the “‘effective history’ of an 
ambiguous heritage of funded meanings” beyond one’s control60 because it results from 
previous stages and under the influence of the “equally historical individuals [that] have 
struggled before us.”61  Moreover, any interpretation of a tradition in the present is 
affected by “our past experience and the understanding embodied in our linguistic 
                                                          
58 PA 49 
59 AI 119 
60 AI 103 
61 PA 66 
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tradition.”62   Each individual person is therefore shaped in relation to the present form 
and membership of the tradition into which he or she is born, along with the multitude of 
historical persons who belonged and contributed to that tradition.   
 
Conversation  
Beginnings in AI  
 In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy emphasizes the hermeneutical character of 
the discipline of theology in general and systematic theology in particular.  While 
conversation was not even mentioned in the index to BRO, it is both a topic for reflection 
and a description of the purpose of AI, because it is his basic model for hermeneutics.  
The core of his account is the Platonic model of dialogue, in which “real conversation 
occurs only when the individual conversation partners move past self-consciousness and 
self-aggrandizement into joint reflection upon the subject matter of the conversation.”63  
Tracy has compared this experience of genuine conversation to experiences either of 
really good acting or of being “in the zone” during sports.64  By giving the self over to the 
issue at stake in the conversation – usually a question of some sort – the partners in the 
conversation lose their own self-consciousness and allow the subject matter to take 
precedence.  Through letting the self be engaged by the question, an interlocutor opens 
the self to the potential occurrence of understanding, an event that happens “not as the 
                                                          
62 AI 101 
63 AI 101; cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. 
P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980) 
64 NCFT 
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pure result of personal achievement but in the back-and-forth movement of the 
conversation itself.”65 
 Potential interlocutors in conversation are myriad.  As his model for 
hermeneutics, Tracy understands conversation to be anything from a symposium to a 
discussion with friends to reading texts, viewing works of art, or reflecting as a solitary 
thinker on some topic.66  The relationship between the reader and text is paradigmatic of 
the interpretive project of genuine conversation, because these “are never static realities 
but realities-in-process demanding the interaction of genuine conversation to actualize the 
questions and responses (the subject matter).”67  For Tracy, some of the best interlocutors 
in conversation are the classics – texts, persons, rituals, symbols, works of art, and other 
expressions of human creativity that carry both an excess and a permanence of meaning. 
 Because Tracy uses conversation as his model for hermeneutics, his description of 
an interpreter in the process of interpretation is applicable to characterize the interlocutor 
in conversation.  Interpretation has four characteristics or moments.  First, the interpreter 
enters into interpretation already possessing some pre-understanding of the subject at 
hand, typically comprised of “questions, opinions, responses, expectations, even desires, 
fears, and hopes.”68  This pre-understanding is a part of the interpreter’s horizon, shaped 
largely by the foregoing history of effects in the interpreter’s tradition and cultural 
context.  When he describes the interpreter as “always a social subject…formed by the 
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67 AI 105 
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community and…responsible to the wider community of inquirers and readers,” Tracy’s 
brief for the relational character of interpretation is perhaps strongest.69   
 The second interpretive moment is the approach of the interpreter to the classic.  
Tracy usually considers the classic as a text.  Whatever its form, the classic has the power 
to claim the interpreter’s attention.  It may vex, provoke, or even seduce the interpreter 
into attending to its subject matter.  This demand for attention is what Tracy calls “a 
realized experience,” in which the classic strikes the interpreter as an event, ranging from 
a subtle resonance to a shocking recognition.  The interpreter cannot control the classic 
since the attempt to manipulate the conversation would corrupt any attempt at 
authenticity.  Rather, the conversation partner must in this case try to be open to the 
possibly challenging, possibly moving claim of the classic. 
 In the third moment, Tracy once again characterizes the conversation as a game, 
which he deems an apt description of “the kind of dynamic actually at work in that 
experience,” since the object of the game takes precedence over the egos or goals of the 
players.”70  Moreover, the game’s dynamics involve the back-and-forth movement among 
the players pursuing the game’s objective, so that it can truly be said that the players 
don’t play the game so much as they are played by the game.  To be sure, dynamic 
movement of interpretation is made possible by the interpreter’s openness to being led by 
the subject matter in question. 
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 Finally, the fourth moment notes that the interpreter also participates in “the 
larger conversation of the entire community of inquirers.”71  This highlights the interplay 
between the interpreters’ understanding of the text and their pre-understanding of the 
tradition.  Moreover, interpreters put into play the impact of others within the tradition on 
their interpretations, so that the history of effects enables particular classic texts not only 
to arise within a tradition but also to become partly constitutive of the trajectory of a 
tradition as others’ interpretations of the same text inform and challenge one’s own.72   
 Central to Tracy’s model of conversation is the openness of the conversation 
partners, which not only allows the subject of the conversation to take the lead but to risk 
exposing one’s deepest views to the other in conversation, for this risk marks the only 
way for the interlocutors to give themselves truly to the dynamics of the conversation.73 
 
Further Development in PA and DWO  
 Plurality and Ambiguity and Dialogue with the Other further elaborate these basic 
moments of conversation.74  Tracy, stressing the connection between interpretation and 
conversation even more explicit, says “We converse with one another.  We can also 
converse with texts.  If we read well, then we are conversing with the text.”75  He points 
out that the reader is not passive in receiving the text, but rather questions to understand 
                                                          
71 AI 120 
72 AI 120-121 
73 AI 446 
74 Tracy in fact sets out at the beginning of that text with conversation as the theme (ix). 
75 PA 19.  See also DWO 63-4: “For the model of conversation is not imposed upon our experience of 
interpretation as some new de jure method, norm, or rule.  Rather the phenomenon of conversation aptly 
describes anyone’s de facto experience of interpreting any classic.” 
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the reality disclosed by text.  Despite the apparently static role of the text at hand, it can 
genuinely captivate the reader by opening new possibilities of meaning and value. 
 The key quality for Tracy is the openness on the part of the interpreter, since in 
reading or conversing interpreters open themselves to the subject matter of the 
conversation.  They risk entering the “zone.”  They also take the risk of openness with the 
interlocutor by placing their pre-understandings, interpretations, and horizons on the line 
in conversation; thus the possibility of radical change becomes real when the process of 
authentic conversation discloses different or other possibilities. In his illumination of the 
analogical imagination in interpretation, this recognition of possibilities also involves 
seeing the “similarity to what we have already experienced or understood” in something 
other than ourselves.76  Besides opening us to the subject matter or to the disclosure of 
new possibilities, the risk of conversation may also initiate an authentic relationship with 
the other.  Real conversation cannot take place with an other projected in one’s own 
mind; it can only occur with someone or something that is real or different from oneself, 
that’s able to disclose meaningful possibilities, when the intergrity of the other is 
respected.77 
 In these more recent works, Tracy is increasingly careful to note how limited and 
imperfect conversation is.  His description of the ideal conversation includes such basic 
tenets as “respect for the sincerity of the other; that all conversation partners are, in 
principle, equals; saying what one means and meaning what one says; a willingness to 
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weigh all relevant evidence…and abide by the rules of validity [and] coherence.”78  
While this ideal is never realized in fact, it helps in realizing the limitations and problems 
in conversation.  For Tracy, the interruptive categories of plurality and ambiguity place 
constraints on the possibility of ideal conversation. 
 Since plurality and ambiguity challenge the relatively simple and basic 
understanding of what real conversations are, Tracy wants to contest the idea that 
conversation is simple and instead acknowledge that language and history, as well as the 
interpretations of fundamental questions formed within language and history, are 
inevitably plural, different, and irreducible to one another.  Yet the recognition of 
plurality also helps one to recognize that some forces in cultures and traditions have 
sought to assert otherwise, to impose uniformity, to reduce the hermeneutical impulse to 
“more of the same.”79  Ambiguity, meanwhile, fosters the central insight that all 
traditions, classics, and indeed all conversations are marred in some way.  Each comes 
with a history, a preunderstanding, that is shaped by countless flawed and sometimes 
morally problematic decisions and interpretations.80  There is not only the risk associated 
with recalling the subtle oppressions and micro-aggressions of this history but also the 
risk of attempting to control or manipulate the other in conversation.  Maintaining 
permanent unwavering openness and risk vis-à-vis the other is simply impossible.   
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Conversation and Tradition  
 Tracy’s theology takes conversation as the basic model and metaphor for 
interpretation, and this then becomes the center of his theological method.  In his view, 
conversation offers the most hopeful way forward in the face of radical plurality and 
ambiguity, but it does not provide a simplistic or even optimistic mode of handling these 
interruptions.  Insofar as plurality and ambiguity aptly describe any “contemporary 
situation,” they always be accounted for theologically.   
 Let me underscore the intrinsic link between tradition and conversation.  Tradition 
is, after all, conversation writ large, involving an ever-increasing number of interlocutors 
through time.81  For Tracy, Christian tradition is a conversation into which candidates for 
classic status enter and engage with fellow classics and interpreters.82  Moreover, 
traditions are dynamic carriers of meaning that can also be in conversation with one 
another.  Consequently, faith traditions, especially Christianity, can only come to real 
self-understanding through a genuine recognition of similarity-in-difference through 
conversation with one another.  Indeed, he is a powerful advocate of the position that 
Christian systematic theology ought to have this conversation with “all the other religions 
and their classics” at the beginning of its efforts, not at the end.83 
 
 
                                                          
81 Tracy’s point here is well stated in Jaroslav Pelikan’s renowned pithy statement that "Tradition is the 
living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.  And, I suppose I should add, it is 
traditionalism that gives tradition such a bad name" (Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 65). 
82 AI 104 
83 AI 449 
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Human Relations with God  
 Previously, I have traced the links among the ideas of the limit-of, the whole, and 
Ultimate Reality through Tracy’s main works in order to show that each of these terms 
generally refer to the reality Christians call God.  In discussing finitude, Tracy uses each 
of these terms to distinguish the experience of human living from God as the mysterious 
reality that grounds this human living.  It is especially the limit-to, both in positive, 
reassuring forms (joy, love) and negative, frightening ones (death, guilt, anxiety) that 
makes the individual aware of the reality beyond the self that is, according to Tracy, the 
horizon of all existence.   
 
The Limit as Revelatory of Relationship  
 The notion of the “limit-to” means those experiences, questions, and situations 
that push one up against one’s limits.  This can occur in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the limits as regards moral and scientific inquiry to those related to personal experiences 
of anxiety, guilt, love, or joy.  These encounters also disclose the “limit-of” these 
experiences, namely the horizon of one’s ordinary existence. 
 In their own way, ecstatic and the boundary situations also disclose a broader 
reality.  Tracy says experience of authentic love “puts us in touch with a reality whose 
power we cannot deny.”84  To be authentic, love must be “self-transcending” to push the 
self to reach beyond the limitations of one’s relative horizon and to care for the other.  In 
the boundary experience of anxiety, however, one faces the “often forgotten but never 
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totally absent consciousness of our own radical contingency.”85  Limit-to experiences, 
questions, and situations bring to collective consciousness the unsettling, sometimes 
terrifying, sometimes exciting sense that there is something beyond us that grounds, and 
perhaps even gives meaning to, our finite lives.   
 The need to articulate this intimation is the primary source of religious language.  
Since such experiences cannot be put into words adequately, people are driven to 
metaphorical and symbolic imagery to describe this “final dimension to our lives.”86  
Tracy thus describes religious language as the limit-language that “re-presents” this final 
dimension in speech.  Finally, he claims that the “objective referent of all such 
language…is that reality which religious human beings mean when they say ‘God.’”87 
 Another way of describing God is the “limit-of” or the final dimension to human 
experience.  God is the ultimate ground and horizon of everyday, ordinary human 
living.88  The encounter with the limit-of that is indicated in the experience of the limit-to 
therefore manifests human finitude and the human relationship with the divine.  For the 
human individual, the religious language for articulating this relationship emphasizes 
both our sense of a basic trust in the graciousness of God as well as our total commitment 
to that reality.89  The divine is what grounds and gives meaning to one’s life, and so it 
orients human life.90   
                                                          
85 BRO 107 
86 BRO 107-8 
87 BRO 109 
88 BRO 147 
89 BRO 122 
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 In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy found the description of the human being as 
related to God not altogether satisfying.  The metaphors of “horizon” and “limit-of” do 
help, but they leave open the question of what it means for God to be in relationship with 
human beings.  From the human side, this relationship is marked by contingency, 
dependence, trust, and commitment, qualities whose meaningfulness is not well served by 
the traditional theistic conceptions of God as impassable and unchanging.  Since these 
conceptions are incapable of doing justice to the relationship between the divine and the 
human, Tracy turns to process theology’s understanding of God as articulated by Charles 
Hartshorne and Schubert Ogden.91 
 Tracy begins his engagement with this view by stating the need for metaphysical 
claims to satisfy two basic criteria: (1) to demonstrate internal coherence; (2) to be 
consistent with “experience broadly and fairly understood.”92  For Tracy, the theistic, 
predominantly Thomist metaphysical depiction of God in the Christian tradition fails on 
both these accounts, because the metaphysical categories of substance and being are non-
temporal and non-relational.93  He suggests that that a non-relational God contradicts the 
witness of scripture, which portrays God as being in an ongoing, expanding covenant 
with humanity. 
 Tracy replaces the categories of substance and being with the categories of 
“process, “sociality,” and “time.”  As applied first to the idea of the self, these categories 
                                                          
91 For Tracy’s main sources here, see Charles Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941); Ogden, The Reality of God; and Charles Hartshorne and William 
L. Reese, eds., Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
92 BRO 172 
93 BRO 173 
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are inherently relational: “The self as we actually experience that self is an illusion if it is 
not a process of change and continuity: a process which precisely as process involves 
both internal relations with all reality and the distinct temporal modes of present, past, 
and future.”94  Moreover, since the central human experience of love is relational, “we 
are authentic selves only in direct proportion to our ability to be affected by and related to 
other selves.”95 
 The process notion of the self is thus dipolar, with both an abstract and concrete 
pole.  The abstract pole is that “aspect whereby I simply exist – I am not affected by 
others.  I simply exist.”96  The concrete pole, however, refers to the aspect of being in 
relation to others and to the world; it is profoundly affected by its context.  The self has 
both poles: the unrelated existent one and the relationally existing one.97   
 Tracy then claims that God is the quintessential example of these categories, not 
the exception.  God can also be analogously understood as a dipolar reality.  In the 
abstract pole, God is supremely absolute and does not depend for existence on any other 
reality.  Yet in the concrete pole, God is not only relative, but supremely relative: God is 
the only reality that is related to everything else that exists.  God is thus “both absolute 
                                                          
94 BRO 173 
95 BRO 178 
96 BRO 179 
97 The abstract pole in process metaphysics should not be confused with the category of “nature” or “form” 
in Thomistic metaphysics.  In the case of the self, the abstract pole does not refer to human nature, with the 
concrete self being an individual existent of that form.  Rather, the abstract and concrete pole in union with 
one another form the individual existent.  By abstract, Tracy means the qualities of a specific individual 
that are “relatively unrelated to others.”  He refers here to that fact of existing with some defining 
characteristics, but does not expand on what those mean.  In fact, one central weakness to the idea of the 
abstract pole is that even the mere fact of existence is relational, in that that existence is not only utterly 
dependent on whatever brought the self into existence (i.e., parents), but also dependent on the reality that 
grounds human existence (i.e., God).  Tracy’s qualifier of “relatively” unrelated seems unsatisfactory in 
this regard. 
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(as the one whose existence depends on no other being) and relative (as the one whose 
actuality is relative to all other beings).”98  The dipolar understanding of God thus 
maintains the perfection language about God, claiming that “in both ‘poles’ of his reality 
God alone is supremely perfect.”99  The traditional description of God’s perfection is 
thereby expanded to include the ideas of change and process within God.100 
 In defending this process notion of God, Tracy argues that it satisfies the two 
criteria mentioned above.  First, he claims the concept is internally coherent, arguing that 
God is “eminently social and temporal.”  God is immediately in relation to all that is, 
participating in reality in a way analogous to the self’s connection to his/her body.101  In 
addition, God is supremely temporal because “God alone synthesizes in each new 
moment all the actuality already achieved with all the true possibilities as yet 
unrealized.”102  This claim to internal coherence is based on the analogy of the self’s 
existence as both relational and temporal, and therefore in process.  As such, it is not a 
claim that can be made finally or definitively, but is instead conceived as an argument, 
not to explain mystery, but to clarify “where the mystery lies.”103   
 With respect to the criterion of adequacy to experience, Tracy believes a process 
understanding fulfills both the sense of contemporary lived human experience as well as 
the scriptural witness.  The dipolar God is a God understood to be profoundly affected by 
the human struggle towards the good, whereas for Tracy the more traditional conceptions 
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100 BRO 176 
101 BRO 181 
102 BRO 181 
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of God as unchanging and impassable risk describing God as indifferent to human 
suffering.104  For Tracy, this is the God of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, who is 
persuaded by Abraham’s negotiations, who liberates God’s people from Egypt, and who 
frees all from sin through the person and event of Jesus Christ.  Thus, Tracy reasons, the 
understanding of God as profoundly related to human existence is a better interpretation 
both of our lives and of the attestation of scripture. 
 The conceptual connections among “horizon,” the “limit-of,” and the process 
theology understanding of God in Tracy’s Blessed Rage for Order bring out the 
profoundly relational character of the human person.  Individuals’ encounters with their 
limits manifest their finitude as well as their connection with what is beyond their limits.  
The metaphor of the horizon only emphasizes this quality even more.  The broad, 
grounding horizon that discloses the “limit-of” ordinary human experience clarifies the 
human person’s relationship to God, and underscores both the contingency and 
dependence of the human and God’s concern for creation.  Tracy claims that “the 
eminently relative God is the absolute ground of all relationships, ours and the divine.”105  
While Tracy will gradually move away from this process theology of God,106 at this early 
stage it clearly demonstrates the importance of relationality. 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 BRO 177 
105 BRO 182 
106 Tracy recounts this argument in AI 160-161, but he does so mainly as an example of the disagreements 
surrounding how adequately the limit-of can be stated in religious language. 
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The Whole in AI  
 In the previous chapter I noted a shift in language in The Analogical Imagination 
from the limit-of to the whole.  This shift connects theology more profoundly with 
culture in Tracy’s work.  The “ethos” and “worldview” of that religious tradition become 
indissolubly linked within a religion orientation to the whole as the ground of existence.  
If the whole is the authentic focus of one’s life, then the reality of the whole and the way 
one should live are interconnected.  The whole is thus a reality to which the individual is 
inevitably oriented, either toward or away from it.  When one’s orientation is a matter of 
basic trust in and commitment to the object of faith revealed by the whole, Tracy calls 
that relationship faith.107 
 The question of the orientation to the whole becomes a key to the larger question 
of the human relation to the divine.  For Tracy, religious classics and theological 
questions are virtually indispensable for “the most serious questions on the meaning of 
existence as participating in, yet distanced, sometimes even estranged from, the reality of 
the whole.”108  How one is oriented indicates where one stands vis-à-vis the wider tension 
between participation in and alienation from the whole.   
 The significance of these two poles is brought out by Tracy’s distinction between 
the classical religious expressions of manifestation and of proclamation.  As classics, 
both manifestation and proclamation are marked by the dialectical tension between 
intensification and distanciation.  “Intensification” means the “journey into particularity” 
in which the producer of the classic (the artist, the thinker, the saint) allows the self to be 
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open to the “game of the truth of existence.”109  The result of intensification is some finite 
expression that aims for the infinite, making its revelatory possibility disproportionate to 
its producer when it culminates the process of intensification.  Tracy calls this 
distanciation, in order to indicate the point at which the producer of the classic lets go of 
the expression so that it becomes shareable and public.110 
 Manifestation names what happens when the process of intensification is 
predominantly a matter of participation and phenomena become saturated with the power 
of the whole.  When that happens, manifestation takes place outside of normal time and 
space and in the realm of the sacred, even as people participate in, for example, myths 
and rituals.111  Then the power of manifestation is disclosed specifically to those who 
enter into the sacred space.  Influenced by the work of Mircea Eliade, Tracy explains that 
only through such participation can “we impoverished and parochial Western moderns be 
freed…from ordinary time and space, indeed from history itself.”112  The classic 
expressions of manifestation engender participation and, in so doing, put people in 
contact with the whole. 
 Proclamation, on the other hand, does not involve participation.  Like 
manifestation, proclamation discloses the power of the whole, but as an address to the 
self that shatters any easy sense of participation.113  Here the experience of participation 
in the whole is dialectically challenged by the feeling of radical difference between the 
                                                          
109 AI 125-6.  Regarding “game,” see Chapter Two, 78 
110 AI 126-7 
111 AI 205 
112 AI 206 
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self and the whole, when the sense of complacency in the adequacy of one’s myths, 
symbols, or rituals is undermined.  Proclamation confronts both the community and the 
self by demanding fidelity “through word and deed in this time and this history to the 
God who gives that word as enabling command.”114  In this way proclamation reveals the 
radical estrangement of the self from the whole.115 
 For Tracy these two classic religious expressions are two distinct but basic ways 
of conceiving the relationship between humans and the divine.  While manifestation and 
proclamation reveal the whole, they are related to different aspects of the divine-human 
relationship.  Manifestation emphasizes the profound connection between humans and 
God through human participation in the whole through ritual, symbol, and myth, whereas 
proclamation shows the radical alienation of the human from the divine, especially as 
regards the finite individual self.  Manifestation and proclamation need each other 
because neither is sufficient on its own to articulate this relationship.  Indeed, only in 
concert with each other can the real ambiguity about the divine-human relationship 
become clear: “the significance and goodness of history, the estrangement and sin in self 
and society, the ultimate incomprehensibility of self, society and history, the hope for a 
really new future, the radical affirmation of world that is released by radical world-
negation.”116   
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115 AI 211.  The religious expressions of manifestation and proclamation will become a central focus of 
Chapter Five. 
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Transformation to the Other  
 Tracy’s depiction of the divine-human relationship in The Analogical Imagination 
in terms of the tension between participation and estrangement makes possible the central 
insight of Plurality and Ambiguity and Dialogue with the Other.  One of the most 
distinguishing marks of contemporary thought is the “shift from modern self to post-
modern other.”117  Indeed, the centrality of conversation and dialogue as a 
methodological requirement for theology is based on the openness of the self to the other, 
even to the point of risking radical change.  To be sure, “otherness” encompasses not 
only those persons, cultures, and contexts that are different from oneself, but also the 
divine Other and one’s own otherness.   
 As we have just seen, the human relationship with the divine Other is marked by 
the experiences of participation and estrangement.  The tension between the two is 
evident in attempts of religious language to articulate the sense of divine mystery.  Divine 
revelation, for example, is fundamentally a disclosure of God’s self, even if it conceals 
even more than it unveils.  Because the divine is ultimately mysterious, religious 
language can never definitely articulate it.  Even the best religious speech ultimately 
“prove[s] uncontrollable and unmasterable.”118   
 Due to the inherent limitations of religious language, Tracy seems to prefer the 
more apophatic type of religious discourse.  Thus, he notes that “Silence may be the most 
appropriate kind of speech for evoking this necessary sense of the radical mystery—as 
mystics insist when they say, ‘Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not 
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know’.”119  Religious speech communicates successfully when it evokes and deepens the 
sense of divine mystery, countering any easy sentimentalism about God while further 
articulating Otto’s  tremendum and fascinans of religious experience.120   
 Yet, Tracy does not simply advocate silence, but insists that religious classics and 
experiences must always be interpreted, since they are responses to the basic questions of 
existence that cannot be thoroughly and definitively answered.  Thus the inevitability of 
human inquiry grounds the ongoing role for religious classics.  Moreover, interpretations 
of these classics need not be performed by the faithful alone since fundamental human 
questions are not the sole domain of believers or religious elites.  Tracy’s argument for 
the public nature of religious classics implies that all people should risk interpreting 
them.  As public discourse, religious classics may  
evoke a wide range of responses…from the shock of recognition religiously 
named faith, as radical trust in, and loyalty to, Ultimate Reality, to some far more 
tentative religious sense that, without implying belief, can nevertheless envisage 
some enlightenment and emancipation in the religious classics.121 
 
The excess and permanence of meaning extending beyond their traditions of origin 
proper to religious expressions as classic enables them to elicit such responses from a 
limitless range of interpreters. 
 These responses, while not an exhaustive list of possible responses to religious 
classics,122 indicate Tracy’s conviction that an encounter with Ultimate Reality can be a 
                                                          
119 PA 108 
120 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 
12-40 
121 PA 111.   
122 Tracy does not, in this context, seem to envision that spectrum as stretching to the possibilities of 
profound disagreement or radical rejection as responses to religious classics (or, for that matter, the even 
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profoundly transformative experience.  In Plurality and Ambiguity, Tracy categorizes this 
transformation as the shift “from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.”123  This shift 
is a corrective to the modern conception of the autonomous ego that Tracy views as a 
misunderstanding of human finitude.  This shift is made possible for the individual by 
one’s “relationship with Ultimate Reality,”124 which emerges in an initial way from one’s 
experience of asking those limit questions that raise the possibility of a grounding reality.   
 The responses Tracy notes above suggest that the relationship with the divine 
disclosed in interpretation of religious classics can be characterized as emancipatory.  
The move from ego-centrism to theo-centrism is not a minor adjustment of the self but a 
release.125  The growing realization of one’s relationship with Ultimate Reality has the 
effect of liberating the individual for responsible agency directed toward “nature, history, 
others, and even the now transformed self.”126  The transformation profoundly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
more challenging response of disinterest).  In part, this is due to Tracy’s confidence that an expression is 
only a classic if it has a demonstrated power to reveal universal truths, and thus the likelihood of radical 
rejection or non-response seems negligible (but still possible).  Nonetheless, Tracy has previously 
recognized the validity of rejecting a classic’s claims (AI 116), even going so far in Plurality and Ambiguity 
as to note that coming to an understanding of one’s profound disagreement with such an expression is a 
valid outcome of conversation (PA 93). 
123 PA 89 
124 PA 90 
125 The use of “theo” in this sentence diverges slightly from Tracy’s intentions in referring to “Ultimate 
Reality” in Plurality and Ambiguity.  He makes the important point that this reality is conceived differently 
in various religions, and these conceptions cannot be meaningfully stripped down to a lowest common 
denominator concept.  Ultimate Reality is not necessarily theo-anything in some of the world religions.  
Nonetheless, in Tracy’s context as a Catholic theologian (who has himself described Christianity as 
“Christo-morphic theo-centrism”), the word choice seems appropriate here. Cf. David Tracy, “Augustine’s 
Christomorphic Theocentrism,” in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, eds. George E Demacopoulos and 
Aristotle Papanikolaou (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 263-289. 
 It should be noted that in addition to the diversity of conceptions of Ultimate Reality among the 
world religions, so too are their conceptions of liberation or emancipation.  In particular, the way in which 
liberation might be achieved or received varies in meaningful ways.  Yet he seems to see that these 
liberations depend in large part on one’s relationship to Ultimate Reality construed in some sense as a move 
away from self-centeredness. 
126 PA 90 
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exemplifies Tracy’s insight into the shift from the self to the other.  Shifting one’s focus 
from the self to the divine not only properly orients the human relationship with the 
divine, but also enables one to enter more fully into right relationship with any other, 
whether as persons, cultures, or even one’s own otherness.   
 It becomes clear therefore that central to the initial trajectory of Tracy’s thinking 
about the divine-human relationship is the power and necessity of human transformation.  
This transformation occurs in and through the relationship with the divine and is 
irreducible to an act of human freedom.  Nonetheless the impact of this transformation 
does depend on the human willingness to be open to it.  This transformation becomes the 
basis for one’s relationships to all others.  Applying Lonergan’s notions of conversion 
and horizon, Tracy argues for transformation as a re-orientation of the self from the self 
to the other.   
 While this trajectory is certainly the dominant one in Tracy’s theology throughout 
the 1970’s and 80’s, an important and ongoing change of direction begins in the 90’s.  
His theological project until this point was predominantly concerned with methodological 
concerns, including transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenomenological modes of 
analysis.  In the 90’s, however, he shifts to the more doctrinal or substantive question of 
God, no longer preoccupied with the terms limit-of, whole, and Ultimate Reality, but 
reconstructing instead what he considers the major traditional ways of naming God.  This 
shift, which still awaits its culmination in Tracy’s not yet finished “God Book,” 
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constitutes a potentially profound shift in how he characterizes the divine-human 
relationship.127   
 
Conclusion  
 The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the importance of the category of 
relationality in Tracy’s theological anthropology.  Intimately linked to the previous 
chapter’s focus on finitude, finitude and relationality are two poles for understanding the 
basic nature of the human person.  Even though the human person is limited and 
bounded, these limits are in some sense both defined and transcended by human 
relationships with the other.  Lonergan’s concept of the horizon is used by Tracy as an 
effective way to articulate this dipolar conception of the self. 
 By examining four important themes in his work – public theology, tradition, 
conversation, and the divine-human relationship – this chapter has shown that each one 
depends upon the human capacity for relationship and moves beyond limitations of the 
autonomous self.  Each of these elements, in different ways, indicates that the human 
person is connected personally, culturally, and historically to a reality that transcends and 
includes the self.   
 Finally, Tracy’s increasing emphasis on the role of interpretation and 
hermeneutics highlights his basic assessment of the human person as an inquisitive and 
interpretive creature.  The very possibility of interpretation rests on the ability of the 
individual to engage with something other, something separate, and something that 
                                                          
127 See especially Tracy, “Form and Fragment,” 98-114. 
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discloses genuine similarities in its differences.  The fact of human relationality is the 
condition of possibility of interpretation.  Tracy construes the human person as an 
interpreting self: 
a self who is a free and responsible individual, who recognizes the intrinsic 
relations of that event of individuality to a particular tradition and society, to other 
selves (interpersonal), to the structural realities of society, culture, politics and 
history; a self whose very selfhood is concretely actual only by the partial 
determination by, a partial freedom from, these encompassing structures; a self 
internally related to the reality of the cosmos which encompasses all selves, 
structures and history; and, above all, a self internally related to the reality of the 
whole now both disclosed and concealed as like a who—a living, empowering 
and commanding reality, a judging, healing, loving God.128 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SIN 
 
 The preceding two chapters examined the anthropological constants of finitude 
and relationality in Tracy’s theology.  These constants are closely linked to one another, 
as the encounter with one’s finitude in limit situations and one’s historicity reveals the 
ways in which one is related to others, the world, and the divine.  Tracy’s central themes 
of public theology, tradition, and conversation illuminate the finite human person as 
always already connected to the other.   
 In accord with Tracy’s theological method, these two constants belong to the sub-
discipline of fundamental theology.  While they have deep theological import, the notion 
that the human person is both finite and relational is not unique to Christianity or to 
religion in general.  Theology can have an authentic conversation about these concepts 
with other disciplines (such as biology, sociology, and literature), and learn from these 
other fields at the same time as it offers a different perspective. 
 For Tracy, the classic Christian symbols of sin and grace are topics in the sub-
discipline of systematic theology, which is concerned with creative fidelity to a particular 
tradition as it interprets its central symbols in light of changing contemporary contexts.  
Systematic theology can engage publics outside the church to which a theologian happens 
to belong; but it speaks precisely from within that church, presuming that its interlocutors 
have some commitment to the tradition or at least a willingness to grant its premises for 
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the sake of conversation.  From the start of his career, Tracy believed that the symbols of 
sin and grace can contribute to the human sciences by offering a more complete account 
of the human “in his concrete performance.”1 
 This chapter focuses on sin in Tracy’s theological anthropology.  He argues that 
sin is both a rejection of human finitude (meaning that clear distinctions need to be drawn 
between these two constants) and a corruption of human relationality.  Further, he argues 
that sin is an inevitable fact even if not an intrinsic or necessary aspect of human 
existence like finitude and relationality.  Tracy distinguishes among three distinct but 
interrelated understandings of sin: personal sins, habitual sins, and inherited sin.  
Although these three dimensions of sin differ in the degree of consciousness they entail, 
they still perpetuate and reinforce one another.  Inherited sin, described as unconscious 
systemic distortion, is Tracy’s primary focus in discussing human sinfulness.  Insofar as 
it affects both the individual and the context, sin distorts not only our finitude but also our 
relationality. 
 
The Relationship Between Sin and Finitude  
 I will outline two important questions integral to Tracy’s understanding of sin at 
the outset.  The first regards the distinction between finitude and sin.  To be sure, the 
treatment of finitude and sin in separate chapters already indicates an implicit distinction.  
A consideration of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology in 
                                                          
1 ABL 190: “In short, if these are in fact the human elements that must be considered by the empirical, 
human sciences, then no human science can successfully analyze its object without an appeal to the specific 
science that handles precisely those elements, viz. theology.” 
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relation to Tracy’s theological anthropology makes the value of such a distinction readily 
apparent.  The key is Ricoeur’s opposition to the conflation of the phenomena of finitude 
and sin in his early trilogy Freedom and the Will.  In those texts, he investigates the 
“fundamental possibilities” of the human, specifically what it means for the human 
person to will.  These possibilities include the possibility of evil and sin, but Ricoeur 
opposes any claim that evil is a necessary outcome of human acts of the will.  The 
possibility of evil arises in the “fault,” the disproportion between human finitude and 
infinitude (i.e., the ability of one’s reason to reach beyond the historically-conditioned 
character of one’s life to understand what is universally true).  The possibility of sin 
therefore depends on the actuality of finitude, but the actuality of sin is a result of one’s 
freely willing to sin.2   
 The second question regards the characterization of the relationship between 
freedom and sin.  Karl Rahner is a notable influence on Tracy, since his treatment of 
original sin as a social situation in which individuals find themselves is clearly important 
for Tracy’s description of inherited sin.3  Yet Rahner’s understanding of original sin as 
analogous sin and secondary in importance to sin as a free decision to say “no” to God 
clashes with Tracy’s claim that the distortion due to inherited sin is the most basic 
meaning for sin in the Christian tradition.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Cf. Chapter One, pages 39-40 
3 Cf. Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 1-20, 152-215 
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The Neo-Orthodox Model of Theology  
 The first appearance of the distinction between finitude and sin in Tracy’s work 
occurs during his description of five models for theology in Blessed Rage for Order.4  
These five models – orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, radical, and revisionist – constitute 
a rough typology of methodological approaches to theological questions.  Tracy situated 
himself within the revisionist model while writing BRO, but for the purposes of this 
section the relationship between the liberal and neo-orthodox model helps explain the 
finitude-sin distinction. 
 The liberal model of Christian theology is deeply committed both to the claims of 
the Christian tradition and to the modern secular project.  According to Tracy, this secular 
project originates from the far-reaching impact of the methods, claims, and values of 
modern philosophy, science, and history.5  Liberal theology both adopts the cognitive 
claims and commits itself to the ethical stances of secular modernity while 
simultaneously intending to take the Christian theological tradition seriously.  When the 
secular and Christian projects conflict with each other, sometimes liberal theologians are 
forced to weaken, modify, or abandon one or the other of these commitments.6  Yet  
                                                          
4 For the description of these various models, see Chapter Two, 84-7. 
5 BRO 25 
6 Tracy cites Ludwig Feuerbach as an “extreme” example of this phenomenon (BRO 26), but one might 
also look to the rise of modernist Protestant theology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to see how 
various denominations struggled with the conflict of theological and scientific claims; see William R. 
Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1992). 
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Tracy asserts the main result of this confrontation of differing commitments is to 
demonstrating the compatibility of Christian and modern “vision and values.”7   
 Typical of the liberal model is the general sense of optimism that pervades much 
of its theology.  Tracy describes this optimism as “evolutionary” in the sense that liberal 
theology, especially in the decades immediately prior to World War I, asserted that 
human knowledge, well-being, and even moral stature were continuously progressing: 
humanity was getting better, even growing up.8  The anthropology of liberal theology 
appropriated the Enlightenment construction of an autonomous and rational human 
person.  Despite the finitude of the individual human person, the possibilities attainable 
by the broader human society’s rational processes were thought to be nearly limitless.  
Some theologians even went so far as to claim that through human effort, the kingdom of 
God would be achieved on Earth within their lifetimes.9 
 The neo-orthodox model of theology is largely a response to and critique of the 
liberal model.  The twin claims of the compatibility between Christianity and culture and 
the optimism about human capabilities was shattered for many by the experience of 
World War I, leading many theologians to challenge the prevailing liberal worldview.  
For Tracy, this critique proceeds along two tracks: first, liberal theology offered an 
inadequate account of actual human existence, and second, it lacked any real commitment 
                                                          
7 BRO 26.  Tracy cites Schleiermacher as the most successful and influential example of such a 
reconciliation. 
8 It would be fair to characterize this as a narrow European-North American perspective, especially as these 
powers attempted to justify their colonial forays as part of their broader efforts to civilize the rest of the 
world.   
9 Cf. BRO 213. 
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to the central role of Jesus Christ in justification and salvation.10  Some Christians feared 
that the compatibility between culture and Christianity amounted to accommodation by 
religious leaders who were, in effect, trivializing the salvific role of Jesus.11  In contrast 
to the more isolationist orthodox model, the neo-orthodox model does not abandon the 
encounter between Christianity and culture.  Tracy insists that Christian tradition both 
challenges and illuminates the cultures it confronts. 
 The central issue here is the difference between these accounts of human 
existence.  If the liberal model did in some cases engage the fact of “human finitude and 
possibility,” it still lacked any real recognition of the negative realities of death, guilt, 
tragedy, and sin.12  These elements are central to neo-orthodox analysis, particularly 
among those theologians whom Tracy characterizes as “dialectical.”13  The dialectical 
thrust within neo-orthodoxy affirms the radical difference between the Creator and the 
created, the latter of which includes both the finite character of human existence as well 
as human sinfulness.  Neo-orthodoxy distinguishes between finitude and sin.  Sin is not 
considered a natural or intrinsic part of created humanity, but rather as an ever-present 
fact of human existence.  The liberal model’s lack of stress on sin in the human condition, 
on the other hand, is not due to the conflation of finitude and sin (as occurs in 
Heidegger), but rather to its pervasive sense of optimism and progress in human history.   
                                                          
10 BRO 28 
11 See H. Richard Niebuhr’s critique of the “Christ of Culture” in Christ and Culture, 108-115; cf. Karl 
Barth, Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 2-15. 
12 BRO 28 
13 E.g. Barth, Bultmann, Brunner, Gogarten, Niebuhr, and Tillich, primarily.  Tracy claims in a footnote the 
specifically “negative” connotation of “dialectic,” stating that it includes “an incisive account of 
‘negations’ in experience and in thought and, ordinarily, an account of the originality of a Christian 
negation of those negations…” (BRO 38 n. 37) 
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 For Tracy, neo-orthodoxy is a corrective moment not only within liberal theology 
but also in relation to the insights of process thought.  Despite his early appropriation of 
the process conception of God as di-polar, he wishes to challenge the scant attention paid 
to anthropology by process thinkers.  Tracy claims that process theology’s limited 
“existential impact” is in large part due to the fact that the process understanding of the 
human person is infected by “residual liberal optimism.”14  So process theology needs the 
dialectical insights of neo-orthodox theology.  Furthermore, Tracy suspects that the 
abstract nature of process thought neglects symbolic language and restricts its ability to 
account for the concrete existential situations of actual human beings.  Put another way, 
only an anthropology embedded in the real ambiguities of human life can offer an 
adequate reflection on contemporary human experience. 
 The central contribution of the neo-orthodox model is the importance it ascribes 
to the sin, ambiguity, and tragedy in human experience.  Even when construed primarily 
as a corrective of the larger liberal tradition, neo-orthodoxy motivates a deeper awareness 
of the role these phenomena play in the actual lives of concrete persons.  The neo-
orthodox recognition of human sinfulness is in part responsible for Tracy’s move away 
from his flirtation with process theology. 
 These two strands make evident that very early on in his theology Tracy 
maintained the distinction between finitude and sin.  The fact of human limitation or 
bounded-ness is neither a result of nor reducible to human sinfulness; nor is sin an 
inevitable result of finitude.  Nevertheless, sin is also a limitation or boundary on human 
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activity, even if it is not intrinsic to human nature.  Rather, the various forms of sin are 
actually a perversion, a corruption, of authentic humanity.15 
 
Rahner and Sin  
 Karl Rahner hypothesizes that original sin is fundamentally a social situation into 
which human beings are born rather than a hereditary stain passed down from parent to 
child.  The insight behind describing original sin as a social situation is that any 
enactment of human freedom in the world will, due to the relational character of the 
human person, affect the freedom of others.  Human persons are not fully able to separate 
themselves from this context, whether as regards current decision and actions or in 
relation to those that occurred in the past.  Therefore individual persons enact their 
freedom in the context prior to and imposed upon them.16   No one can meaningfully and 
completely control or determine one’s own context, and thus each person’s freedom is 
co-determined by the freedom of others, past and present, whether in righteous or guilty 
decisions.  To recognize that everyone’s freedom is co-determined in this way, and thus 
that each succeeding generation of humanity will experience this context of co-
determination, is to realize that Rahner understood this situation to be the universal and 
enduring reality of original sin.17   If original sin perpetuates itself by virtue of the fact 
that all people are born into it and are not able to eliminate it of their own accord, then 
                                                          
15 Tracy at one point goes so far to say that the rejection of human finitude is in itself sinful; cf. PA 74. 
16 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 107 
17 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 109 
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original sin does not come from a dualistic, independent principle of evil, but rather from 
the complex of free decisions of the human community. 
 To illustrate this point, Rahner provides a mundane but particularly illuminating 
example in Foundations of Christian Faith by reflecting on the act of purchasing 
bananas: 
…when someone buys a banana, he does not reflect upon the fact that its price is 
tied to many presuppositions.  To them belongs, under certain circumstances, the 
pitiful lot of banana pickers, which in turn is co-determined by social injustice, 
exploitation, or a centuries-old commercial policy.18  
 
Thus banana purchasers become part of and benefit from a situation outside their 
immediate control, so that even an apparently innocuous decision like picking up the 
groceries enacts human freedom within a context riddled throughout with moral 
consequences both for the agents and for those affected by such choices.  In short, by 
acting in the world, the agent participates in the reality of original sin.  Indeed, Rahner 
uses this understanding of original sin precisely to explain how no human action can be 
completely free of guilt. 
 In explaining original sin as an analogous sin, Rahner intends to distinguish 
between the situation marked by sin and personal sin.  In Rahner’s theology, all human 
beings are free, and they have this freedom in relationship to God.19   Thus freedom is 
both grounded in God and qualifies the personal relationship to God.  Rahner then 
presents the notion of the fundamental option: each person’s “yes” or “no” to God.  For 
                                                          
18 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 110-111.  More contemporary environmental theologies would 
likely add the impact of shipping bananas thousands of miles to regions that cannot grow them 
indigenously.   
19 Karl Rahner, “Theology of Freedom,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 6 (Baltimore, MD: Helicon 
Press, 1969), 180. 
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Rahner this is not a matter of any particular choice made in the course of an individual’s 
life, but rather has to do with the person’s overall disposition towards God over the 
course of a lifetime.  So sin in the personal sense is this “no.”  In this enactment of the 
fundamental option, the human person definitively rejects God’s gracious self-
communication.  Even though such a rejection is also implicitly an acknowledgment of 
the very ground of that freedom, Rahner maintains that the human person can freely give 
a “no” to God.20   Such sin is highly personal because the agent bears the responsibility 
for this act.  Indeed, even though human beings are social and live within a web of 
relationships to neighbors and to God, this sin entails “the act of that freedom which 
permits of no deputization.”21    
 Original sin is analogous to personal sin.  For Rahner there is an analogy between 
the situation of freedom (original sin) and the individual freedom of the person (sin 
proper).22  Rahner focuses on several diverse aspects of this analogy: pre-existence vs. 
enduring character, the decisions of others vs. one’s own decision, and the “dialectical 
relation between two existentials” (original sin and being redeemed) vs. the “non-
dialectical relations of a free decision in Yes or No.”23   Whatever the many differences, 
                                                          
20 Rahner, “Theology of Freedom,” 182.  For a more in-depth look at Rahner’s concept of sin as a “no,” and 
especially the problems of describing this “no” as “definitive,” see Ron Highfield, “The Freedom to Say 
‘No’?  Karl Rahner’s Doctrine of Sin,” Theological Studies 56 (Sept 1995): 485-505. 
21 Karl Rahner, “The Immaculate Conception,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 1 (Baltimore, MD: 
Helicon Press, 1961), 208.   
22 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 111 
23 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 111 
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the analogy is based on the fact that while the guilt of personal sin cannot be imputed to 
another person, such sin does shape the context in which others enact their freedom.24 
 
The Inevitable Fact of Evil and Sin25 
 The distinction between finitude and sin leads to the second key part of Tracy’s 
explicitation of sin and evil, which he regards as a fact.  He does not make a rigid 
distinction between evil and sin, and at times he treats the terms somewhat 
interchangeably.  He suggests that the main difference is that sin is an explicitly Christian 
rendering of evil.  He subtly emphasizes the importance of human freedom in relation to 
evil and sin and prescinds from questions about natural or non-agentive evil.  He also 
raises the questions of whether the ubiquity of evil in the world warrants the claim that 
evil is a necessary result of human freedom. 
 For Tracy, evil is a fact of human experience but not a necessity.  Invoking 
Ricoeur’s distinctions in Freedom and Nature, Tracy says “That human beings are also 
fallible, that we can commit error, is a direct consequence of the human reality as 
constituted by both freedom and nature.  But that we in fact commit not merely error but 
evil cannot be a necessary characteristic of our being.”26  If evil were a necessary result 
of human freedom, the Christian claim that humans are free and responsible beings would 
                                                          
24 Furthermore, the non-imputation of another’s guilt is one of Rahner’s reasons for rejecting the more 
“biological” model described above.  He denies that original sin has anything to do with the sin of Adam or 
Eve, as their particular guilt cannot be transmitted to their descendants.  It can, and does, impact the 
situation into which their descendants are born and thus the situation of their freedom.  See Foundations of 
Christian Faith 110-11. 
25 Tracy does not so much conflate the two as indistinguishable in themselves as describe sin as the 
specifically Christian understanding of moral evil (cf. BRO 212, 229 n. 51-54); cf.  Lonergan, Insight, 714-
718. 
26 BRO 211-2 
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be false, because sin coerced from the human person nullifies human responsibility.  
Furthermore, to claim that evil is necessary contradicts the belief in God’s essential 
goodness.  To affirm that in creating human beings God had intended them to turn away 
from God is to deny the more basic assertion that God created human beings for 
beatitude.  The assertion that evil is necessary contradicts both the freedom of the human 
person as free to make genuinely moral decisions and the creation of human beings by a 
good and loving God.   
 When Tracy calls sin or moral evil an “existential fact,” he rejects the 
metaphysical necessity of human sin.  However, Tracy does say that sin is inevitable in 
the realm of human action—“inevitable” instead of “necessary” precisely because of the 
sheer statistical probability that each human person will sin.  The decision to sin will be 
made “freely and responsibly,” without coercion, yet everyone will eventually make it.27   
 Tracy considers the inevitability of sin to be the central intelligibility in Christian 
teaching on original sin.  On his analysis of the “medieval scholastic discussion” of this 
topic, it holds that human actions can still be considered free even if consent is not 
always overt, as happens with habitual action, which, though often unreflective, is still 
free.  It follows that original sin is understood as a “habitual inclination to evil.”28 In 
some particular instances, this inclination can be resisted or avoided, but the human 
person is unable to maintain the unyielding vigilance that would be necessary to avoid 
every habitual yet free sinful act.  Moreover, such a habit is formed within “a social 
                                                          
27 BRO 212.  It perhaps goes without saying that Tracy would exempt Christ from making the free decision 
to sin. 
28 BRO 212, emphasis mine 
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situation where evil is clearly present,” so that the options available to the person are 
limited.  These twin forces of habitual inclination and social context exacerbate the 
probability – indeed, the virtual inevitability – of individual sin. 
 The role of the social situation in the fact of evil demonstrates that evil and sin are 
not simply the result of individual choices.  Agreeing with Reinhold Niebuhr’s The 
Nature and Destiny of Man, Tracy says that human sin occurs “on an individual, societal, 
and a historical scale.”29  The deeper recognition of sin inspired in Tracy by the neo-
orthodox model includes the claim that sin corrupts social structures, foments the 
repression of marginalized groups, and infects the histories and traditions of cultures.  As 
Tracy put the matter in Dialogue with the Other, “there is no innocent tradition (including 
modernity), no innocent classic (including the scriptures) and no innocent reading 
(including this one).”30  The ambiguity discussed in Plurality and Ambiguity implies the 
many ways in which sin is embedded not just individually but socially.  Just as human 
beings are formed by their relations within traditions,31 so too formation inculcates the 
“habitual inclination of sin” in individuals and propagates the sinfulness within those 
traditions. 
 
Tracy’s Three Dimensions of Sin 
 On the basis of the fact of sin and the distinction of sin from finitude, Tracy 
describes three related ways of using the term “sin.”  The first and perhaps most obvious 
                                                          
29 BRO 213 
30 DWO 5-6 
31 See the previous chapter 
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is concrete personal sin that arises from the free decisions consciously committed by the 
agent.  The second is what Tracy calls habitual sin, which is routinely committed by the 
agent without explicit reflection.  As such, they are tantamount to pre-conscious sins even 
though the agent remains fully responsible for them.  The third is inherited or (more 
traditionally) original sin.  Tracy commonly uses the metaphor of distortion to describe 
inherited sin, because original sin is at once unconscious and systemic within the self.  
The unconscious systemic distortion operative in broader cultures and societies is a 
further undercurrent in Tracy’s theological anthropology. 
 These three ways of using the term “sin” for Tracy are interrelated dimensions of 
sin but are not reducible to one another.  Each dimension reinforces the others and 
perpetuates the sinful condition in which human beings exist, make decisions, and 
generally dispose of themselves.  Yet among these dimensions, Tracy clearly regards the 
state of sin that he speaks about primarily through the metaphor of distortion as 
predominant within Christian reflection.  Thus, he differs from Rahner’s understanding of 
sin that emphasized the role of human freedom in actualizing the fundamental religious 
option with respect to God. 
 
Actual personal sin  
 “Actual personal sin” describes those sins that are the individual human agent’s 
conscious and free decisions for evil.  Such sins are concrete and particular actions, 
decisions, or omissions of the human person.  Consider, for example, the penitential 
Confiteor prayer used in the Catholic mass, which expresses remorse for sins committed 
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“in my thoughts and in my words, in what I have done and what I have failed to do.”  
While the specific motivations for any given sin might be obscure, even in hindsight, any 
individual sin represents free actualization of the human will performed with an 
awareness of “missing the mark.”32 
 In presenting this dimension of sin, recall Tracy’s distinction between error and 
sin.  He describes error as a reasonable possible outcome in human endeavors stemming 
from human fallibility.33  Tracy adopts Ricoeur’s account of fallibility as a “direct 
consequence” of the fact that the human person possesses both freedom and nature.  
Fallibility is the capacity to commit error.34   
 For Tracy, error has a primarily cognitive dimension.  Error refers to the fact that 
human minds misunderstand, make invalid inferences, and fall into faulty logical 
deductions.  While this certainly includes mistakes in remembering made with respect to 
facts or ideas (e.g. confusing Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address with his Second Inaugural), it 
also includes actions inspired by cognitive mistakes (e.g. a quarterback throwing 
interception after misreading the defensive coverage).  The human person will not get it 
right all the time, and this, in a sense, is due to the limitations of human abilities.  Further, 
such errors can be corrected through the application of reason, whether through argument 
                                                          
32 The word ἁμαρτία (hamartia), which is translated in the letters of Paul as “sin,” comes from the Greek for 
“to miss the mark.” 
33 It is left somewhat ambiguous as to whether error is a necessary outcome, however. 
34 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 133-146 
Chapter Four 
195 
 
(narrowly construed) or through informal conversation.  Rational error can be removed 
light of a more complete knowledge or understanding.35 
 If errors are those thoughts or actions resulting from mistaken knowledge or 
understanding, is it then possible to describe personal sins analogously as moral errors?  
Sins of both thoughts and actions can be caused by a mistaken understanding of the right 
thing to do in a given situation and repented of following their commission.  Further, just 
as regularly repeating the same error can create an error-prone habit (consistent bad 
grammar leads to habitual bad grammar), so too can repeating the same sins lead to the 
development of vice.  Finally, Tracy’s understanding of error and sin is influenced by 
Ricoeur, and we note that just as the possibility of error is grounded in human finitude, so 
too is the possibility (but not inevitability) of sin and evil. 
 Yet this “moral error” analogy also includes substantial dissimilarities.  Most 
importantly, sins are not motivated primarily by false knowledge or misunderstanding.  
The sinful decision is driven more by a disordered sense of the good rather than a 
mistaken one.  Tracy describes the motivation to sin as “the self’s eternal struggle to 
absorb all reality into itself: to force, with both the arrogance of pride and the sloth of 
self-dispersion, all reality into my needs and my desires or else level it.”36  This is to 
make the good that is the individual self the highest good, and so to turn the self into an 
idol.  Reality then confirms that idolatry or hinders its fulfillment.  In sin the good of the 
                                                          
35 Tracy, “The Christian Understanding of Salvation-Liberation,” 135-6.  In the examples provided, 
returning to the sources can correct the first while more careful attention to game tape can limit the 
recurrence of the second. 
36 AI 53 
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self and the good of the world beyond the self, including the ultimate reality of God, 
become distorted. 
 There are two further objections to the notion that sin is primarily motivated by 
cognitive error.  First, the degree of culpability for personal sins depends on one’s 
understanding of the moral value of that thought or action.  The person would not have 
the same degree of responsibility for an act committed merely out of ignorance as  for an 
act committed with full comprehension.37  Secondly, if sin were a cognitive error, then 
rational reflection or conversation would be sufficient to combat sin.  Tracy suggests that 
we must use “some resources other than the more familiar Western discussion of 
conscious reason to ‘heal’ that situation” because such rational approaches are incapable 
of correcting not only particular sins but the fact of sin in general.38   
 Thus personal sins are moral errors in a rather circumscribed sense, namely free 
and conscious thoughts and actions that are distorted with respect to the good committed 
by the individual human agent.  Since the good can be conceived of in various ways 
depending on the circumstances (such as the divine good, the good of others, the good of 
the self, and the good of creation), there may already be complex negotiations among 
these goods independently of any distortions.  The difficulty of discerning the good can 
be exacerbated by the potential competition among a range of goods, yet the pursuit of 
the good is more profoundly challenged, and indeed corrupted, by the disordered self 
who engages in this pursuit. 
                                                          
37 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Scotts Valley, CA: NovAntiqua, 2010),  I-II, Q. 76, Art. 4, 
resp 
38 Tracy, “The Christian Understanding of Salvation-Liberation,” 136 
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Habitual Sin  
 Personal sin is not an independent reality for Tracy.  Rather, experiences of 
personal sin are enmeshed with the other two understandings of sin, habitual sin and 
inherited sin.  While Tracy focuses least on habitual sin, it is still crucial to his 
understanding of human sinfulness.   
 Habitual sin is a particular kind of habit formation.  According to Aristotle’s 
account, habits are states of character brought about through a process of habituation: “a 
state of character results from the repetition of similar activities.”39  The habit eventually 
becomes second nature for the individual and requires no real deliberation; given the 
appropriate circumstances one is simply inclined to behave in a certain manner.  Of the 
two kinds of habits, virtues and vices, virtues are oriented toward good choices and deeds 
while vices are not, so that “it is as difficult for the vicious person to be good as for the 
virtuous person to be evil.”40 
 For Tracy, habitual sin is a result of vice.  Because habits are a “second nature,” 
they issue from the good or evil character of the person with little or no reflection or 
deliberation.  Thus, in contrast to personal sins, habitual sin is said by Tracy to be pre-
conscious.41  The agent participates in a sinful pattern of behavior precisely because prior 
                                                          
39 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 1103b.21-22 
40 NCFT; cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b1.28-29, 1104b.5-10 
41 Tracy draws on Aquinas here, arguing that “a sin committed through habit” is still sinful because “the 
free subject wills the habit” (David Tracy, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Religious Dimension of 
Experience: The Doctrine of Sin,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 
(1974): 172. 
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personal sins have become habitual, as in the case of habitual liars.  As regards habitual 
sin, it is the person’s selfish orientation (the curvatus in se) that makes it sinful.42   
 Ultimately, these particular ways of behaving and thinking become so engrained 
in the agent that only with intentional conscious reflection can a habitual sinner resist or 
prevent habitual evil choice or deed.  Habitual sin can be resisted, as Tracy points out in 
relation to confession and repentance.  The pre-conscious aspect of habitual sin does not 
totally remove the freedom of the agent to resist.  Although both are wounded, Tracy 
thinks that the mind and the will remain free enough to at least cooperate in some way 
with grace to resist human faults and sins.  Thus resistance to habitual sin is possible, but 
it must rely on the power of God’s grace.43   
 
Inherited or Original Sin  
 The first two dimensions of sin in Tracy’s thought involve concrete actualizations 
of human freedom.  Personal sins are particular choices in thought and in deed that are 
sinful, and habitual sin results from the formation of vicious habits that make it 
increasingly difficult to choose the good freely.  “Inherited sin,” however, has less to do 
with the freedom of individuals than with the systemic distortion of the self’s mind and 
will and the social world. 
 
 
                                                          
42 For a fuller reading of curvatus in se, see Matt Jenson, Gravity of Sin: Augustine, Luther, and Barth on 
‘Homo incurvatus in se’ (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 6-46 
43 For a fuller discussion of the role of grace in Tracy’s theological anthropology, please see Chapter 5, 
“Grace” 
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 Systemic Distortion as Personal  
 As was previously mentioned, “distortion” is Tracy’s primary metaphor for 
inherited sin, and it is specifically related to the important difference between sin and 
error.  Error, as was noted above, is generally correctible through the use of one’s reason.  
But what if one’s reason is itself distorted?44  According to the theological teaching about 
inherited sin, every human act of knowing and willing will be tainted to some degree by 
the inner distortions..  Tracy frequently reinvokes his claim that “there is no innocent 
tradition (including modernity), no innocent classic (including the scriptures) and no 
innocent reading (including this one),” which stems from the pervasive fact of distortion 
and the inability of the human person to discuss, to negotiate, or to reflect one’s way out 
of it.45   
 Since Tracy uses “distortion” to describe both individual and social aspects of 
inherited sin, it can be somewhat difficult to pin down its meaning.  He is perhaps 
clearest when discussing its individual aspect:  
Sin pervades and de-centers the self’s evasions, whether subtle or brutal.  The self 
keeps turning in upon itself (curvatus in se) in an ever-subtler dialectic of self-
delusion…It is named radical alienation or systemic distortion from the viewpoint 
of the self.  It is named sin from the viewpoint of Ultimate Reality: a perverse 
denial of one’s finitude and a willful rejection of any dependence on Ultimate 
Reality.46 
 
Thus distortion refers to this continual inward turning upon itself by the self, as the ego 
becomes entrapped by itself.47  Because of this turning in on itself, every aspect of the 
                                                          
44 NCFT 
45 DWO 5-6 
46 PA 74 
47 NCFT 
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individual’s life becomes tainted or corrupted.  This wounded mind and will does not 
render the individual incapable of either resisting personal or habitual sin to some degree 
or of cooperating with healing grace, but this vulnerability and distortion cannot be 
corrected by the individual alone. 
 According to Tracy, one of the key characteristics of inherited sin as distortion on 
the individual level is that it operates below the threshold of explicit awareness, so that he 
calls it unconscious.  The turn inward, the self-delusion, even the denial of one’s finitude 
are not expressly willed by the individual.  The insidiousness of such distortion derives 
from the subtle way it insinuates itself into the thoughts, the words, the deeds, and the 
omissions of the individual.  Even one’s ostensibly moral actions are derailed by the fact 
of the curvatus in se.  Thus when Tracy describes sin as inevitable but not necessary, he 
is expressing the inexorable way in which the distorted self commits personal sins and 
reinforces habitual sins.   
 Tracy’s use of the term “distortion” to describe inherited sin with respect to 
individuals is quite consistent with traditional interpretations of original sin, but in a 
demythologized reinterpretation that rejects the mythical language of “an historical Adam 
and Eve and their ‘fall’” in favor of an existential analysis of the fallen-ness of each 
person.48  The damage, corruption, and selfishness ascribed to distortion is intended to be 
a construal of this central Christian symbol.   
 A further question concerns the connection between inherited sin and the meaning 
of distortion as social.  The centrality of the social understanding of distortion is clear in 
                                                          
48 DWO 76-77 
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Tracy’s view of sin.  He identifies numerous instances of social systemic distortion, such 
as ecclesiolatry and traditionalism;49 elitism;50 sexism, racism, homophobia, and 
Eurocentrism,51 yet he maintains that these phenomena do not exhaust sin as distortion.  
Invoking Freud and Marx, Tracy refers to “infrapersonal [sic] conflicts” and “structural 
societal conflicts and contradictions” as sources of systemic distortion in the social world.  
Instead of analyzing the sources of these conflicts, he points to the important work of 
feminist, liberation, and political theologies in “the retrieval of the social systemic 
expression of sin over individual sins.”52  Social systemic distortion seems to be a fact for 
Tracy, but he does not make immediately clear its connection to inherited sin and 
individual systemic distortion. 
 
 Systemic Distortion in History  
 In seeking to clarify this relationship, it will be helpful to consider first the locales 
of social distortion in Tracy’s thought and second the responses to this distortion.  For 
Tracy, social distortion occurs in three primary places: history, communication, and 
religion.  As was noted previously,53 history is constitutive of human relationality in 
Tracy’s anthropology.  Human persons are embedded in a history conditioned by the 
collective action of all who precede them.  The self is formed within a historical matrix 
                                                          
49 AI 323 
50 PA 104 
51 David Tracy, “Saving from Evil: Salvation and Evil Today,” in The Fascination of Evil, eds. David 
Tracy and Hermann Häring (London: SCM Press, 1998), 112 
52 AI 348; ONP 64 
53 Chapter 3, pages 149-58 
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also constituted by cultural and linguistic matrices, so all persons are “inevitably shaped 
by the history we were born into.”54   
 Every history is ambiguous.  In Tracy’s understanding of the term, ambiguity 
includes visible effects of God’s grace in history (most notably the event and person of 
Christ) as well as the pervasive and visible effects of human sin.  He is an advocate of a 
sense of ambiguity that contrasts with the more optimistic (or even naïve) belief that 
history is innocent and that past failures on the part of humanity are sporadic aberrations 
or isolated incidents.  Indeed, not only are there individual and group acts of sin 
throughout history, but considered more deeply, the history into which we are born and 
that “inevitably shape[s]” us reinforces and perpetuates the fact of sin itself.  Thus 
Tracy’s emphasis on history as ambiguous is also an assertion that history is distorted. 
 This raises the question of what distortion in the context of history means.  On the 
individual level, distortion indicates the way in which the capacities of the human person 
are corrupted.  It means that the individual person is continually and too exclusively self-
centered.  History is “the way it is not because of any natural necessity but only because 
equally historical individuals have struggled before us.”55  History is created by persons 
who are both conscious and responsible and selfish and distorted.  Thus the distortion of 
history itself cannot be separated from the role of individuals involved in it. 
 Tracy is particularly concerned with the interpretation of history.  He resists 
attempts to read national, social, ethnic, and religious histories as singular trajectories 
aimed solely towards progress.  Such “official stor[ies] of triumph” ignore the 
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marginalized who either did not participate in the narrative of progress or who were 
actively trodden upon by the narrators.56  To concede the truthfulness of such narratives 
obscures or even ignores those historical events and periods that both call into question 
the interpretation of progress and still affect the contemporary situation of those caught 
up in such a history.  Tracy instead conceives of history as interruptive, having “no single 
theme and no controlling plot.”57  Thus, for example, both the contemporary United 
States and ancient Greece are civilizations that have achieved great honor and success but 
have also destroyed and enslaved other peoples.  The Native American and African 
American experiences in the United States, from their earliest encounters to the present 
day, force us to recognize the interruptions in history. 
 For Tracy, the Holocaust—as the starkest interruption in recent Western history—
so shocks the conscience of humanity that we scarcely possess sufficient language to 
describe it: 
The genocide of six million Jews by the Nazis is—is what?  Shocking seems an 
altogether inadequate adjective to apply to that enormity…Madness?  Aberration?  
Sin?  Or all these, and something more, something demonic and more radically 
interruptive of our history than we can imagine?  The Holocaust is a searing 
interruption of all the traditions in Western culture.  None of us yet know even 
how to name it properly.58 
 
Citing appreciatively Arthur Cohen’s retrieval of Rudolph Otto’s tremendum, Tracy 
hopes that this “unsettling, unexpected phrase” will prove more appropriate than 
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traditional invocations of “radical evil.”59  The Holocaust as interruption deflates both 
liberal theological “expressions of enlightenment and emancipation” as well as neo-
orthodox “outbursts of paradox, ambiguity, and negation,” and forces theological 
reflection to take account of “the subscension of individual historicity by the sheer force 
of the tremendum of the Holocaust.”60 
 While it may be difficult to name what the Holocaust was and what it represents, 
there remains a profound need to face that reality.  Acknowledging Karl Barth’s claim 
that the “one really central ecumenical question…is our relationship to Judaism,” Tracy 
contends that Christian theology, if it wishes to take concrete human history seriously, 
must face head on this most profound interruption within history, in part because of the 
strains of anti-Semitism that have imbued much of Christian history, and in part because 
of the active role some Christians played in prosecuting the Holocaust.61  Tracy is 
adamant about this demand upon Christian theology to face the Holocaust precisely 
because it interrupts and so challenges Christian hope that the Holy Spirit continues to 
work in human history and that our lives have an eschatological purpose. 
 The concrete experiences of Native and African Americans in the US and of the 
Jews in the Holocaust are, for Tracy, among the most notable examples of Hegel’s 
                                                          
59 David Tracy, foreword to The Tremendum: A Theological Interpretation of the Holocaust, by Arthur A. 
Cohen (New York: Crossroad, 1981), viii; see also David Tracy, “Religious Values after the Holocaust: A 
Catholic View,” in Jews and Christians After the Holocaust, ed. Abraham J. Peck (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1982), 87.  With respect to Cohen’s use of Otto, Cohen will go further and qualify tremendum as a 
“subscending” (as opposed to transcending) tremendum, indicating the way in which human life is swept 
under by the profound evil of this event. 
60 Tracy, “Foreword,” ix.  Tracy goes so far as to describe the liberal response as “the theological 
equivalent of a Hallmark card of condolence.” 
61 ONP 63-4 
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“slaughter-bench of history.”62  They are major confirmations of Tracy’s description of 
history as an ambiguous configuration of both great honor and tragic violence.  Yet how 
exactly do these examples demonstrate that history is itself distorted?  There can be no 
doubt that within Tracy’s understanding of sin and distortion, such historical interruptions 
are caused by distorted historical persons.  That these events are themselves not discrete 
moments in time, but rather often extend over long periods and across borders and 
continents, only further suggests the deep complexity of ambiguous history.  Still the 
complicated texture of historical events, whether distorted or not, provides no more than 
initial evidence for Tracy’s conception of distortion within history. 
 Thus, history is distorted in an analogous sense.  It differs from individual human 
distortion as discussed earlier in this chapter.  However, like individual distortion, 
history’s distortions perpetuate and reinforce human sinfulness and foster both social and 
individual levels of distortion.  As a reality into which we are thrown and that shapes us 
throughout our life, history sets limits on our possibilities and embeds us in a context 
pervaded by and perpetuating various “isms” that epitomize systemic distortion.  While 
the limits themselves may be merely a testament to human finitude instead of human 
sinfulness, the sexism, racism, elitism, et al., that Tracy writes about are perduring social 
sins in history.  These phenomena both foster concrete interruptive events, such as the 
Holocaust and the history of Christian anti-Semitism in Germany, Europe, and beyond, 
and are fostered by them, such as anti-Semitism under the guise of Holocaust denial.  Just 
as the systemic distortion interiorized by human persons is an enduring fact that 
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conditions all human activity, so too systemic distortions in history engender historical 
interruptions and ambiguities in a self-perpetuating cycle of decline. 
 The case for thinking of an analogy of distortion in history is buttressed by the 
issue of recovery and correction of course.  According to Tracy, no individuals can heal 
themselves of distortion by themselves because doing so would involve engaging the 
already distorted human minds and wills.  Nor can the distortions within history simply 
be healed or corrected through human intervention alone.  This does not imply some 
banal recognition that the past cannot be undone.  If one is engulfed in a distorted history, 
one cannot escape from that history; there is no neutral or objective vantage point from 
which one can try to correct or reverse the distortions.  Even so, the distortions of history 
must be faced by us.   
 
 Systemic Distortion in Communication  
 Communication is a second locale of social systemic distortion.  As was noted 
previously,63 conversation is one of the focal themes in Tracy’s view of relationality.  It 
not only is the foundational reality in his theological method, but it also embodies the 
way in which the self in a socio-linguistic context is dependent upon others and on 
traditions.  For Tracy, in the “ideal speech situation,” interlocutors fully and consistently 
demonstrate sincerity, respect, and openness with regard to one another and to the subject 
matter in question.64  Yet because this ideal speech situation never occurs in fact, it 
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functions as a “regulative model” for understanding the de facto ambiguities in human 
communication.65   
 To illustrate these ambiguities, Tracy negotiates the linguistic turn in philosophy, 
in which he discerns roughly four stages: language (1) as use, (2) as system, (3) as 
differential non-system, and (4) as discourse.66  Language as use refers to the 
understanding of language as purely instrumental, so that language is “secondary, even 
peripheral, to the real thing.”  Language is used to indicate, but it plays no real role in 
shaping our understanding of the world – an understanding that is implicitly “pre-
linguistic.”67  Despite otherwise substantial disagreements, according to Tracy positivism 
and romanticism are rooted in the instrumental approach to language.  Positivism holds 
that a scientific understanding of reality points to “a realm of pure data and facts” while 
“art, morality, religion, metaphysics, and common sense” yield no more than feeling-
laden interpretation.68  Romanticism, on the other hand, “uses language to express or 
represent some deep, nonlinguistic truth inside the self,” most notably the individual’s 
genius.69  The former links language as use with an external reality and the latter links it 
to an internal one, and yet both regard the respective realities as independent of the 
language used to express them.   
                                                          
65 PA 26 
66 PA 61; cf. Tracy, “Hermeneutics as Discourse Analysis,” 262-271 
67 PA 47-49 
68 PA 47.  Cf. AI 12 
69 PA 49.  Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose hermeneutics are paradigmatic of romantic hermeneutics, 
describes genius as the identity of the classical (“what is most productive and least repetitious”) and the 
original (“what is most individual and the least common”); Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and 
Criticism: And Other Writings, ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13. 
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 With the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, the understanding of language as system 
breaks from the instrumental view.  Saussure studied language as “a system of 
differentially related signs.”70  The linguistic system is based on the fact that linguistic 
signs differ from one another, and that the relationships among the differences constitute 
the meaning of language synchronically isolated from its concrete usage.  Tracy offers 
the example of “tree,” a word which is meaningful precisely because it is different from 
other signs both visually and aurally.71  The meaning of this sign is based on its 
relationships of difference, but that meaning is also abstracted from the use of this sign in 
a given language in concrete situations by actual persons.72  The linguistic system as 
diachronic is not totally separated from its use, but rather the understanding of that 
system in Saussure’s linguistic prescinds from such use. 
 The development of linguistics after Saussure follows several trajectories, but for 
Tracy the most significant figure is Jacques Derrida.73  His assessment of the 
relationships of difference that give signs meaning in the linguistic system raises the 
further question of whether that system “can adequately account for its own ineradicably 
differential nature.”74  According to Derrida’s interpretation, Saussure both assumed a 
                                                          
70 PA 53 
71 PA 53.  Tracy offers “free” and “three” as similar but different graphemes and “she,” “be,” and “thee” as 
similar but different sounds.  He does not venture further to dramatically different visually or aurally 
different signs, such as “acorn,” “leaf,” or “wood,” even though within the system of language in which the 
word “tree” becomes a meaningful sign these ostensible different terms are much more closely related 
through difference.   
72 PA 54 
73 PA 54-5.  Tracy names structuralism, formalism, and semiotics as the “three major alternatives in post-
Saussurean hermeneutics,” but he largely declines to attend to the differences among them (or, more 
intricately, the differences between structuralists and post-structuralists.  The latter category includes 
Derrida, to whom we turn here, and Benveniste and Ricoeur, to whom we will turn next). 
74 PA 56 
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unity between the sign and the thing that it signified but asserted that the unity was 
arbitrary although based on the differences among signs.  If the meaning of a sign is 
determined by the web of differences, then the meaning of any one sign can never be 
fully present due to the absence of the other signs that give it this meaning.75  The idea of 
presence, however, rests on a fundamental assumption of “a nonlinguistic pure self-
presence of consciousness,” a thing in itself that is not shaped by the interplay of 
differentiated signs.76  For Derrida, however, the self is not fully present to the self, but 
rather is always already enmeshed in this differential non-system of signs that endlessly 
defers full presence.  Put another way, one can only understand the meaning of the self 
through language, but meaning in language can never be fully realized. 
 Following his explanation of these three views, Tracy adopts a discourse model of 
language derived primarily from the work of Emile Benveniste and Paul Ricoeur; this 
model integrates the basic tenets of the three ways of conceiving language just discussed.  
In discourse, language functions as use when it is used by persons to communicate; in 
Ricoeur’s famous rendition: when “someone says something to someone about 
something.”77  Yet to have any actual use, or in order for the “somethings” that the 
“someones” say to issue in meaning, language must also be understood as “a system of 
differentiated signs.”78  Still more (and agreeing with Derrida), if signifiers have their 
meaning determined by this absent system of signs, then meaning cannot be fully present.  
                                                          
75 PA 56-7 
76 PA 57 
77 Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 
ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 138; cf. Tracy, 
“Hermeneutics as Discourse Analysis,” 268 
78 PA 53 
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But meaning is never fully absent either.  It is “crystallized into significant discourse” 
through texts.79   
 On the discourse model of language, language is both historical and social; it 
exists prior to the individual self.  We are born into and raised in a discourse that shapes 
us and our interactions with each other.  Whatever particular language (or languages) we 
learn first conditions our understanding of reality since language is in fact a key condition 
of the possibility for achieving any sort of understanding.80  Tracy underlines the shared, 
public character of language: “We do not invent our own private languages and then find 
a way to translate our communications to others.”81  Language is an intersubjective 
reality that depends on the participants who construct meaning within the differentiated 
system of signs.82 
 Tracing this history of the linguistic turn in philosophy enables Tracy to analyze 
distortion in communication, specifically how language as discourse discloses both the 
plurality and the ambiguity present in human communication.83  Communication is 
enacted by persons who are not only finite and contingent, but also flawed.  While our 
finitude prevents our knowledge from ever being complete and our interpretations from 
being definitive, our flaws yield distorted communication when we say what we do not 
mean, we deceive others, and we use words to inflict harm.  Such personal, conscious 
sins occur within a context of discourse already marked by ideology, bigotry, and 
                                                          
79 Including, Tracy notes, the texts of the deconstructionists.  Cf. Tracy, “Hermeneutics as Discourse 
Analysis,” 269. 
80 PA 66 
81 PA 49 
82 For more on intersubjectivity, see MT 57-61.  
83 PA 65 
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violence.  Our discourse takes place in distorted contexts: “unconscious systemic 
distortions…inevitably pervade all discourse.”  Just as we live within distorted histories, 
so we communicate through distorted languages.   
 
 Systemic Distortion in Religion  
 Religion is a third social reality marked by unconscious systemic distortion.  
Tracy’s approaches towards a heuristic but incomplete description of “religion”—in 
which religion is conceived as the human attempt to articulate some understanding of the 
whole of reality motivated by the encounter with the limits of human experience—opens 
the possibility of recognizing how distortion might feature within religion.84  As an all-
encompassing view, religion runs the risk of becoming a totality that prevents the genuine 
in-breaking of something new.85  Does religion really account for the wide range of 
human experience, including error, distortion, and sin?  Lastly, does religion also 
recognize that it is both a historical and linguistic phenomenon, and as such its particular 
history and discourse will suffer from distortion as well? 
 Tracy’s discussion of systemic distortion in religion focuses on the varieties of 
distortion within the Christian tradition.  Beyond being a conduit of propositions, the 
Christian tradition includes rituals, symbols, beliefs, attitudes, and structures that have 
developed in response to the encounter with the person and event of Jesus Christ.86  As a 
                                                          
84 On Tracy’s understanding of religion, see Chapter Two, pages 91-2 
85 David Tracy, "African American Thought: The Discovery of Fragments," in Black Faith and Public 
Talk: Critical Essays on James H. Cone’s Black Theology and Black Power, ed. Dwight N. Hopkins 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), 31 
86 AI 322 
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theological and social reality, the church is the “primary mediator” of Christ to those 
involved in its social institutions, interpersonal communities, and shared meanings.87  
Despite their purpose in mediating Christ to humanity, Tracy insists that both the church 
and the tradition suffer from distortion.  The church as the community that carries on and 
embodies this tradition is ambiguous precisely because it is also a “sinful church” that 
regularly betrays the very reality it seeks to mediate.88   
 This betrayal can take several forms, such as the Christian church’s two common 
distortions, “ecclesiolatry and traditionalism.”89  In ecclesiolatry, the church as institution 
(including whatever structures pertain to that church) displaces the communal response to 
Christ as primary in one’s faith; in traditionalism, the historically and linguistically 
conditioned formulations of the past are handed on uncritically, elevating these 
formulations, at the price of the realities they signify, to objects of faith.  Tracy refers to 
the distortions of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism that imbue not only the classics of 
the tradition but “their history of effects upon all interpretations.”90  Thus while “every 
theology worthy of the history of the classic self-understandings of Christianity” will 
attend to the classic symbols of sin, grace, church, revelation, Christ, God, and so forth, 
the classic texts, images, rituals, and lives that derive their meaning from these symbols 
can be marked by these (and other) forms of distortion.91 
                                                          
87 AI 50, 22 
88 AI 321 
89 AI 323 
90 PA 104 
91 AI 373.  As an example, the Catholic liturgy for Good Friday prior to the mid-1950’s included a prayer 
for the Jews, referring to them with the Latin word perfidiis.  While this term is more accurately translated 
as “unbelieving,” it was often translated with the English cognate perfidious, meaning “treacherous.”  As a 
result, a ritual with the ostensible goal of praying for the salvation of others became marked by currents of 
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 Among this array of distortions, Tracy underscores the perhaps even more subtle 
and pervasive one: elitism.  In theology, elitism usually involves privileging particular 
sources for theological reflection and particular persons for the interpretation of those 
sources—an issue that arises for Tracy as he reflects on his own use of classics.  The very 
term “classic” already carries an undercurrent of cultural and socioeconomic class, but in 
general the focus on classics concentrates on “extremities and intensifications” in contrast 
with “the ordinary practices, beliefs, and everyday rituals of all religious persons.”92  As 
for the basic perspective of the theological elite, “All who wish to enter the discussion 
should leave the margins and come to the centers to receive the proper credentials.  They 
must earn property rights if they are to fashion proper readings of the religious 
classics.”93  In an essay on evil, distortion, and sin, Tracy highlights how elitism effects 
this distortion in religious discourse, advocating   
for theologians to face not just the fascination with evil so prominent among 
contemporary cultural elites but to consult and learn from the real experts in evil: 
the suffering, poor and oppressed as they have left their reflection in their 
narratives, songs, actions and rituals.94 
 
These marginalized persons not only give voice to their experiences of suffering but can 
also offer profound reflections on other symbols of the Christian tradition.  They must 
therefore be taken seriously as both sources and interpreters of religious discourse.  While 
Tracy seems hesitant on the point, he wonders whether religious discourse focused 
                                                                                                                                                                             
distrust and disrespect for the Jewish community.  In 1960, Pope John XXIII had perfidiis dropped from the 
prayer, and following the Second Vatican Council the prayer was entirely rewritten (Michael Phayer, The 
Catholic Church and the Holocaust: 1930-1965 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 209). 
92 PA 97 
93 PA 104 
94 Tracy, “Saving from Evil,” 107 
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exclusively on interpretations of classics and performed mostly by the highly educated 
members of the tradition ever effectively reaches the lived experience of the vast majority 
who participate in the tradition. 
 Ecclesiolatry, anti-Semitism, and elitism are by no means a comprehensive list of 
the distortions that may be present in Christianity specifically or any other religious 
tradition.  Even if all the forms of distortion were to be named, this would not exhaust for 
him the depths of sin as a fundamental religious classic.  His investigation of these forms 
of distortion, however, suggests myriad ways in which unconscious and systemic issues 
pervade religious traditions and communities.  Community members formed in their 
particular traditions become susceptible both to acting out of such unconscious systemic 
distortions and to perpetuating these distortions by passing on their tradition. 
 
 Distortion and Inherited Sin  
 For Tracy, t classic Christian symbol of the Fall remains an effective one—not as 
a literally true story about the actions of the first couple but as a mythic account of the 
way in which the human condition is damaged, tainted, and distorted.  Tracy uses 
“systemic distortion” to highlight the curvatus in se of the sinful person.  This twisting in 
on the self is largely unconscious and thus not the result of an explicit choice by the self.  
Tracy applies this term primarily to the individual human person, as the locus of 
understanding, freedom, and responsibility are in the self.  Derivatively, however, Tracy 
explains social systemic distortion as analogous to individual systemic distortion 
precisely because of the role played by contingency in propagating human sinfulness.   
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 Tracy’s claim that systemic distortion functions both individually and socially 
implies that sin affects human persons in both their finitude and their relationality.  Using 
the term “inherited sin” to name this reality already entails its relational character.  
Unconscious systemic distortions are received by the self, and they grow, develop, even 
fester in that self.  The distortions in the self will manifest themselves more fully later in 
life as the self grows in maturity.  Selves raised in distorted contexts become tainted by 
these distortions and contribute to the ongoing extension of these distortions in society.  
As in the previous chapter we saw the mutual entanglement of finitude and relationality, 
so too are the individual and social levels of inherited sin. 
 Finally, when Tracy qualifies sin on this level as unconscious, he means that 
inherited sin is not about any particular act or a habit formed by a series of acts, but a 
state in which one finds oneself; it is an aspect of being human that, though not a 
necessary part of human nature, is nonetheless inevitable.  In addition, the systemic 
distortion is unconscious, but not unknowable.  Tracy’s assessment of the role of 
distortion in individuals and so in history, communication, and religion is concerned with 
unmasking these distortions and, whenever possible, resisting them.   
 
Relations Among the Three Dimensions  
 Tracy understands the different dimensions of the idea of sin as personal, habitual, 
and inherited.  While each is distinct from the other, they cannot ultimately be separated 
from one another.  The routinization of personal sins engenders habitual sins; surrender to 
these two types of sin sustains the turning in upon oneself proper to inherited sin.  
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Alternatively, the systemic distortions in self and society lure individuals toward making 
sinful decisions and developing vicious habits.  That these three dimensions of sin 
mutually implicate one another is central for Tracy. 
 What holds these three dimensions of sin together is the relationship between 
consciousness and freedom.  As one moves from personal sins through habitual sins to 
inherited sin, the degree of awareness that the individual self has of one’s actions 
becomes more diffuse.  Although personal sin arises from conscious and considered 
decision, Tracy claims that precisely because habitual sin emerges from a habit it 
typically occurs without full reflection.  Inherited sin, on the other hand, is less a matter 
of the particular decisions made than of the interior disposition of the self and its effect 
upon subsequent self-comportment.  The degree of human agency in each of these 
dimensions correlates the degree to which consciousness is heightened.  Personal sin can 
be resisted in any given instance, and sinful habits can also be altered.  Inherited sin, 
however, is unavoidable and cannot be overcome by human effort alone.  Rather, all the 
individual can do is seek to become more open to cooperating with God’s grace.  In fact, 
Tracy holds that in all three kinds of distortion, true healing is only possible through 
grace.95   
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has delineated Tracy’s understanding of sin and its role in his 
theological anthropology.  His analysis of personal, habitual, and inherited sin enables 
                                                          
95 NCFT 
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Tracy to explore deeply the various ways sin affects human life.  At the most basic level, 
the individual person has a distorted sense of self by rejecting its own finitude and 
recoiling in self-importance.  The context of the self’s existence is also distorted by the 
historically contingent choices of past and present individuals.  The centrality of the 
relational character of human living for Tracy’s understanding of tradition and 
conversation emerges again in his view of systemic distortion, by which they too become 
derailed.  While history, communication, and religion are analogously distorted, they 
condition individual lives so drastically that human activity alone cannot correct them. 
 As the most fundamental kind of human sinfulness, inherited sin contributes to 
and is reinforced by the self’s personal and habitual sins.  These three dimensions of sin 
mutually implicate one another as they sustain the inevitable yet unnecessary condition of 
sin.  The self has some ability to reverse or recover from its own sinfulness, whether 
through unmasking the self’s or society’s distortions or through resisting temptations to 
occasional personal and habitual sins.  Yet, since sin does not leave the human reason and 
will uncorrupted, so that both are damaged but not destroyed, such resistance will always 
be partial, incomplete, and ultimately submissive to one’s self-distortions.  Ultimately, 
only grace can be the sufficient antidote to human sinfulness in all its forms. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GRACE 
 
 Tracy’s most clear and concise treatment of grace appears in The Analogical 
Imagination.  There he defined Christian responses to the contemporary situation as 
responses 
to the event of Jesus Christ as that event is mediated through the tradition in the 
situation.  Those mediations are expressed in three paradigmatic forms: 
manifestation, proclamation and historical action.  The primary response of any 
Christian systematic theologian remains a response in the present to the event and 
person of Jesus Christ.  Whenever that event is experienced in the present 
situation through some personal sense of the uncanny, the event-character itself 
moves to the forefront of Christian theological attention.  The primary Christian 
word designed to emphasize that event-character is the word ‘grace.’  Grace—the 
grace of Jesus Christ—is mediated through the ecclesial and cultural traditions 
and through the situation in the three principal forms of manifestation, 
proclamation and historical action.1 
 
In contrast to the work of his mentor, Bernard Lonergan, Tracy largely prescinds from the 
highly technical discourse about grace undertaken by many Catholic theologians, 
particularly those within the Thomistic tradition.2  Rather, his efforts to explicate the 
importance of grace in Christian theology focus on the ways in which God’s grace is 
mediated to the human person and the impact that grace has on human living.  Thus in 
analyzing Tracy’s understanding of grace, I will first examine his understanding of the 
                                                          
1 AI 371 
2 For example, Tracy’s work largely sidesteps the distinction between operative and cooperative grace.  
This does not seem to be due to any disagreement with such a distinction, but rather his prudential 
judgment that this conversation is not the most relevant to the more methodological, hermeneutical, and 
linguistic concerns of his theological research.  For Tracy’s examination of Lonergan’s work on grace, see 
ABL chapter two.  For Lonergan’s work on grace, see Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: 
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan vol. 1, eds. 
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
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relationship between sin and grace.  Tracy often uses his views on sin as an opportunity 
to pivot to discussing grace, in which the connection between sin and grace is revealed to 
be based on a more fundamental relationship between nature and grace.  The 
primordiality of the nature-grace relationship lies at the heart of the divine-human 
relationship while the dialectic of sin and grace is derivative.   
 Following my consideration of the complex of relationships among nature, grace, 
and sin, I next turn to Tracy’s work on “the uncanny” in order to show how it illumines 
his understanding of grace.  In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy emphasizes the 
uncanny and its relationship to the role of the religious dimension of human experience, 
which serves as a primary characteristic of his account of grace.  Third, I consider his 
Christology, where Tracy argues that the self-manifestation of God in Jesus Christ 
becomes crucial for explaining grace in human life and what humans are called to 
become.  By showing the relevance of the contemporary sense of the uncanny for the 
Christological tradition, I investigate how Tracy sees grace as mediated to human beings 
and the effects it has on them.  In conclusion, I present Tracy’s understanding of the 
connection between grace and freedom and the ways in which freedom thematically 
unites Tracy’s four anthropological constants. 
 
Nature-Grace and Sin-Grace  
 As one of the central symbols of Christian theology, Tracy understands grace as 
belonging to the grammar of systematic theology.  For him, grace functions as part of one 
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of two pairs of symbols: nature-grace and grace-sin.3  Tracy analyzes grace-sin as a 
dialectic of opposites and nature-grace as a polarity.  By polarity, Tracy means that nature 
and grace exist in a tension such that they are not in opposition but rather complement 
each other.  He agrees with Aquinas’ famous dictum that “grace does not destroy nature 
but perfects it”4 so that grace presupposes nature.  Nature is thus open to grace in a non-
oppositional way. 
 In contrast, the dialectic of sin and grace is one of opposites.  As I argued in the 
previous chapter, Tracy’s discussions of sin deal predominantly with inherited sin 
(unconscious systemic distortion).  Because this distortion is not just error, human beings 
are incapable of correcting it on their own.  Sin can only be healed by grace.  As Tracy 
says repeatedly, one’s understanding of sin depends on one’s understanding of grace (for 
cognitional, not ontological reasons).5   
 This dependence must be qualified in three ways.  First, nowhere does Tracy 
suggest that the reality of sin depends on the reality of grace or vice-versa; it is only our 
understanding of sin that depends on our understanding of grace.  Second, each time 
Tracy speaks of the relationship between sin and grace, his point is that sin can only be 
understood (inasmuch as it can be at all) in light of the understanding of grace. Thus, he 
argues that the polarity of nature and grace is a more fundamental Christian teaching than 
the dialectic of sin and grace and the intelligibility of grace is integrally related to one’s 
                                                          
3 AI 373 
4 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 1, Art. 8, ad. 2: “Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat.” 
5 “The Christian understanding of sin is understood as sin only in the light of grace” (AI 53); “We can 
understand what a Christian means by sin…only by grasping what a Christian means by grace” (PA 75-5); 
“one may have as radical an understanding of evil and sin as necessary as long as one’s understanding of 
grace and salvation are equally radical” (Tracy, “Saving from Evil,” 107). 
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understanding of nature, not of sin, because sin is a distortion of nature.  Through sin, 
“the self alienates itself as well from nature, history, others, and, in the end, from itself.”6  
Sin is the antithesis of nature. 
 Third, Tracy emphasizes that grace is not just a response to sin.  He describes 
grace in terms of realized eschatology, the “always-already, not-yet.”  This means that 
human beings already experience grace and that grace is still to come.7  At stake here is 
the fact that reality is fundamentally gracious because of the “Pure Unbounded Love 
disclosed to us in God’s revelation of who God is and who we are commanded and 
empowered to be in Christ Jesus.”8  This statement is based on the belief that God is love 
and is immanent in reality.9  Thus the human person can have faith in the graciousness of 
a reality that “can be trusted in spite of it all.”10  The gracious character of reality is 
asserted in spite of the fact of systemic distortion.  Grace is fundamentally God’s love for 
creation.  The healing aspect of grace is a result of this more basic reality, and so is 
relatively less important.   
 It is not that the sin-grace dialectic is not important both for theology and 
theological anthropology.  For Tracy this dialectic functions as a Christian hermeneutic 
of suspicion or even an early theological analogue of “critical theory.”11  While the 
                                                          
6 PA 74 
7 See especially AI 430-449 for the “always-already, not-yet” character of grace.  The “not-yet” aspect of 
grace will be examined more fully in the section on Christ below. 
8 ONP 101 
9 Cf. David Tracy, "God Is Love: The Central Christian Metaphor," Living Pulpit 1, no. 3 (July-September 
1992): 10-11; AI 432 
10 AI 320 
11 NCFT 
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theologian ought always to approach the other12 with a hermeneutic of trust, at least 
initially, something may arise during that encounter that causes the theologian to suspect 
that distortions of some sort may be involved.  This suspicion may lead an interlocutor to 
call upon any of a number of critical theories, which “are designed…to test such 
suspicions, to try to spot them, and, if possible, to heal them as much as possible.”13  The 
dialectic of sin and grace parallels the insights of critical theory precisely because it 
functions as a way to unmask the unconscious systemic distortions that plague 
individuals and communities and to seek ways to heal them.   
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the most pressing question about grace 
concerns the integration of nature, grace, and sin into theological anthropology.  Tracy 
says that “the relationship between nature and grace is the basic foundation of all 
theological anthropology.”14  A full understanding of what it means to be human requires 
recognizing the graced character of the human person, who experiences this graciousness 
not as contradictory to human nature but as integral to that nature.  Typical theological 
anthropologies approach the question of human nature using categories such as 
creaturehood, embodiment/corporeality, sociality, historicity, and freedom.  Chapters 
                                                          
12 Here Tracy pointedly remarks that this includes not only the “friendly” other (family, nation, church), but 
any other. 
13 NCFT; cf. AI 363: “Conflict is our actuality.  Conversation is our hope.  Where that actuality is 
systematically distorted, conversation must yield for the moment to the techniques of liberation and 
suspicion classically expressed in Freud, Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger.” 
14 NCFT.  Just before making this claim, Tracy made the even more provocative claim that “In all three 
forms of theology, the basic model for understanding, the correlation (the interpretation of the tradition, the 
interpretation of the situation, the use of different forms of reason and different understandings of faith) is 
in fact, I think, the relationship of nature and grace.” This comment suggests that grace is to the tradition as 
nature is to the situation.  Unfortunately, Tracy does not carry this insight through or expand on the 
possible nuances of this (for example, it seems unlikely he would go so far as to say that “the tradition does 
not destroy the situation but perfects it”). 
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Two and Three have stressed finitude and relationality as the two basic aspects of Tracy’s 
understanding of human nature.15  After this emphasis, Chapter Four turned to his 
theology of sin in which the notion of unconscious systemic distortion showed that sin 
involves both a rejection of authentic finitude and a corruption of relationality.  The 
present chapter explains the relationship of grace to nature and to sin in light of the forms 
of mediation through which human beings experience grace and in light of the effect of 
grace on the human person.   
 
The Uncanny and Grace  
 Appreciation of Tracy’s understanding of grace requires an investigation of his 
description of “the uncanny.”  Tracy insists that only by considering “the many 
expressions of what can be named the emergence of the uncanny” can one’s 
understanding of grace offer something to a Christian view of the human person.16  The 
phrase “emergence of the uncanny” as pertaining to the contemporary situation implies 
both that the uncanny is not a permanent or transcultural fact of all situations and that it is 
something distinct, perhaps even jarring, about the situation that exists now.  In fact, for 
Tracy, the emergence of the uncanny is a key descriptor for the “religious sense of our 
                                                          
15 In particular, the categories of sociality, historicity, and freedom are clearly implicated in the chapters on 
finitude and relationality.  Significantly, embodiment/corporeality is not developed in either of those 
chapters due to the overall lack of focus on this topic in Tracy’s thought.  This lacuna in his work will be 
one of the central points of critique of Tracy’s theology in the following chapter. 
16 David Tracy, “Grace and the Search for the Human: The Sense of the Uncanny,” in Catholic Theological 
Society of America Proceedings 34 (1979): 64.  Tracy seems to draw the term “uncanny” from Freud’s 
seminal 1919 essay “The Uncanny,” where Freud describes the uncanny (das Unheimlich) as “that species 
of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar” (Sigmund 
Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 124).  
While Tracy’s interpretation of the uncanny differs from Freud’s, it shares the same sense that something 
with which one is familiar and accustomed has become anxiety-inducing. 
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situation.”17  Thus, Tracy uses it to connect the religious character of the situation with 
the doctrine of grace by way of offering a meaningful reflection on the human condition. 
 
Fundamental Trust in BRO  
 Tracy does not use the term “uncanny” in Blessed Rage for Order when 
considering the religious dimension of a given situation; however, he does develop this 
basic problematic in terms of “limit” language.  The notion of “limit” lies at the heart of 
Tracy’s theology of finitude and of relationality.  Limit-experiences and situations 
indicate the radical contingency of human existence.  Yet the same limit-experience may 
lead human persons to “find ourselves radically out-of-our-everyday-selves as ecstatic, as 
gifted, even as ‘graced.’”18  The human experience of finitude and contingency can lead 
people to experience their relationship with the ground of that contingency, or the reality 
that gives both existence and its meaning to them.  In BRO, Tracy describes this 
grounding reality as the “limit-of.” 
 Tracy calls this relationship with grounding reality a “basic faith in the 
worthwhileness of existence.”19  By basic faith, he means the belief that life has meaning 
and value, even in the face of sheer absurdity or apparent rejection of any meaning or 
value, and that this is a feature of common human experience.20  According to Tracy, the 
contingent character of human lives means that life must be understood as gracious or 
gifted.  Such a recognition leads to the further acknowledgment that basic faith 
                                                          
17 Tracy, “Grace and the Search for the Human,” 75 
18 BRO 107 
19 BRO 119 
20 BRO 119 
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necessarily presumes a lack of human control over our own individual situations as well 
as existence broadly speaking.  Indeed, basic faith is grounded in the “limit-of” reality 
that we encounter when we press up against our limit-experiences and situations.21   
 
Uncanny in AI  
 Tracy introduces the term “uncanny” in The Analogical Imagination in his 
description of the situation in which contemporary systematic theology is done.  He 
describes this situation as postmodern, pluralist, and predominantly Western.22  Perhaps 
what is most striking is that, for him (unlike Tillich), the contemporary situation “poses 
no one dominant question” but rather faces “the conflictual pluralism…on what 
worthwhile fundamental questions are now to be asked.”23  This is a tribute to the success 
of the masters of suspicion and to critical theorists, whose unmasking of the myths and 
claims of modernity and the Enlightenment have defated any belief in an “absolute 
standpoint.”24  As Tracy says elsewhere, there are no innocent traditions or cultures.  In a 
postmodern age, “all are now under suspicion.”25  Unmasking the distortions in the 
contemporary situation has not only challenged the dominance of any one explanatory 
narrative but it has also opened up the greater diversity of concerns and questions that 
mark the situation.   
                                                          
21 BRO 187 
22 These three qualifiers are not meant as normative, but rather as a realistic description of Tracy’s context 
in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. 
23 AI 341, 342 
24 AI 346 
25 AI 347 
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 These critical efforts to unmask the ambiguities and distortions in the 
contemporary situation have also disclosed the sense of the uncanny as one of its key 
characteristics.  Tracy offers a thick description of the various ways the uncanny is 
encountered in order to emphasize the inherent pluralism of the experience: namely, 
encounters on the part of scientific humanists, conservatives, deconstructionists, the 
oppressed, the marginalized, and even ordinary, everyday persons.26  While these 
experiences may be diverse and even conflicting, Tracy focuses on the recurring theme of 
negation and release that marks all of them.  The sense of the uncanny arises from 
encountering a negation in the present situation, whether that be a situation of oppression, 
alienation, domination, exile, totalization, or even hopelessness.  Such negations in turn 
give rise to hope for release from these negative realities.27  Thus, perhaps Tracy’s most 
succinct description of the uncanny names it “the postreligious, religious sense of our 
situation.”28 
                                                          
26 AI 358-362 
27 The list is by no means exhaustive 
28 AI 362.  Tracy’s writings are not altogether clear about whether the uncanny is a feature specific to the 
contemporary Western situation in which he works (which his invocation of scientific humanists and 
postmodern deconstructionists seems to suggest) or if it’s a more general and permanent possibility of all 
(or most) situations (which his general invocations of the extraordinariness of the ordinary suggests).  
Tracy does not describe the uncanny as totally new, so that it would remain a possibility in any historical 
situation.  Still, because he discusses the “emergence” of the uncanny, it seems to be characteristic of the 
situation occurring now instead of the recent past.  The fact that he sees it as characteristic of the present 
postmodern situation would seem to exclude its also being a facet of past situations.  Cf. AI 357: “As the 
secular traditions set loose by the postmodern classics show us, the experience of the uncanny awaits us 
everywhere in the situation.” 
 A second problematic in Tracy’s description of the uncanny becomes evident in the subtle 
differences between chapter 8 of the Analogical Imagination and his article “Grace and the Search for the 
Human.”  The latter often asserts the negativity or even sinfulness of the uncanny, i.e. “we may have as 
radical a doctrine of the negative, of the uncanny, of sin itself as we wish and need as long as our doctrine 
of grace is equally radical” (Tracy, “Grace and the Search for the Human,” 65).  Here, negativity and the 
uncanny are tied together in apparent opposition to grace and hope (65).  It is unclear what sense of 
“negativity” he intends (e.g., “negative” as in bad or “negation” as in unmasking).  This article goes on to 
pit the uncanny as a good reality in comparison to “canniness,” meaning “bogus affirmations, those 
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 An important aspect of the uncanny is that something is given to us no matter 
what the cause behind this sense of the uncanny is, because the “presence of the 
uncanny” refers to something beyond our control, something that comes to us both as 
“gift and command.”29  That which is given is completely other from ourselves.  In both 
of the two poles of situation and tradition, the emergence of the uncanny discloses the 
“religious dimension.”  Thus, what Tracy means by “the power of the uncanny” in The 
Analogical Imagination refers to his earlier formulation of “the whole,” which is the 
generalized articulation of the divine in AI.  The disclosure of the whole in our situation 
and in our tradition is a revelation of the divine, which in the Christian tradition is 
regarded as sheer gratuity.30  This experience disrupts and constitutes our interpretations 
of our situation and tradition. 
 For Tracy the sense of the uncanny we experience in our contemporary situation 
amounts to a further development of what he previously described in BRO as “basic 
faith” in the graciousness of existence.  His later description of the uncanny draws on the 
gratuity of our own existence, yet it has developed from the basic faith in the 
worthwhileness of existence to a more ambiguous recognition of the negative facets of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
principles of domination, those slack feelings which tempt us beyond mere error and even illusion to the 
final distortions of sheer indecency” (76).   
 Adding to the lack of clarity regarding these two texts is the tremendous overlap between the two, 
including many sections that are quoted verbatim or with only minor changes.  The article version suggests 
that it is a later adaptation (a “sketch”) of the chapter (65 n. 3), but its citation has an early publication date 
for AI.  This suggests that submission of the article to the CTSA Proceedings for 1979 occurred prior to the 
actual completion of the text of AI.  AI’s presentation of “uncanny” is more consistent in portraying the 
uncanny as involving a certain form of bondage, alienation, or oppression, and the related hope for release 
or liberation from that negativity.  As such, the uncanny is neither negative nor sinful itself, but rather 
includes the recognition of negative and sinful realities in one’s life.  Given that the two works are 
produced at roughly the same time and that AI has proved to be the more enduring and influential of the 
two, preference will be given to AI’s formulations when these two texts differ.   
29 AI 374.  Later Tracy will describe it as “gift and threat” (PA 75). 
30 AI 374 
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our reality from which we hope for release.  There is what Tracy might call a “rough 
coherence” between basic faith and uncanny hopefulness, even though in AI the latter 
more effectively acknowledges the negativities within which hope is experienced.  The 
significant continuity between the two is Tracy’s profound sense of graciousness as the 
the ground for this basic faith or hope.  We experience grace through our personal 
recognition of the uncanny in our situation.31 
 
Uncanny in PA  
 The use of the term “uncanny” tends to disappear from Tracy’s work in the mid-
1980’s, but the underlying idea he wants to convey with that term remains pertinent to his 
theology.  In Plurality and Ambiguity, he describes grace as “a power erupting in one’s 
life as a gift revealing that Ultimate Reality can be trusted as the God who is Pure, 
Unbounded Love.”32  Although not stated explicitly in PA, the language here of “erupting 
in one’s life” shares a rough coherence with the personal sense of the uncanny in AI.  
Tracy’s claim that grace is experienced as both the gift of transformation and the threat 
that unmasks the various ways in which humans reject or hide from Ultimate Reality.  
“Gift and threat” develops and intensifies the earlier “gift and command” formulation in 
AI.33  In both formulations one’s experience of grace in the contemporary situation is 
                                                          
31 AI 371 
32 PA 75.  As was noted in Chapters Two and Three, Tracy uses different terms to refer to the divine in 
BRO, AI, and PA.  Nonetheless, the idea of basic faith or fundamental trust rooted in this divine reality 
remains a fixture of each.   
33 Cf. AI 235, 248, 269, 330, 371, and 434 
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characterized by both disclosure of some form of bondage or distortion and the 
concomitant possibility of release from that bondage that is experienced as hope.   
 Tracy’s “basic faith” is continued in PA.  But this attitude is slightly recast as 
“fundamental trust,” a disposition nourished by one’s particular faith tradition.  Just as 
religious traditions can be helpful to one’s self-reflective interpretation of the uncanny, so 
too religion can help an individual to “resist the ego’s compulsive refusal to face the 
always already power of the Ultimate reality that bears down upon us.”34  Tracy 
continues to emphasize human beings’ dependence on the gracious quality of this 
ultimate reality for their existence.  However, PA further tempers his optimism about this 
basic faith, since he explicitly says that fundamental trust “is not immune to either 
criticism or suspicion.”35  It is an ambiguous aspect of human existence, potentially in 
need of the sort of disclosure and releasement that the sense of the uncanny is able to 
bring about.   
 
Jesus Christ  
Christ as Representation in BRO  
 In Tracy’s “revisionist” approach to fundamental theology a Christological 
interpretation of common human experience is not the first step.  Rather, he claims that 
one ought to begin with a general religious interpretation of human experience, followed 
by a theistic interpretation of that religious interpretation.  Only then does he face the 
                                                          
34 PA 84 
35 PA 112 
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issue of a Christological interpretation of the theistic and religious views.36  In BRO, 
Tracy explains how each of these layers functions within his fundamental theology.  His 
emphasis here is on the criteria—especially the language—used to interpret common 
human experience. 
 Tracy approaches the initial religious question by focusing on the “limit-of” 
reality that discloses the overall horizon of existence, since for Tracy the idea of “limit” 
distinguishes the religious dimension of existence from other dimensions.  This “limit” 
quality reveals the religious dimension as the “ultimate ground to or horizon of all other 
activities.”37  The language used to describe this dimension of common human 
experience “re-presents that basic confidence and trust in existence” that Tracy had 
already designated as a sense of the gracious ground of existence.38   
 The next step is to determine whether a theistic interpretation of the religious 
dimension of common human experience is “an adequate re-presentation of those basic 
beliefs.”39  For Tracy, there is no intrinsic requirement for a religious interpretation to 
become a theistic one.  However, he questions whether one can have fundamental trust in 
the graciousness of reality without faith being placed in something.  For him, a theistic 
interpretation describes this something as the “single metaphysical referent to our most 
basic faith or trust,” that which is commonly denoted “God.”40  Like religious language, 
theistic language is re-presentative of fundamental trust, because it provides an adequate 
                                                          
36 BRO 91 
37 BRO 108 
38 BRO 134.  “Religious language” is here what Tracy would later call “the uncanny” in AI. 
39 BRO 154 
40 BRO 156 
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interpretation of the human experience of basic faith in the gracious character of 
existence.41  Tracy does not find the particular interpretation of the metaphysical term of 
“classical Christian theism” a compelling one, since at this point in his theological 
development he regards a process account of God to be a more relatively adequate one.42 
 The third step inquires into the interpretation of the religious dimension of human 
experience, entering more fully into the particularities of a specific tradition.  Of course 
any religious tradition begins “with some moment or occasion of special religious 
insight” to be interpreted by those who experience it with “limit language representative 
of that insight and that experience.”43  Anticipating his later ideas about “the classic,” 
Tracy describes this event as both universal in its potential disclosure of meaning and 
particular with regard to its own history.44   
 Tracy’s focal example of this third step is the Christological interpretation of 
religious experience that takes the life of Jesus of Nazareth as this grounding event, in the 
sense that through his words, actions, and life, Jesus lived “the representational reality 
present in the office of Messiah.”45  By “representational reality,” Tracy means that in 
Jesus, fulfillment of what it means to be the Christ not only epitomizes but makes present 
again (“re-presents”) the life human beings are called to have in relationship to God.46  
                                                          
41 BRO 154 
42 See BRO Chapter 8 for more on the process understanding of God as a more relatively adequate model 
for a theistic interpretation of the religious dimension of common human experience and of the Christian 
fact.   
43 BRO 205 
44 BRO 206 
45 BRO 216 
46 BRO 218 
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Through his teaching, his ministry, his life, and his death, Jesus as the Christ47  lives a “a 
certain limit-mode-of-being-in-the-world,” a profound intensification of the possibilities 
of human living.  In this life at the limit, Jesus as the Christ re-presents “the righteous, 
loving, gracious God.”48  “God” then is what Christians intend when they articulate an 
objective referent for basic faith: 
For Christians, christological language suffices because it fulfills certain factual 
understandings of human and divine reality: the fact that our lives are, in reality, 
meaningful; that we really do live in the presence of a loving God; that the final 
word about our lives is gracious and the final power is love.49 
 
According to Tracy, Christological language summarizes and sublates both the religious 
and theistic interpretations of the religious dimension of common human experience.  
Jesus as the Christ is both the universal and historically particular re-presentation of the 
gracious God who is the ground of human existence.50 
 
Christ as Divine Self-Manifestation in AI  
 In Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy’s religious, theistic, and Christological 
interpretations of experience indicated the interconnection between basic faith in the 
graciousness of existence and the reality of Jesus as the Christ as the re-presentation of 
the gracious God attested to in Christianity.  In the Analogical Imagination, his theology 
                                                          
47 This is one of several ways Tracy commonly refers to Jesus in BRO.  Others include “Jesus of Nazareth 
as the Christ,” “Jesus the Christ,” and the more widely used “Jesus Christ.”  The other variations are 
designed to underline a distinction (not separation) between the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth and 
the office of the Messiah as the anointed one of God. 
48 BRO 221 
49 BRO 223 
50 BRO 237 
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of grace brings together more clearly basic faith and Christology in terms of the uncanny 
and the classic in order to articulate the distinct forms of the mediation of grace. 
 As presented in Chapter One,51 the classic for Tracy is an expression arising from 
within a tradition with an excess and permanence of meaning.  While classics are 
particular in origin and form, in principle they can reveal truth to any self-reflective 
person open to engagement with them.  Although classics arise within and shape those 
traditions, their disclosive possibilities are not confined to those traditions.  The form of 
the classic Tracy works with the most is the text, but the category of the classic also 
includes images, symbols, rituals, events, and even persons.   
 Tracy applies the category of classic to Jesus Christ, understanding him as both 
event and person.  In fact, Jesus Christ is the focal Christian classic: “At the center of 
Christianity stands not a timeless truth, nor a principle, nor even a cause, but an event and 
a person—Jesus of Nazareth experienced and confessed as the Christ.”52  While classic 
texts, particularly the canon of Scripture, witness to this event and person, these in turn 
are themselves “normatively judge[d] and inform[ed]” by the event and person of Jesus 
Christ.53  The normative status of Scripture is not intrinsic to the text, but it is derived 
from the reality to which it witnesses.  Tracy carefully distinguishes Christianity from 
other “religions of the book” precisely because in Christianity the book is secondary to 
the event and person to which it attests.54   
                                                          
51 Chapter One, pages 62-4 
52 AI 317 
53 AI 233 
54 AI 249.  Tracy seems to overlook the fact that the other two main religions of the book, Judaism and 
Islam, also believe in a transcendent God to whom their central texts give witness.  However, at least in 
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 Although Christ is both event and person, Tracy emphasizes the event-character 
of Jesus as interpreted by Christian theology.  Event and person remain necessarily 
connected by the simple fact that there would be no event of Jesus as the Christ without 
the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth.55  This is because the primary experience we 
have of Jesus now is the event of Jesus Christ as mediated through various Christian 
traditions and churches.56  The mediation of the Christ event occurs in Christian 
communities through word, sacrament, and action.57  These forms of mediation attest to 
the present experience of the event mediating the historical person of Jesus in telling the 
story of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection through the normative texts of Scripture.58 
 The “event” of Jesus Christ discloses God.  Within the community that mediates 
this Christ event through word, sacrament, and action, the event of Christ is experienced 
precisely “as an event from God and by God’s power.”59  As a classic, this event 
provokes a response from its potential interpreters, and demands of them recognition and 
engagement.  For Tracy the event of Christ is both gift and command, both graciousness 
and the demand to live in light of that graciousness.60  Tracy says this is the “gift and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Islam, the Quran is viewed as the Word of God essentially, not derivatively as Christianity views the Bible.  
In fact, some have noted that while Christianity typically refers to Jesus Christ as the “Word of God,” Islam 
primarily uses “Word of God” to describe the Quran.  Cf. The Midwest Dialogue of Catholics and 
Muslims, Revelation: Catholic & Muslim Perspectives (Washington, DC: United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, 2006), 4. 
55 AI 234 
56 AI 408 
57 AI 254 
58 Tracy makes a helpful distinction between the knowledge of the contemporary Christian about the event 
and person of Jesus, noting that “What Christians know historically about the ‘Jesus of history’ they know, 
like everyone else, through the ever-shifting results of historical criticism.  That Christians believe in the 
actual Jesus as the Christ comes to them from some present experience of the Christ event: an experience 
mediated by the whole community of the Christian church” (AI 428). 
59 AI 234 
60 AI 235 
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command of agape” disclosed in the event of Christ, and it is the vocation of all 
Christians.61  The life of Jesus of Nazareth is lived as radical love through profound faith 
in God, and is disclosed in the “event” of Jesus Christ as a new possibility for human 
persons.62 
 For Tracy, the Christian belief in Christ affirms that the Christ event is not only 
disclosive of God, but is in fact the decisive self-manifestation of God in Christ.  The 
language of manifestation (and more specifically self-manifestation) refers to the 
revelatory or disclosive character of the event.  “Manifestation” means that it shows the 
reality to which it attests.  Thus, in The Analogical Imagination “manifestation” 
effectively reformulates the terms “re-presentation” and “re-presentative” Tracy used in 
Blessed Rage for Order in order to describe the connection between Jesus Christ and 
God.63  The Scriptures, as well as the mediation of this event through the tradition and 
community, attest to the claim that in the event of Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion, and 
resurrection, God reveals God’s self.64  Moreover, this self-manifestation has the 
proleptic quality of an “event of the decisively true word and manifestation that already 
happened, that happens now, always happens, that will happen in Jesus Christ, the event 
                                                          
61 AI 434 (cf. AI 326) 
62 AI 330-1 
63 Neither of these terms is exclusively in either text.  In a few isolated incidents, Tracy uses “self-
manifestation” in BRO to describe how Jesus re-presents God (BRO 205), and at least once in AI he uses 
the terms together to refer to the same idea (AI 216).  Nonetheless, the language of re-presentation is 
dominant in BRO, while the language of manifestation is dominant in AI and leads into the three central 
mediations of grace in manifestation, proclamation, and historical action. 
64 AI 250 
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of God.”65  The Christ event is already/not-yet, shown in the past and present life of the 
tradition and hoped for in a future to come. 
 Because Christ is the self-manifestation of God, the Christ event for Tracy is the 
fullest disclosure of the reality of grace.  The centrality of Christ in the larger Christian 
tradition attests to the fundamental trust in a gracious God.  Such a disclosure of grace 
unmasks the ambiguities experienced in the uncanniness of the situation.  It unveils the 
possibilities for liberation from these ambiguities and empowers us to live agapically.66  
For Tracy, the fundamental disclosure that occurs in the self-manifestation of God in the 
event of Christ is precisely the reality of grace, understood proleptically.67  Grace is an 
always-already present reality that heals and liberates, but also a not-yet reality that will 
only be fulfilled eschatologically.  Moreover, grace reveals not only that human beings 
are loved and called to be loving, but that the entire world is the beloved of God.  In other 
words, both humanity and the world coexist in grace.68  Grace is experienced as both gift 
and command, driving and enabling the human person to live the life of love disclosed as 
possible for everyone by the life of the person Jesus of Nazareth.  Thus, with the 
realization that he or she is graced, “the Christian should be released to the self-
transcendence of genuine other-regard by a willing self-exposure to and in the 
contemporary situation.”69 
 
                                                          
65 AI 309 
66 AI 430, 438 
67 AI 430 
68 AI 438 
69 AI 446 
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Forms of Mediation  
 For Tracy, the reality disclosed by the event of Jesus Christ is grace, meaning the 
love of God that enables and commands us to love.  This event, rooted in the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth, must be also mediated historically through the community gathered 
around this central reality and through the traditions that have been passed down in this 
community.  Thus, grace is mediated through the contemporary situation in which we 
find ourselves, and it is disclosed in the sense of the uncanny in of our situation.   
 A distinction needs to be drawn at this juncture between two valences of 
“mediation” in Tracy’s understanding of the mediation of grace: context and form.  First, 
the community, the tradition, and the contemporary situation are all contexts or locales 
through which grace is mediated.  We encounter the event of Jesus Christ here and now.  
Second, while the event is mediated through these contexts, the mediation takes place in 
three particular forms: proclamation, manifestation, and historical action.  In some places, 
Tracy will refer to these three forms with the more traditionally Christian vocabulary of 
“word, sacrament, and action.”70  These two valences of mediation, context and form, are 
intertwined in Tracy’s understanding that the event of Jesus Christ is mediated through 
the tradition, the community, and the situation in these three paradigmatic forms of 
manifestation, proclamation, and historical action.  In what follows, the focus will be on 
the forms and how they have developed in his thought.   
 
 
                                                          
70 AI 234.  Tracy first draws the analogy between manifestation/proclamation and sacrament/word in AI 
203.   
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The Analogical Imagination  
 Manifestation  
 While Tracy works with all three forms of mediation, his main focus is on 
manifestation.  This is evident in his description of Jesus Christ as the “self-
manifestation” of God.  Manifestation has to do with understanding truth as disclosure.  
Tracy contrasts this idea with truth understood as adequation or as verification.71  Truth 
as manifestation means that one ought to let “whatever shows itself to be in its showing 
and hiddenness.”72  Manifestation therefore indicates a reality that, in its appearance, both 
discloses something that is true but also keeps some aspects of its reality concealed.  
Disclosure is never full disclosure; uncovering carries with it some hiddenness.   
 Tracy’s understanding of manifestation is influenced by the work of Paul Ricoeur.  
Ricoeur describes five key traits of manifestation.73  First, the experience of the sacred in 
manifestation is the numinous in Rudolf Otto’s sense of the fascinans et tremendum, 
where manifestation is attractive, awesome, and overwhelming.74  Second, the sacred 
manifests itself in some form (what Mircea Eliade calls “hierophany”) that is not initially 
or primarily a verbal form.  Third, manifestation is more than a symbolic representation 
of the sacred; it also requires ritualized behavior that consecrates the world in which this 
manifestation takes place.  Fourth, the symbolism in manifestation is a “bound 
symbolism,” meaning that those elements of nature and reality through which the sacred 
                                                          
71 Cf. Chapter Two, pages 88-9 
72 AI 195 
73 Paul Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” in Figuring the Sacred, ed. Mark I. Wallace, trans. 
David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 49-55. 
74 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 25-40. 
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manifests itself can only become symbols when they become transparent.  Put another 
way, the symbol that mediates the sacred does so most effectively when there is an 
“immediate liaison between the appearance [of the symbol] and its meaning.”75  The fifth 
and final trait functions as a summary of the previous four traits: our ability to say 
anything about the sacred depends on the possibility of the created world to symbolize 
the sacred in a way that is other than the created world.  Ricoeur emphasizes the pre-
verbal character of manifestation as resting on the “law of correspondences,” so that our 
linguistic articulations about sacred reality depend on some correspondence between the 
world we can see and the transcendent reality we believe is revealed through it.  
Manifestation means a disclosure of the sacred mediated by the created order.  For 
Ricoeur,76 manifestation, although it might be verbal or linguistic, is chiefly symbolic and 
precedes and grounds later verbal articulations of what is revealed.77   
 On the basis of Ricoeur’s law of correspondences and his description of the 
transparency of the symbol to the symbolized, Tracy adds that a central feature of 
manifestation is that one experiences it as gift, so that like grace itself, it is never 
something one initiates or controls, but rather it comes to oneself from beyond oneself.  
The sacred reality encountered in manifestation gives itself in the experience.78  Such 
experiences can thus be meaningfully described as self-manifestations.  With Eliade, 
Tracy describes manifestation as a “purely given” that separates the sacred and profane 
                                                          
75 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 54 
76 And also Eliade 
77 Cf. AI 205 
78 AI 206 
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realms.79  Such manifestation of the sacred occurs in the profane character of one’s 
everyday life, but it alters one’s experience of these realms.80 
 The manifestation of the sacred calls us to partitipcate in the sacred realm.  What 
is participation?  Recall the two decisive moments in the production of the classic:  
intensification, by which the classic expresses in radically particular ways the meanings 
and values of some person or community; and distanciation, which liberates the 
expression from the control of its producer and renders it shareable beyond its particular 
origins.  According to Tracy, this is a dialectical process that sometimes enables either a 
“sense of radical participation,” which he calls manifestation, or a “sense of radical 
nonparticipation,” which he names proclamation.81  Manifestation happens in relation to 
those classic expressions that provoke a sense of participation in the sacred that is 
disclosed in them.  Participation in this sense is never a matter of complete or total 
transparency, but rather discloses the mysterious quality of the sacred – or in Tracy’s 
language, of “the whole” – which is manifested.  In short, we encounter the whole with a 
sense of fascinans et tremendum.82  Manifestation brings about a sense of the 
accessibility of mystery, so that we can say something about it, or point to something real 
about the whole, and so articulate some claims, however inadequate they may be. 
 In Tracy’s account, manifestation mediates the encounter with the sacred in three 
primary ways.  The first, and perhaps the most familiar to philosophers and theologians: 
                                                          
79 AI 206.  Cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(San Diego: Harvest Book, 1987), 11 
80 AI 207 
81 AI 203 
82 AI 176 
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philosophical reflection on the experience of wonder.  The use of reason to think about 
these experiences is important for this way of mediation, especially because the sorts of 
eruptive events in nature and history described in scripture seem no longer seem to 
happen.  Yet reasoned reflection on this original witness may mediate some recovery of 
the “fundamental trust” in gracious reality to which these original claims testified.83  The 
second way of mediation is through our ordinary experience, which can be a vehicle for 
the disclosure of the sacred precisely in its concrete everyday-ness.  Tracy wonders about 
the potential attractiveness of this kind of manifestation because in such contemporary 
situations as the uncanny experience of homelessness, the ordinary can provide a real 
sense of belonging to and participating in families, communities, traditions, and so 
forth.84  Finally, there are the extraordinary experiences, in which human persons 
encounter their sheer finitude and face the sort of limit questions treated in BRO.  These 
experiences are perhaps not so much the eruptions referred to earlier instead of the 
“paradigmatic” and “privileged” experiences that occur in special “places, times, events, 
rituals, images, [and] persons” who reveal the truth of the whole to us.85  This series 
repeats the litany of the typical forms of expression that might attain classic status.  After 
all, isn’t the classic essentially an extraordinary expression that manifests truth in this 
way?   
 These three ways of experiencing manifestation each communicate the sense of 
giftedness and wonder characteristic of manifestation.  Through manifestation as one 
                                                          
83 AI 379 
84 AI 380 
85 AI 383 
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major form of the mediation of grace, “some pervasive yes at the heart of the universe” – 
the ground of fundamental trust in the graciousness of existence – is disclosed.86  This 
manifestation of grace liberates because it frees us to trust in the meaningfulness of 
existence and to love in an agapic, self-donating way.87  Ultimately, in the manifestation 
of Jesus Christ, which for Christian theology is the primary analogue for all other events 
of manifestation, the disclosure of grace reveals the radical ubiquity of God’s love, which 
inspires “theologians of manifestation” to proclaim that “All is grace.”88 
 
 Proclamation 
 The second paradigmatic form of the mediation of grace is proclamation.  
Proclamation is similar to manifestation inasmuch as both are experienced as decisive 
events, but proclamation because it is a “word of address,” which confronts the individual 
who receives it.  The word confrontation is intentional, because this word of address 
shocks, disconcerts, provokes, and judges the person who receives it.89  In receiving 
proclamation, the “hearers of the word” are challenged to recognize not only their 
freedom but also their dependence and their sinfulness.  In the reception of proclamation, 
hearers are forced to face themselves. 
 The main term for characterizing proclamation is “kerygmatic.”  The kerygma 
refers originally to preaching or announcing good news; namely, the New Testament 
                                                          
86 AI 386 
87 AI 432 
88 AI 386.  Tracy cites Friedrich Schleiermacher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Karl Rahner, Langdon Gilkey, 
and John Cobb as examples of “theologians of manifestation.” 
89 AI 269 
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message about Jesus.  Tracy makes a rough distinction between “Jesus-kerygma” and 
“Christ-kerygma.”  The former refers to the earliest layers of apostolic witness that can 
be reconstructed from the New Testament, so that there is some overlap between the 
“Jesus-kerygma” and the “historical Jesus” that some modern thinkers have sought to 
uncover, but the role of apostolic witness in the kerygma creates a crucial if subtle 
distinction between them.90  The “Christ-kerygma,” however, refers to the witness to the 
Christ event as the disclosure of God, especially as it is described in the work of “John, 
Paul, and early Catholicism.”91  In this sense, Tracy’s use of “Christ-kerygma” refers to 
the primary witness to the Christian classical event of Jesus Christ.92  According to Tracy, 
it is precisely this “Christ-kerygma” that is both the ground and the norm for Christian 
theology.93   
 As kerygma, proclamation is then the act of preaching.  Yet this act always 
implies content because preaching witnesses to the decisiveness of some fundamental 
                                                          
90 AI 245 n.24.  The distinctions Tracy is trying to make here are not entirely clear.  He places Paul’s letters 
in the “Christ-kerygma” category, but scholars generally agree that the letters of Paul are the earliest texts 
still extant from the community centered on Jesus.  “Jesus-kerygma” seems to be based on a historical-
critical reconstruction of earlier sources used in Paul and the Gospels (i.e., hymns or liturgical descriptions, 
the episode of Jesus’ cleansing the Temple), but this does not seem to be any sort of developed or 
substantiated claim.  This Jesus-kerygma then differs from the quest for the historical Jesus in that its aim 
in reconstructing earlier layers of New Testament texts is to discover earlier theological witnesses to the 
Christ event.  It does not seem to be an attempt to reconstruct the historical figure or his socio-historical 
context.  Tracy goes on in the referenced footnote to cite the confusion of “Jesus-kerygma” and “historical 
Jesus” as a problematic aspect in the Christologies of Boff, Sobrino, and Küng.  Whatever may actually be 
the case here, one ought to resist the apparent analogy between “Jesus-kerygma” and “Christ-kerygma” 
with the relationship between the person of Jesus of Nazareth and the event of Jesus Christ.  Ultimately, 
resolution of the apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies in Tracy’s terminology for this issue is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
91 AI 270 
92 What is perhaps less clear is whether the references to “Christ-kerygma” refer more restrictedly to the 
event of Jesus Christ as it was experienced by these early communities, or whether there can still be 
“Christ-kerygma” today. 
93 Cf. AI 245 n. 23 
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event, person, or meaning.94  In New Testament proclamation, this content is the belief 
that the person Jesus of Nazareth, “who preached, lived, ministered, was crucified and 
raised by God,” is the same person as the risen Christ who is experienced in the present 
as “the decisive disclosure of who God is and who we are.”95  This basic belief unifies 
what in fact are rather diverse “kerygmata” in the New Testament.96  The relationship, 
then, between preaching and the content of that preaching is integral to Tracy’s notion of 
proclamation.  Proclamation includes both. 
 In this vein Tracy names proclamation as one of the classic genres of the New 
Testament.  Certainly, in its confessional function, proclamation is a primary genre in the 
New Testament.97  As such, he thinks proclamation is a relatively more adequate source 
for understanding the event and person of Jesus than what Tracy calls the “corrective 
genres” of apocalyptic and doctrine.98  Proclamation in the New Testament is both the 
primary source for preaching about the event and person of Jesus and the fundamental 
norm for judging later proclamation. Tracy says scripture is “proclamation” only in a 
derivative sense, because prior to the witness of scripture is the event to which scripture 
                                                          
94 AI 269.  Here Tracy states that kerygma “is a language of response and witness to a founding event 
recognized and confessed as the decisive event of the self-disclosure of God.” 
95 AI 272 
96 E.g., Tracy often contrasts the theologies of Paul and John as examples of this diversity.  Cf. AI 281-287, 
431. 
97 The others are narrative/gospel and symbol/reflective thought.  Cf. AI 275-287.  While this part of the 
dissertation focuses on proclamation to the relative exclusion of these other genres, this is due to the scope 
of the question regarding the complex of manifestation-proclamation-action as mediations of grace rather 
than the genre distinctions among proclamation-narrative-symbol.  Tracy is clear that, as a genre, 
proclamation depends on these other genres (as well as apocalyptic and doctrine) precisely because 
“without them proclamation is ever in danger of becoming either merely abstract content or violent and 
authoritarian act of address” (AI 274).  My goal in this section, however, is to investigate how the 
description of proclamation as a genre can illuminate our understanding of proclamation as a form of 
mediation of grace. 
98 AI 239, 268.  Tracy is clear here that these are not unimportant or unenlightening genres, but simply that 
their effectiveness depends upon the three primary genres of proclamation, narrative, and symbol. 
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witnesses.  Taking seriously the Word of God theologians of the early 20th century, Tracy 
states that proclamation “exists primarily as word-event from God,” namely, the Word 
made flesh in both the person and event of Jesus Christ.99 
 In this insight Tracy is especially under the influence of the neo-orthodox 
Protestant theologians of the early and mid-twentieth century, specifically Barth, 
Brunner, Gogarten, Bultmann, and Tillich.  Each was a theologian whose professional 
careers were profoundly marked by the complex and ambiguous relationship that liberal 
German Protestantism had with its larger culture during the period from before the 
beginning of WWI until the end of WWII.  Despite the many later disagreements among 
these figures, they were largely in accord on rehabilitating proclamation as a central 
category for understanding God’s revelation in the Word of God.100  Their central 
concern, according to Tracy, was that the only salvation possible for human beings comes 
through divine address.  This address is experienced as an event that is directed to all 
persons and that reveals both the “true godforsakenness” of all addressees and their 
“possible liberation” from that state.101  Our salvation is dependent on this disclosure. 
 The character of proclamation as address underlies one of Tracy’s distinctions 
between proclamation and manifestation.  Whereas manifestation is characterized by 
participation in the sacred reality that is manifested, proclamation does not enable a sense 
of participation in the reality that addresses us.  Playing on the hermeneutical term 
“distanciation,” i.e. the process through which an expression is “distanced” from its 
                                                          
99 AI 273.  By “Word of God theologian,” Tracy primarily has in mind Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, Emil 
Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich (AI 389, 415). 
100 AI 389 
101 AI 386 
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original producer, Tracy notes that in receiving the word of address from God, the self 
becomes distantiated from prior senses of participation.102  Proclamation is “shattering, 
disclosive, [and] eschatological;” it reveals the distance between the divine and the self.  
Thus, in contrast to manifestation’s sense of participation in mystery, proclamation 
discloses the radical otherness and incomprehensibility of that mystery.103 
 Here again Tracy evokes Ricoeur’s distinction between manifestation and 
proclamation, once again based on the contrast between the logic of correspondences 
(manifestation) and the logic of limit-expressions (proclamation).104  The logic of limit-
expressions resists classification in accord with the five criteria of manifestation, which 
intimate the connection between the created cosmos and sacred reality.  Ricoeur 
characterizes proclamation’s eruptive speech as both historical and ethical, and it 
challenges the manifestation of the sacred in nature because “a theology of history could 
not accommodate a cosmic theology.”105  The limit-expressions of proclamation “bring 
about the rupturing of ordinary speech” through intensification.106  Ricoeur says that 
limit-expressions intend to orient the hearer toward limit-experiences.  For him, the 
paradigmatic limit-experience in Christian theology is the Kingdom of God.  Instead of 
making the Kingdom of God manifest in our universe, proclamation points us to the 
“something more” that is experienced not only as crisis, but also as culmination.107   
                                                          
102 AI 210 
103 AI 212 
104 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 57.  He also uses the distinction between seeing and hearing 
as a metaphor for the differences between these phenomena. 
105 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 56 
106 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 60 
107 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 60-61.  For more on this sense of crisis, see Friedrich 
Gogarten, “Zwischen den Zeiten,” Christliche Welt 34, no. 24: 374-378. 
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 In Ricoeur’s account of the relationship between manifestation and proclamation, 
these two phenomena need and imply the presence of the other.  Nevertheless, he tends to 
give some priority to proclamation, as in the statement, “the numinous is just the 
underlying canvas from which the word detaches itself.”108  Tracy regards the 
fundamental difference between Ricoeur and himself as based on the contrast between 
Ricoeur’s Reformed Protestant interpretation and Tracy’s Catholic reading.109  Tracy 
subtly prioritizes manifestation as the “enveloping presupposition” of proclamation.110  
Tracy agrees with Ricoeur that there is some ultimate unity between word and sacrament 
parallel to proclamation and manifestation, but Tracy insists that the pre-verbal character 
of manifestation is the basis for the transformative possibilities proper to proclamation.   
 Such subtle disagreements over the relative importance of manifestation and 
proclamation, according to Tracy, suggest the more fundamental unity between them, 
because isolated from the other, manifestation and proclamation would devolve into 
caricatures of themselves.  Thus, absent the kerygmatic word of address, “sacrament 
becomes magic, aesthetics, or even mechanics,” and absent the symbolism of 
manifestation, proclamation becomes the “righteous rigorism of duty and obligation” and 
loses its capacity to move “our hearts and imagination.”111  Yet in the final analysis, these 
two phenomena are most fundamentally united in the reality of Jesus Christ.  The event 
                                                          
108 Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 56.  Cf. also “The sacrament, we could say, is the mutation 
of sacred ritual into the kerygmatic realm” (Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” 67). 
109 AI 221-223 n. 26 
110 AI 215 
111 AI 217.  Tracy is perhaps nowhere clearer on this than in his description of the theologies of Paul and 
John in the New Testament, in which he reads Paul as fundamentally a theology of proclamation while 
John is one of manifestation (AI 282-287). 
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and person of Jesus Christ is the self-manifestation of God, but as the Word made flesh 
this manifestation is also the primordial proclamation of God.  This unity of proclamation 
and manifestation is perhaps most explicit in the Gospel of John. 
 
 Historical Action  
 Of the three paradigmatic forms that mediate grace, Tracy pays the most attention 
to manifestation and proclamation.  This seems to be due to Tracy’s focus on classic texts 
of the Christian tradition, especially the books of the New Testament, as examples of 
manifestation and proclamation themselves and as witnesses to the proclamation and 
manifestation of the event of Jesus Christ.  Yet these texts are also witnesses to the 
actions of Jesus and his disciples.  In the contemporary situation, Tracy no longer regards 
manifestation and proclamation as adequate for Christian theology; so many theologians 
move away from these forms “into the realms of action and history, of performative 
personal, social and political praxis.”112  These theologians do not so much detach 
themselves from manifestation and proclamation, but rather take them as starting points.  
Using the metaphors of seeing (manifestation) and hearing (proclamation) the word, 
Tracy says that theologians who have turned to historical or prophetic action feel called 
to be “doers of the word in history.”113 
 For Tracy, the key to historical action as a form of the mediation of grace is his 
notion of ‘praxis.”  The first use of this term occurs in Blessed Rage for Order, where he 
                                                          
112 AI 390.  The theologians Tracy has in mind here are Johann Baptist Metz, Gustavo Gutierrez, Jürgen 
Moltmann, Dorothy Soelle, Carl Braaten, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and James Cone. 
113 AI 390 
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primarily associated it with the version of practical theology he then advocated, namely 
the future-oriented practical theology whose goal was “the rigorous investigation of the 
possibilities of praxis” rooted in the historia and theoria developed by historical, 
fundamental, and systematic theologies.114  Praxis was more than practice; it meant “the 
critical relationship between theory and practice whereby each is dialectically influenced 
and transformed by the other.”115  Praxis is irreducible to any particular social program 
precisely because it engages the theoretical work that is so often relegated to the 
provenance of fundamental or systematic theologies.  In BRO, Tracy regards Metz, 
Moltmann, Segundo, Gutierrez, and Soelle as exemplary praxis theologians who have 
reformulated a neo-orthodox model of theology based on “Hegelian-Marxist praxis” 
instead of “the Kierkegaardian-Heideggerian sense of the individual.”116  Tracy situates 
these theologians within the sub-discipline of practical theology working on the model of 
neo-orthodoxy.  He avoids suggesting that they do not make meaningful or substantive 
contributions to conversations about theory, but he is primarily interested in the social 
and practical concerns these theologians have about the injustices and problems of their 
socio-historical situation. 
 In The Analogical Imagination, praxis remains linked to the sub-discipline of 
practical theology while he subtly reframes the task of practical theology.  The future 
orientation of praxis continues in a perhaps attenuated manner, but it is oriented towards 
the public of society.  Because Tracy describes practical theology as being particularly 
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concerned with “some particular social, political, cultural or pastoral movement or 
problematic which is argued or assumed to possess major religious import,” praxis in AI 
is focused on a specific issue rather than being concerned with a generalized notion of 
social engagement.117  Since all theologians are situated in a specific context, in some 
sense all are already shaped and motivated in their work by a “situation of praxis.” 
 On the one hand, Tracy argues that all theology is built on lived praxis.  Any 
theoretical work depends “on the authentic praxis of the theorist’s personally 
appropriated value of intellectual integrity and self-transcending commitment to the 
imperatives of critical rationality.”118  On the other hand, praxis sublates theory; it is 
more than some mechanistic application of theory to practice.  In light of the authentic 
personal commitments one makes, praxis integrates theory into itself.119  In theology, this 
is reflected in the fact that praxis-focused theologies include and build upon the 
theoretical work of non-praxis theologians.  To acknowledge that praxis-theologies make 
significant contributions to the overall field of theology means also realizing that these 
contributions usually depend on the praxis-theologian engaging the theoretical work of 
someone else within the praxis-theologian’s “situation of praxis.”  The situation of praxis 
of individual theologians becomes a constitutive base for whatever theoretical work they 
undertake.  This theoretical (i.e., fundamental and systematic) theology in turn provides a 
basis for practical theology.   
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 This attention to the mutual mediation of praxis and theory is most evident in his 
depiction of political and liberation theologies in AI.  He understands the praxis 
orientation of these theologies to mean that the transformative model of truth is its 
primary model, so that the adequacy of any claim to truth (orthodoxy) is the measure in 
which it leads to right action (orthopraxis).  Truth ought to be transformative in the life of 
the person speaking it, and so if this fails to be the case its claims are called into 
question.120  Tracy does not eliminate the importance of truth as disclosure, but he 
provides a criterion by which to judge truthfulness in a balanced manner.  He regards this 
emphasis as a corrective to the privatization in religion that resist the significant 
contributions theology might make to the public of society.  Precisely because of the 
failure to live according to the transformative criterion of truth, any theology which lacks 
this criterion is potentially “fatal…to the proclamation and manifestation of the event of 
Jesus Christ.”121   
 It remains that Tracy’s position on the relationship between praxis theology and 
its claims to truth is that he tends to limit the political and liberation theologies to the 
field of practical theology.  In so doing, he tends to undervalue the theoretical insights 
and gifts these approaches bring to light from the perspective of their concrete situations 
of praxis.  For example, when Tracy claims that such theologies “represent above all a 
classic event in search of a classic text,” he nevertheless states as well that the “search for 
the classic disclosed through and by these theologies…will not end in any text…[but an] 
                                                          
120 AI 71.  Tracy does go on to claim that this criterion of truth ought to be applied in all forms of theology, 
but he does so in the context of affirming that the claims of truth in these other theologies are sublated in 
the work of praxis-theologies (AI 73). 
121 AI 393 
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event of a liberating praxis.”122  Despite finding the texts by Gutierrez, Metz, Segundo, et 
al. exemplary, Tracy does not regard them as classics in the genre of liberation and 
political theologies.   
 Tracy uses praxis to ground his claim that historical action is a form of the 
mediation of grace.  The classic event that praxis-theologies pursue is a “kairotic event 
disclosing and transforming all.”  Clearly he maintains the primacy of the future-
orientation of praxis from BRO.123  The struggle for liberation is both an ever-present 
demand in our contemporary situation and an eschatological hope for the coming 
Kingdom of God that will set all people free.  This eschatological hope ought to ground 
the historical action demanded now.124  Even though contemporary efforts cannot 
complete the work that needs to be done to free ourselves and others from the systemic 
distortions, it is important to acknowledge that they are performed in hope of some 
current improvement and some proleptic fulfillment.  Historical action mediates grace 
precisely in the possibilities for liberation not only disclosed by such action but 
transformative of those who are undertake it.  Here the encounter with grace as both gift 
and command frees and enables us to pursue justice and liberation in our world.   
 For Tracy, the three paradigmatic forms of mediation of grace (manifestation, 
proclamation, and action) mutually mediate one another through the whole life of the 
Christian tradition.  We encounter grace in our daily lives in each of these forms, where 
sometimes one type occurs with greater emphasis than another.  Yet because all three 
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witness to the same core reality of the self-manifestation of God in the event and person 
of Jesus Christ, they cannot be decisively separated.  Using Christological symbolism, 
Tracy explains that each of these mediations emphasizes a different aspect of the mission 
of Christ.  Manifestation emphasizes the incarnation by highlighting the “immanence” of 
God in reality.  Proclamation emphasizes the judging-healing address of Jesus in his 
ministry and the crucifixion as the focal judgment on humanity.  Historical action 
emphasizes the resurrection as the eschatological promise of redemption brought about 
by crucified Jesus.125  These three mediations depend on the incarnation-crucifixion-
resurrection, symbols of any genuine Christology.  To summarize, “The scope of the 
entire Christian symbol system, like the reality of the event of Jesus Christ which 
decisively elicits and empowers the whole system, is the always-already, not-yet reality 
of grace as manifestation, proclamation and prophetic action.”126   
 
Shift in Dialogue with the Other  
 As the preeminent means through which we encounter the grace disclosed in the 
event and person of Jesus Christ, manifestation, proclamation, and historical action lie at 
the heart of Tracy’s explanation of grace in The Analogical Imagination.  These three 
forms of mediation are so intimately intertwined with one another that no one can 
adequately capture the Christian understanding of reality without the others. 
 Thus it comes as a surprise in Dialogue with the Other that Tracy shifts his focus 
from manifestation, proclamation, and action to the dialectic of the mystical and 
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prophetic.  This involves two aspects.  First, while insisting that manifestation and 
proclamation are still the dialectic “at the heart of Christianity,” he feels compelled to 
acknowledge that the “pervasive religious dialectic of manifestation and proclamation is 
best construed theologically as mystical-prophetic.”127  This acknowledgment coincides 
with Tracy’s increased involvement in interreligious dialogue following the publication 
of AI.128  In DWO, Tracy moves away from emphasizing the role of manifestation and 
proclamation in the mediation of grace and explores the rhetorical strategies of mystics 
and prophets, since he regards the mystical and the prophetic as modes of discourse 
regarding disclosure of the divine Other.  Some fundamental consistency remains 
between these two dialectics because they all aim at the disclosure of the gracious reality 
that grounds existence. 
 The second shift is that this new dialectic of mystics and prophets subsumes the 
distinct role of historical action in AI.  In DWO, Tracy portrays his previous work as an 
attempt to “rethink the traditional Christian theological dialectic of sacrament and word,” 
                                                          
127 DWO 7.  It remains an open question whether there is an opposition here between “religious” and 
“theologically.”  His concentric levels of religious, theistic, and Christological as a way of describing 
dimensions of experience in BRO might be instructive here, although it would take a further hermeneutical 
nuance to claim that the sense of “theologically” here is congruent with the use of “theistic” in BRO.   
128 Tracy’s work in interreligious dialogue has focused on Jewish-Christian and Buddhist-Christian 
conversations.  On the former, his main interlocutors are Arthur Cohen and Tikva Frymer-Kensky (one of 
his colleagues at the Divinity School).  His publications in this dialogue are “The Dialogue of Jews and 
Christians: A Necessary Hope,” Chicago Theological Seminary Register 76, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 20-28; 
“God as Trinitarian: A Christian Response to Peter Ochs,” in Christianity in Jewish Terms, eds. Tikva 
Frymer-Kensky, David Nowak, Peter Ochs, David Sandmel, and Michael A. Signerl, 77-84 (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000).   
 In Buddhist-Christian dialogue, his main interlocutor is Masao Abe, although he makes frequent 
reference to the Kyoto School of Japanese thought on religion and philosophy.  His engagement with 
Buddhist-Christian dialogue also seems to be influenced by efforts in this dialogue by process theologian 
John Cobb and Divinity School colleague Langdon Gilkey.  For Tracy’s publications in this dialogue 
beyond the text of DWO, see “The Christian Understanding of Salvation-Liberation;” "Kenosis, Sunyata, 
and Trinity;” and “Some Aspects of the Buddhist-Christian Dialogue.” 
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but he seems to omit the constitutive role he assigned to action in this symbolic 
complex.129  This apparent demotion of action is also expressed when he states that 
manifestation-proclamation is a dialectic.  It seems that the missing third member is now 
thought to be better construed in terms of the dialectic of the mystical-prophetic.  It is not 
that there is no place for action in Tracy’s new schematization, but only that in DWO he 
displaces its distinct role in the mediation of grace into the terms of a dialectic. 
 
 The Mystical  
 In the move to the dialectic of mystical-prophetic, the mystical assumes the role 
previously played by manifestation.  Tracy does not completely drop the term 
“manifestation,” particularly in DWO’s chapter on Mircea Eliade.  Here Tracy claims that 
truth in religion is primarily that of manifestation, not of correspondence or adequation, 
or even of praxis.  Tracy resumes his account of the classic as the expression through 
which such manifestation takes place, and again he highlights the influence of Eliade on 
his own development of the classic.130  These religious expressions make manifest the 
Other, whether as “Being, the cosmos, [or] the sacred that both reveals and withdraws 
itself in all the religions.”131  Manifestation both reveals and conceals the reality that is 
disclosed in any given expression.   
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 If the form of truth as manifestation is mainly activated in religion, then Tracy 
uses a hermeneutic approach to engage the question of mysticism.132  Hermeneutics 
means not so much a theory of interpretation as the actual practice of interpreting these 
disclosures.  Mysticism, Tracy argues, is characterized by a series of common traits.  The 
first is what he calls “basic grammar,” by which the mystic seeks to break reality down 
into basic components in order to understand the relationships among them.133  In the 
Christian mystics, these key components are God, the world, and the soul, which are the 
hermeneutical keys through which the mystic interprets scripture.  This is characteristic 
of each of the Western mystical traditions Tracy identifies, especially as seen in the 
“love-mystics”134 and the apophatic mystics.135  This structural trait is essentially 
apophatic precisely because it strips away the accidental layers of reality in order to 
understand the relationships at the heart of reality. 
 Yet for the apophatic mystics, this structural trait makes way for a further process 
of negation, in which the mystic sees these at first distinct components as dissolving into 
one another, undermining the structure of the first move.136  Tracy seems to read this 
second apophatic step as clearing space for the Other to speak, insofar as the apophatic 
mystics will then often finally “adopt a prophetic rhetoric and proclaim the word of the 
Other.”137  The mystics’ coming to grips with the structure of reality in “its radically de-
                                                          
132 DWO 43 
133 DWO 24 
134 E.g., Bernard of Clairvaux, Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, John the Evangelist 
135 E.g., Meister Eckhart, Pseudo Dionysius.  In the chapter cited here, Tracy actually reads Jacques Lacan 
as an apophatic mystic in relation to Tracy’s reading of Sigmund Freud as a prophet. 
136 DWO 25 
137 DWO 26 
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structuring actuality” enables them to disclose the truths the Other wishes to disclose.  In 
effect, the mystic wishes to unsay whatever the prophet has said as well as to say more 
than the prophet did.138 
  
 Prophetic  
 As Tracy begins to talk about manifestation in terms of the mystical, so too did he 
speak about proclamation in terms of the prophetic.  The prophet discloses the Other 
through speech, but the prophet is effectively an instrument in this process.  Prophetic 
speech is direct speech from the Other that takes shape in the words of the prophet.  The 
prophetic words are deliberately jarring, “disrupt[ing] consciousness, actions, 
deliberations” both in those who hear the prophets and in the prophets themselves.139  
These words disturb not only because they come from the Other through the prophet, but 
because they strike the receivers in their own selves.  It is precisely this sense of 
prophetic rhetoric as disturbing word of address where Tracy finds the link to his 
previous depictions of proclamation.  There is still the possibility of healing by this word 
of address, although Tracy now speaks of it more as “continuous convalescence” than as 
once-and-for-all healing.140  Yet, even with this caution, Tracy is adamant that the role of 
the prophet is not to deliver consolation but challenge and judgment.  Despite this 
challenge, prophetic rhetoric can also be persuasive, enabling the hearer of the prophet to 
recognize the truth in the words of the Other in the life of the recipients. 
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 In Dialogue with the Other, the emphasis previously given to manifestation is 
now placed on mysticism.  In this text, Tracy wants to retrieve the prophetic element of 
the Christian tradition for the contemporary age by subtly accentuating the prophetic 
dimension of the three Abrahamic religions through strategic placement of his study of 
prophecy in the text.  Thus, the discussion of prophetic rhetoric comes before mystical 
rhetoric partly because of investigating whether or not Lacan (the mystic) interprets 
Freud (the prophet) adequately.  This has the general effect of proposing mystical rhetoric 
as basically a response to prophetic rhetoric.  Even as the prophetic and mystical are 
dialectically related to one another, monotheistic traditions ascribe a certain priority to 
the prophetic. 
 Towards the end of the text, Tracy calls for a return to prophetic approaches to the 
Christian tradition.  His work with both Jewish-Christian and Buddhist-Christian 
dialogues led him to recognize meaningful parallels in the understanding of mystics and 
prophets among these traditions.  He is persuaded of the need to de-emphasize “the ‘no-
self’ of Buddhism and the ‘death of the subject’ of post-modern thought.”141  Tracy 
becomes convinced that contemporary Christian theology needs to retrieve the image of 
the prophet as the responsible human agent who works to correct present injustices.   
 
 Action  
 In DWO, the role of historical action as it appears in AI is effectively included 
under the purview of the prophetic.  Prophetic rhetoric emphasizes “the notion of 
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freedom as responsible agency,” to which all are called and empowered by the Other who 
speaks through the prophet.142  He is insistent on the Christian understanding of freedom 
in the struggle for justice, which stresses the responsibility of human persons and grounds 
their freedom in the freedom of Jesus Christ, so that the ethical demand for human action 
is balanced against the rejection of modernity’s putative freedom of the autonomous ego.  
As a Christian theologian, Tracy holds that our freedom cannot be understood apart from 
the Other’s gift of that freedom accompanied by the command to use that freedom well.  
The prophet typically calls upon agents particularly to work with and for the 
marginalized and oppressed; and so Tracy connects the prophetic to liberation, political, 
and feminist theologies which require theology to take account of “the concrete histories 
of suffering and oppression” that are so often ignored by “mainstream” theologies.143   
 Besides the prophetic involvement in action, the mystic, and particularly the love-
mystic, is strongly engaged in the life of action to which people are called.  For Tracy, the 
mystical reading of the Gospel of John illuminates the self-manifestation of God in Jesus 
as “a meditative self empowered and commanded to love.”144  The mystic’s responsible 
agency, however, is characteristically motivated by love, which is disclosed most 
profoundly in the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ.  Without such a love, the work of 
the responsible agent risks becoming sanctimonious and self-righteous. 
 Therefore, both the prophet and the mystic disclose a call to responsible agency.  
Tracy leaves the difference between the two roles seriously underdeveloped.  The clearest 
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distinction  he brings to bear is that between the political/justice orientation of the prophet 
and the mystic’s insistence on genuine love as the source of this pursuit.  Perhaps the 
weakness of this distinction is largely attributable to a statement early in the text of DWO 
that what really interests him in the mystical-prophetic is the “hyphen” between them.145  
His point of course is that the mystical and prophetic need each other because it is only 
with this balance of love and justice that a complete understanding of Christian freedom 
is possible.  This freedom is a call to freedom, received as both gift and command 
through the grace of God.146   
 The mystical-prophetic dialectic, with its attendant demand for the responsible 
agency of the human person, integrates the role of manifestation, proclamation, and 
historical action play in the mediation of grace according to Tracy’s earlier theology.  
Here, the self-manifestation of God in Jesus Christ is decisive precisely because in Jesus 
we learn both who God is and who we are supposed to be.  Jesus is fully human, not only 
in the sense that nothing human is lacking in Jesus, but that Jesus represents what we are 
to become in order to be fully human ourselves.  In the event and person of Jesus Christ, 
then, we see grace not only as the command to be like Jesus – to love, to pursue justice, 
to serve the marginalized and oppressed – and as the gift of enabling us to be like Jesus.  
Through the mystical-prophetic, and the significance of that hyphen, we are challenged 
and empowered to genuinely graced discipleship. 
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Salvation, Liberation, and Transformation  
 The preceding section looked at the ways, according to Tracy, human persons 
encounter grace in their lived experience.  The triad of mediations described as 
manifestation, proclamation, and historical action on the one hand and the dialectic of the 
mystical and the prophetic that leads to a retrieval of responsible selfhood on the other 
comprise the complex sets of symbols which Tracy employs to describe the encounter 
with grace; they are all rooted in God’s revelation of God’s self in the event and person 
of Jesus Christ, who is the unifying and decisive disclosure of God’s grace in creation.   
 In recalling the earlier discussion of the nature-grace polarity and the sin-grace 
dialectic, it is important to point out that while Tracy contends that the former is more 
fundamental to theological anthropology, the latter is often his primary focus in 
discussing grace.  The corrupting character of sin in relation to both finitude (as in the 
rejection of human finitude) and relationality (as in the systemic distortions that plague 
and condition our relations with one another, with creation, and with God) causes sin to 
be an ever-present problem for authentic human living.  As I argued in Chapter Four, 
Tracy’s primary metaphor for sin is distortion, more explicitly unconscious systemic 
distortion.  This emphasizes a social interpretation of inherited sin as a way of accounting 
for the overall context of human living rather than only the corruption of individual 
persons.147 
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 In the case of grace, Tracy’s primary metaphor for the effects of grace in our lives 
is salvation.  For Tracy, salvation is an experience of “releasement” from a situation of 
evil.148  The breadth of this description suggests that salvation includes not only some 
final and definitive deliverance of humankind from sin but also all the smaller “salvific” 
experiences of daily life.  For instance, someone who has been marginalized by one’s 
community because of the social stigmas associated with homelessness or mental illness 
might experience releasement from this situation of evil if the community rejects the 
stigma and restores that person to community.  Whatever the situation might be – guilt, 
anxiety, bondage – the persons released from it interpret that releasement as salvific.149  
Their understanding of what they have undergone is that of being freed from the evil 
situation. 
 In addition, the person is not only free from the situation but is freed to something 
as well.  For Tracy, the Christian view of freedom rests on the claim that sinful human 
freedom is grounded in Christ, and so positively, the salvific experience of grace also 
frees one to love.  This does not mean that one now has an option to love that one may 
choose to ignore; rather, one is tasked, commanded, and fundamentally enabled to love.  
The releasement from sin is therefore also a releasement to love.  Tracy’s frequent 
references to grace as gift and command, gift and task, even gift and threat, all point to 
the twofold aspect of salvation. 
 For Tracy, the empowerment to love is the clearest effect of grace in our lives.  
Tracy treats manifestation, proclamation, and historical actions as the paradigmatic ways 
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in which grace is mediated to us, but he depicts love as “the concrete experiential form of 
grace.”150  All mediations of grace are examples of God’s love for us, which we are in 
turn gifted and commanded to share with others.  Grace experienced as love “displaces 
‘our hearts of stone with hearts of flesh’” and releases us from the constant turning 
inward upon oneself proper to the curvatus in se, the unconscious systemic distortion that 
pervades our own individual corruptions.  This opens us up to love each other and the 
Other that is God.  Tracy says this heals both our authentic eros for the divine and 
transforms it by divine agape.151  Our desire for God and for the other becomes one with 
the desire to serve God and the other.152 
 The empowerment to love carries with it the command to work for the liberation 
of others.  Liberation is another term Tracy often invokes in speaking about grace, and it 
is related to the attempts to correct concrete social evils.  He acknowledges the situations 
of oppression and marginalization that liberation theologians have so effectively brought 
to the forefront of theological reflection, and he agrees that we are called to work to 
remedy the systemic and other causes that lead to and sustain these situations.  Yet he 
often warns that the Christian view of salvation and liberation cannot be reduced to or 
limited to the attempts to heal these particular wounds: “Christian salvation is not 
exhausted by any program of political liberation, to be sure, but Christian salvation, 
rightly understood, cannot be divorced from the struggle for total human liberation—
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individual, social, political, and religious.”153  Such efforts may be salvific, and 
individuals caught in such situations may experience releasement.  Yet, the breadth of 
Tracy’s view of salvation excludes such experiences from fully comprehending the whole 
meaning of salvation. 
 The work of social and political liberation demands the efforts of individuals who 
have experienced these encounters with grace.  Tracy typically reserves the term 
“transformation” to name the experience of grace through which the individual person is 
re-oriented from self-centeredness and towards other- (or Other-) centeredness.154  He 
sees the call for transformation especially in the commandment to love one’s neighbor as 
oneself, which he describes as “a command to a life at the limits.”155  This use of limit 
language explicates those situations where one comes into contact with the gracious 
ground of existence by showing a life of genuine neighbor-love is a privileged way of 
experiencing the divine.  Yet Tracy claims that this command is not solely “command,” 
but that it is connected to the ability of the individual to respond: “the Christian is 
ennobled, empowered, gifted, graced to hear and fulfill that command.”156   
 Such a transformation in oneself does not originate with the self but rather with 
the divine reality, as the free gift from God, without our deserving or demanding, and it 
comes to us through our experience of the event of Jesus Christ.157  Moreover, this 
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initiative actualizes the revelatory power evident in manifestation, proclamation, and 
historical action.  For Tracy, if theological anthropology accounts for the pervasiveness 
of sin in human existence, it does not do so at the expense of hope in the saving power of 
grace.  Despite the fundamental ambiguity that plagues all human activity, Tracy believes 
in “the ultimate triumph of grace in the human spirit and history.”158  Rooted in the divine 
initiative of love for us, grace finally not only perfects nature but heals all the distortions 
of sin that plague our nature. 
 
Freedom  
 The significance of transformation and liberation in Tracy’s understanding of 
grace culminates in the role of freedom in his theological anthropology.  This is true for 
three reasons.  First, freedom is the aspect of Tracy’s theology where the influence of 
Lonergan, Ricoeur, and Rahner is most evident.  Second, freedom is really the locus 
where Tracy’s four anthropological constants intersect.  Finitude, relationality, sin, and 
grace are all implicated in his view of freedom.  Third, freedom is his most apt way of 
describing what the human person is called to become. 
 Early in Tracy’s career, the influence of Lonergan’s understanding of freedom 
was quite clear.  In The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, Tracy describes Lonergan’s 
view of freedom as “the actuation of one’s rational self-consciousness” that “emerges 
from ordered horizon of intelligence, reason and decision.”159  Freedom in this sense is 
focused on the freedom in the life of the individual as a personal capacity.  As the 
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distinguishing characteristic of Lonergan’s “fourth level,” freedom includes the 
possibility that one might not necessarily follow up on the results of the “insights, 
judgments, and decisions already achieved” through one’s decision-making process.  
Thus there is a difference between one’s “hypothetical effective freedom,” meaning what 
one might actually do given the fulfillment of all necessary conditions for enacting that 
freedom (e.g., sufficient time for reflection, the absence of external constraints), and 
one’s “proximate effective freedom,” meaning what one actually does in a given 
instance.160  Tracy describes this difference as “man’s moral impotence,” in distinction 
from human sinfulness.  Sinfulness, in this Lonerganian understanding of freedom, refers 
to the “recognition of the need for liberation from man’s inability to sustain his 
development,” to continue in self-transcendence and in the enactment of one’s effective 
freedom.161  For Tracy, the import of this Lonerganian understanding of freedom is that 
human beings are in fact free, that freedom is the actualization of one’s insight, 
judgments, and decisions, and that this freedom is constrained both by external factors 
beyond one’s control and by the “reign of sin” in one’s life. 
 While Tracy’s goal in ABL was to exposit Lonergan’s theology, Lonergan’s sense 
of freedom definitely shaped Tracy’s early work on freedom, self-transcendence, and 
liberation.  For example, in Blessed Rage for Order, Tracy considers self-transcendence 
in the context of the limit-questions of science.162  He argued that those who pursue 
“some ideal of what is truly good” rather than their own self-interest are participating in 
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“real, moral, existential, and communal self-transcendence.”163  He characterizes 
authentic human living as pursuing Lonergan’s transcendental imperatives164 and being 
open to a continued process of self-transcendence.  
 Tracy appropriates the idea of self-transcendence largely through the language of 
“disclosing genuine possibilities” for the human person.  In BRO, this phrasing is situated 
in the context of the need for narratives and symbols beyond “conceptual analysis” in 
understanding human existence.165  Through narrative and symbol, the human person can 
encounter potentially transformative understandings of how one is called to be human.166  
This is most fundamentally true in the case of Jesus Christ; attending to the narratives of 
Jesus’ life in the Gospels can disclose to the human person “real human possibilities for 
genuine relationship to God.”167  Encounters with these new possibilities for human 
existence can challenge the person towards continued self-transcendence. 
 In addition to Lonergan, the influence of Paul Ricoeur is also clearly present in 
Tracy’s early formulation of freedom.  Drawing on Ricoeur’s work in the Freedom and 
Nature trilogy, Tracy relates freedom to the possibility of sin.  While recognizing that 
fallibility, meaning the possibility of erring, is part of the freedom and nature of being 
human, he argues against the necessity of committing error.  Since fallibility refers to the 
possibility of error, it then follows for both Ricoeur and Tracy that it is possible (but not 
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necessary) for human beings to commit evil and sin.168  Human freedom on its own 
explains neither the fact of evil nor its inevitability, but freedom is one of the conditions 
of possibility for sin in the world. 
 While the influence of Lonergan and Ricoeur is still quite strong in BRO, this text 
also marks the beginning of the central role of “liberation” in Tracy’s understanding of 
freedom.  In the index of BRO, under the heading for “freedom” it simply says “See 
Liberation.”169  His evaluation of theologies of praxis at this time highlights their 
rejection of individualism and their advocacy for a more contemporary, social model for 
humanity.170  It is through theologians like Gutierrez, Metz, and Soelle that “one 
witnesses, above all, a retrieval of the Jewish and Christian eschatological symbols as 
symbols of societal, political, and religious liberation.”171  By rooting his understanding 
of freedom in his understanding of liberation, Tracy intimately links the two and orients 
freedom towards not only one’s personal releasement from bondage but toward the 
emancipation of human beings more broadly.  Looking back on the rampant development 
of political, liberation, and feminist theologies in the 1970’s and 80’s, Tracy later claims 
that the “insistence on political, economic, and cultural freedom in these theologies has 
considerably revised any residual purely ‘private’ or individualistic understandings of the 
self and its freedom.”172 
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 In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy sustains the connection between freedom 
and liberation by casting freedom in terms of love.  Opposing “sentimentalized notions of 
love” to the visceral reality of those people are called to love, Tracy claims that “love as a 
freedom for the other” includes all the difficult ways of loving that Jesus called for: love 
of outcasts, love of enemies, love of one’s persecutors.173  The freedom that Christians 
have then is expressed as “loyalty” to “the oppressed, the alienated, and the 
marginalized.”174  Tracy conceives of freedom as the commitment to loving those whom 
God loves, thus tying freedom to human responsibility.  
 In describing freedom as “a gift to the self-transcending self,” Tracy connects 
freedom to his sense of grace being received as both gift and command.175  The command 
element relates to the human person as responsible for these others whom one is called to 
love.  The self “is a free and responsible individual” who bears “responsibility as a self to 
all reality.”176  Responsibility is construed here as a relational concept, meaning that the 
responsibility of the self is always situated in the context of the self’s interconnections 
with other persons, structures, the wider cosmos, and God.177  Freedom therefore cannot 
be conceived in terms of individual autonomy because freedom is relational and 
intimately connected to one’s love for reality broadly construed. 
 While his references to freedom in Plurality and Ambiguity are brief, here again 
Tracy maintains the relational focus of freedom.  He challenges the modern conception of 
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the autonomous ego and contrasts it with an “authentic freedom” that is “related to 
nature, history, others, and even now the transformed self.”178  Human beings are still 
called to self-transcendence, which is described in PA as turning “from self-centeredness 
to Reality-centeredness.”179  Through their focus on Ultimate Reality, religions disclose 
authentic possibilities to the human person in the sense that they can enable one to resist 
selfishness, canniness, or the desire for mastery of others.180  The very meaning of being 
a human person is tied to this call to be a relational self that loves others as genuine 
others.   
 Tracy’s understanding of human freedom ultimately crystallizes in the 
terminology of the Christian as a “responsible agent.”181  The language of responsible 
agency ties together the command that the Christian be responsible to the wider reality of 
which one is a part as well as the conviction that the human person has “sufficient 
freedom” in order to be capable of responsibility.182  The Christian as responsible agent 
becomes one of three “crucial facts” in the intra-Christian debates about the human 
person: 
[F]irst, there is meaning to the word freedom for the Christian insofar as that word 
refers to some notion of personal agency and some sense of personal 
responsibility; second, the ground of that freedom, as Paul insisted, is, for the 
Christian, Jesus Christ; and third, the center of that freedom is the kind of agent 
disclosed by the narratives on the singular agency of this Jesus as the Christ.183 
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Christian freedom therefore means that the human person has the possibility of being 
responsible, that this freedom is a gracious gift rooted in the event and person of Jesus 
Christ, and that the genuinely new possibilities for authentic existence disclosed by the 
event and person of Jesus Christ exemplify the lives that human beings are called and 
enabled to live.  The Christian’s experience of transformation or liberation due to the 
encounter with Christ’s grace shows the self both how one ought to live and that one is 
empowered to live that way.184  The dual nature of grace as gift and threat thus becomes 
the basis for Tracy’s language of “responsible agency.”  
 Freedom is, finally, the theme through which Tracy’s four anthropological 
constants are most clearly connected.  As finite beings, humans do not have limitless 
capacities for enacting their responsible agency.  Rather, the “fragile, finite, gifted, free 
self” is subject to a wide range of “orientating and disorienting…liberating and 
distorting” factors and constraints that shape and limit the exercise of one’s freedom.  
Freedom is relational precisely because responsible agency includes one’s responsibility 
to all of reality, to other persons, and to “the God of history.”185  A free self is 
fundamentally a relational self: 
a self who is a free and responsible individual, who recognizes the intrinsic 
relations of that event of individuality to a particular tradition and society, to other 
selves (interpersonal), to the structural realities of society, culture, politics and 
history; a self whose very selfhood is concretely actual only by the partial 
determination by, a partial freedom from, these encompassing structures; a self 
internally related to the reality of the cosmos which encompasses all selves, 
structures and history; and, above all, a self internally related to the reality of the 
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whole now both disclosed and concealed as like a who—a living, empowering 
and commanding reality, a judging, healing, loving God.186  
 
In terms of sinfulness, Tracy argues that personal sins and habitual sins are both results of 
human freedom.  While not necessary choices, human sinfulness more broadly 
(represented in Tracy’s thought by inherited sin and unconscious systemic distortion) 
means that human beings will inevitably choose sin.  And while inherited sin is not itself 
a conscious free choice by the individual or community, the way in which it shapes one’s 
choices means that human sinfulness is a constraining factor on one’s exercise of 
freedom.  Finally, grace not only heals the human person of the sinfulness that wrongly 
limits one’s freedom, but it is more basically the source of human freedom itself.  Jesus 
Christ is the ground of human freedom, and so it is through the grace of Christ that the 
human person is gifted and commanded to live a life of responsible agency. 
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has sought to explain the role of grace in Tracy’s anthropology.  
Among Tracy’s few explicit statements about anthropology is his insistence that an 
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace is fundamental to a Catholic 
theological anthropology.  Even so, most of his elaborations of grace regard the dialectic 
of sin and grace.  Through my examination of Tracy’s theology of grace, it remains clear 
that both dynamics play important roles in his work.  Grace is a divine initiative that 
Christians claim is disclosed in Jesus Christ.  Through his classic terms of “event” and 
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“person,” Tracy delineates this disclosure by distinguishing, not separating, the historical 
figure of Jesus of Nazareth and the Christian community’s experience of this person as 
the self-manifestation of God in the past, present, and future. 
 Now, two millennia removed from the original encounter with this person, we still 
experience grace through what Tracy in his early work called the paradigmatic 
mediations of manifestation, proclamation, and historical action.  In his later work, Tracy 
sought to improve his thematization of these mediations, opting for the dialectic of the 
mystical and prophetic.  Yet, in either exposition he intends to communicate the profound 
experience of grace as both gift and command.  Indeed, it is the language of gift and 
command (and his variations on the theme) that perhaps epitomizes Tracy’s 
understanding of grace.  The healing and judging experience of grace in its various 
mediations is never just a release from sin and distortion, but an empowerment to become 
what God intended human beings to be.  Grace is what empowers human freedom and 
enables the self to be a free agent, responsible to the self, the neighbor, the world, and 
God.  As finite and relational creatures, human beings are called to love and to serve one 
another and God.  They are called, in effect, to be human in the way Christ was human.  
Grace does not just heal people of sin; it perfects and enables them to love the way 
human beings are intended to.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
TRACY’S ANTHROPOLOGY: TOWARD A PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT 
 
 The goal of this dissertation has been to elucidate the theological anthropology of 
David Tracy through a close reading of his extensive body of work.  His references to 
theological anthropology have typically been offhand and infrequent, yet his descriptions 
of limits, interpretation, tradition, method, distortion, grace, freedom, and several other 
key concepts have demonstrated that a complex and implicit understanding of the human 
underpins his theology.  A close reading of his use of these concepts yields a more 
developed understanding of his theological anthropology. 
 Since Tracy’s anthropology is more implicit than explicit, this dissertation has 
proposed four “anthropological constants” as a heuristic for investigating his theological 
anthropology.   As noted in the Introduction, these constants are my own framework for 
analyzing Tracy; they were not originally articulated by him.  Nevertheless, taking a cue 
from Schillebeeckx’s work in Christ, which advocated for “anthropological constants” 
(permanent features of human existence even though their concrete particulars depend on 
the particular context in which they are instantiated), I proposed the constants of finitude, 
relationality, sin, and grace as a framework for analyzing Tracy’s anthropology.  The 
scope of this investigation focused on his published writings from 1968 through 2011.  
While his terminology and even certain basic ideas would change, the regularity with 
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which these four constants recur in his writings suggested they could be useful 
hermeneutical keys for elucidating his anthropology.   
 The previous chapters have offered genealogical interpretations of method, 
finitude, relationality, sin, and grace in Tracy’s theology.  They have looked at the way 
his thought has developed and at those who have been his key theological and 
philosophical influences.  In particular, I have argued that Tracy’s distinction between the 
methods of fundamental and systematic theologies could prove helpful in understanding 
how the four anthropological constants are related to one another. 
 This concluding chapter offers a critical assessment of Tracy’s anthropology.  
This assessment will proceed in three parts.  First, it will discuss the contributions that 
Tracy’s anthropology makes to contemporary discussions in theological anthropology 
and to the field of theology more generally.  Second, it will offer a critique of Tracy’s 
anthropology.  Here the focus will be on important omissions in his anthropology and on 
his use of context as constitutive of human existence.  The third part looks at some 
challenges for theological anthropology that might provide a fruitful and productive 
conversation for further development of his theological anthropology. 
 
Tracy’s Contributions  
 Assessing Tracy’s contributions to the field of theological anthropology requires 
some qualification of what is meant by “contribution.”  Because his working 
anthropology has been implicit, Tracy’s anthropology has not been particularly 
influential.  Examinations of Tracy’s anthropology are few, and those that do exist are 
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problematic.1  Because much of Tracy’s work has been devoted to method, hermeneutics, 
and public theology, not many theologians have explicitly engaged his anthropology. 
 Moreover, Tracy is clearly drawing on a very diverse range of interlocutors.  His 
work on method, hermeneutics, and public theology appropriates and synthesizes the 
work of many figures, but it also affords him the opportunity to make a creative and 
original impact on theology.  The lack of attention to his anthropology has overlooked the 
ways in which it too is a well-woven synthesis of the work of several major figures that 
offers productive insights for theological anthropology.   
 Given this situation, what might one conclude about what his anthropology and 
what might be beneficial for other theologians to appropriate?  In this light, Tracy makes 
two key contributions: (1) his developmental and conversational approach to 
anthropology and (2) the interrelationship between his theological method and 
anthropology, which yields the insight that theological method assumes an anthropology 
and that an implicit anthropology is best examined through an analysis of theological 
method. 
 The developmental and conversational approach to anthropology refers to how  
Tracy’s theological project is best understood as an ongoing project rather than a static 
achievement.  As his thought has developed, he has demonstrated an openness to 
changing previous formulations in favor of newer or more compelling ones.2  Because he 
views theology as a continuing conversation, he is open to reformulating his own work 
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and to changing his mind when warranted.  Thus the ideas of development and 
conversation are intertwined, since it is through the process of conversation that his 
thought develops.   
 This does not mean that Tracy is unwilling to take stands or vacillates in his 
theology.  He upholds the ethical values that he outlines in his discussion of the three 
publics and the three sub-disciplines of theology.  Throughout his work, he maintains a 
commitment to open and honest critical inquiry, pursuing truth even when it challenges 
his previous stances.  He remains committed to creative fidelity with his faith community 
of Roman Catholicism, even when fidelity might occasionally manifest itself as “loyal 
dissent.”  Finally, he continues to encourage involvement in situations of praxis in the 
form of his support for so-called “contextual” theologies (e.g., feminist, liberation, and 
political theologies).  Through these basic commitments Tracy maintains his open and 
conversational approach to theology.   
 The four anthropological constants in Tracy’s anthropology point to concerns that 
persist throughout his career.  While their concrete formulations, the topics through 
which he presents them, and the conversation partners he engages change, each of the 
four constants has a continuous presence in some fashion throughout his theological 
corpus.  This developmental and conversational approach is driven largely by Tracy’s 
participation in wider circles of discourse.  While Rahner, Lonergan, and Ricoeur clearly 
have been significant influences, Tracy’s work has been marked by many other 
conversation partners, such as Ogden, Hartshorne, and Tillich. 
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 Lastly, by pursuing a conversational approach that retains key principles and ideas 
without rigidly enforcing particular formulations, Tracy has been able to present a more 
dynamic understanding of the human person.  He has described nature-grace as the 
fundamental polarity at stake in theological anthropology and has largely avoided talking 
about human nature as a category.  As presented in Chapter Five, Tracy’s treatment of 
nature is constituted by the constants of finitude and relationality.  He does not focus on a 
particular understanding of “nature,” nor does he regard nature as static and unchanging.  
Like Schillebeeckx, Tracy resists a “totalitarian conception” of the human person that 
ignores the various ways context co-determines one’s existence.  By means of the 
anthropological constants of finitude and relationality, Tracy’s anthropology can be seen 
as an ongoing conversation with key features of human existence without viewing these 
features as rigid.  These characteristics of humans are incarnated in different times and 
places.  Tracy’s understanding of what it means to be human attends to the importance of 
differing contexts while still advocating for enduring characteristics of human existence.   
 Tracy’s second major contribution consists in the close relationship between his 
theological method and his anthropology.  As has been shown, he draws on the previous 
efforts of Lonergan to base the eight functional specialties of his general empirical 
method on the four levels of conscious intentionality.  While Lonergan explicitly 
grounded his method on his anthropology, Tracy does so only implicitly.  Relating 
method to anthropology yields helpful insights about the project of relating fundamental 
and systematic sub-disciplines of theology.   
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 The connection Tracy draws between method and anthropology is structured 
differently from Lonergan’s approach.  Tracy does not articulate an anthropology and 
then unfold a method based on it.  Rather, he makes a claim about the types of 
commitments theologians hold and articulates a method built on them.  One discovers 
Tracy’s anthropological assumptions by looking at how his theological method develops.  
The most notable example is his description of the pole of “common human experience” 
in the context of explaining his method of critical correlation in BRO.  His articulation of 
the “limit-to” and “limit-of” in human experience provides the earliest formulations of his 
understanding of finitude and relationality.  A second example occurs in his discussion of 
conversation as the model for hermeneutics, in which he proposes an understanding of 
human persons as engaged in conversation with the other.  Although these conversations 
are at times marked by distortions, they offer genuinely new possibilities for the 
development of the self.    Thus, Tracy’s method is a major source of his anthropology.  
At the same time, since his method is articulated without an explicit anthropology, he 
assigns a certain priority of method over anthropology. 
 Since most of Tracy’s work has been in fundamental, rather than systematic, 
theology, his work expends tremendous energy on the appropriate warrants, evidence, 
criteria, and modes of argument in theology.  Thus, outlining a theological method fits 
well within the sub-discipline of fundamental theology.  However, because it concerns a 
particular faith tradition’s reinterpretation of what it means to be human in light of that 
tradition’s contemporary context, theological anthropology is usually a locus in 
systematic theology. 
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 However, as the treatment of Tracy’s four anthropological constants in this 
dissertation has indicated, theological anthropology is not only a systematic endeavor.  
Fundamental theology’s focus on how arguments are made is inseparable from its interest 
in interdisciplinary approaches to what it means to be human.  This question is not the 
exclusive concern of theology; it is a field of academic inquiry in which disciplines as 
diverse as biology, sociology, economics, and theology can ask and answer questions 
about a particular phenomenon held in common.  A robust theological anthropology must 
take account of the insights of other disciplines in addition to the interpretations of one’s 
religious tradition.  As this dissertation has shown, finitude and relationality are 
“fundamental” constants because they are more compatible to interdisciplinary 
approaches to what it means to be human.  While Tracy draws primarily on the discipline 
of philosophy in his work, he also engages psychology, art, and sociology.  His focus on 
relationships with the “other” draws heavily on liberation theologians.3  Through their 
work he engages postcolonial and subaltern studies as well.  Tracy plainly engages fields 
beyond theology in his understanding of human existence, and so it is clear that he does 
not consider theological anthropology to be only a “systematic” endeavor. 
 
Critiques of Tracy’s Anthropology  
 Despite the valuable aspects of Tracy’s theological anthropology, there are three 
particular areas that deserve more focused treatment in a robust theological anthropology: 
(1) his lack of engagement with traditional teaching on the imago Dei, (2) the limited 
                                                          
3 Especially Gustavo Gutierrez; see Chapter Five, 268-9. 
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references to human corporeality, and (3) the abstract way in which he uses “context” and 
“situation.” 
 As Chapter One explained, the imago Dei is the Christian claim that human 
beings are created in the image and likeness of God.4  This doctrine has traditionally been 
central to Christian interpretations of what it means to be human.  It describes the human 
as created, and it describes that creation as being intimately related to God in such a way 
that humans are distinct from the rest of creation.5  The imago is therefore key to 
understanding the divine-human relationship.  Moreover, the status of the imago in 
relation to original sin was one of the contested issues between Catholic and Protestant 
theologians during and after the Reformation.  Thus it seems that attention to the imago 
would be a key feature in one’s theological anthropology.   
 However, references to the imago Dei are rare in Tracy’s work.  The only explicit 
mention of it occurs toward the end of Plurality and Ambiguity.  There Tracy claims that 
hope arises from one’s belief in a gracious Ultimate Reality.  Anyone who acts on that 
hope “acts in a manner faintly suggestive of the reality and power of that God in whose 
image human beings were formed to resist, to think, and to act.”6  Of the three verbs 
Tracy attaches to the imago Dei here, the latter two, “to think” and “to act,” are 
suggestive of traditional interpretations of the imago Dei, referring primarily to human 
                                                          
4 Chapter One, pages 25-28 
5 The question of human distinctiveness from the rest of creation has been challenged by some ecological 
approaches to anthropology.  See Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); Leonardo Boff, Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm, trans. John 
Cumming (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995); Denis Edwards, Jesus the Wisdom of God: An Ecological 
Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995). 
6 PA 114 
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rationality and freedom.  The use of “to resist” is more in keeping with Tracy’s call to 
resist canniness, inauthenticity, oppression, and sin.  Thus, Tracy locates the human 
capacity to fight evil in humans having been created in the image and likeness of God. 
  Another instance, although less explicit, is Tracy’s use of the imago Dei to 
describe Jesus as “the decisive manifestation both of who God is and who human beings 
are empowered and commanded to become.”7  Here he focuses on the vocation of human 
beings rather than their creation.  Jesus represents who human beings are called to 
become.  Because Jesus is both divine and human, calling for humans to be more like 
Jesus means calling for them to be more like God: loving, free, gracious, authentic, and 
concerned for the other.  Here Tracy subtly links the vocation of the human person with 
being like God, but he does not significantly connect it with the doctrine of the imago 
Dei.   
 A more robust anthropology on Tracy’s part would include a larger role for the 
imago Dei.  Tracy does have a strong sense of the divine-human relationship, but he 
characterizes it primarily in terms of human dependence on the gracious ground of 
existence (whether that is termed the “limit-of,” “the whole,” or “Ultimate Reality”).  The 
dependence of the human on this ground implies God as Creator, but that is perhaps a 
somewhat tenuous leap.  Indeed Tracy largely overlooks the theological locus of creation. 
 A second issue concerns the limited role for corporeality and embodiment in 
Tracy’s anthropology.  Typically, his description of the human being focuses on the 
cognitive functions of the human person, such as interpreting, conversing, reasoning, and 
                                                          
7 DWO 112 
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deciding.  The role the body plays in interpretation or conversation is not specified, and is 
in need for further development.  Although the constants of finitude and relationality are 
manifested in Tracy’s theology in terms of experiences that enable people to recognize 
that they are distinct from but connected to others, the “experiences” he considers tend to 
emphasize awareness, the exchange of ideas, the disclosure of possibilities, or the sense 
of dependence on the gracious ground of existence.8  Neither the physical limitations of 
the human body nor the mediation of one’s experiences through the body receive 
sufficient attention.9   
 Tracy also tends to omit the body in considering the constants of sin and grace.  
The three dimensions of sin are distinguished primarily by the degree of human 
consciousness (conscious, preconscious, and unconscious), but there is no apparent 
reference to the role of the body in sin.  This might stem from Tracy’s rejection of a 
biological transmission model for inherited sin or his strong focus on unconscious 
systemic distortion, but either way it avoids specifying whether the body is relevant to 
sin.  With grace, neither in its relationship to sin or to nature is the relevance of the body 
mentioned.   
 The only exception to this omission occurs in a brief reference to the character of 
human knowing.  Describing the relationship between reasoning and knowing, he states 
that “we humans must reason discursively, inquire communally, converse and argue with 
                                                          
8 E.g., self-consciousness (54-5), of being limited by guilt and death (Chapter Two), of conversation with 
the other (Chapter Three).  Tracy does explicitly mention “sensory experience” (54), but mainly to suggest 
that this is not the whole of experience. 
9 Tracy misses a clear opportunity to involve the body in this way during his rejection of the Cartesian 
cogito: “For the concrete self is always mediated by the ideas, actions, works, images, texts, institutions and 
monuments that objectify our experience” (AI 199). 
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ourselves and one another.  Human knowledge could be other than it is.  But this is the 
way it is: embodied, communal, finite, discursive.”10  However, his reference to 
embodiment here is only made in passing; it is not developed.  The communal, finite, and 
discursive character of knowledge, particularly framed as conversation, serves as the 
focus of PA.  The “embodied” aspect of knowledge would benefit from similar 
development. 
 A place where one might have expected the body to play a larger role is in 
Tracy’s Christology.  In considering the incarnation, he talks about the founding narrative 
of Christianity and the three interrelated symbols of incarnation, crucifixion, and 
resurrection.  Each of these symbols has traditionally been highly corporeal: the Word 
becomes flesh; Jesus experiences the pain of mortification, crucifixion, and death in his 
body; the resurrected Jesus is encountered in a glorified body in a series of resurrection 
accounts.  Yet Tracy’s investigation of this narrative only considers what these symbols 
mean in terms of manifestation and proclamation, the meditative-contemplative mode of 
thought that the narrative calls for, and the reality of the event of Jesus Christ that human 
beings experience now in their contemporary situations.  Even when Tracy considers the 
question of the “historical Jesus,” he only considers the kerygma of Jesus, not his 
embodiment.11 
 This lacuna in Tracy’s anthropology is problematic for several reasons.  First, the 
question of the relationship between soul and body has been the subject of longstanding 
debate in Christian anthropology.  That Tracy ignores this question, a central aspect of 
                                                          
10 PA 27 
11 AI 239 
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theological anthropology, is puzzling.  Second, all the cognitive aspects of the human that 
he does consider are implicitly corporeal.  No one interprets, knows, or encounters 
classics without using their brain.  Currently, there is a burgeoning theological 
engagement with neuroscience, which is investigating questions about the brain, belief, 
and the soul, that a robust contemporary theological anthropology ought to consider.12  
Third, certain classics, such as rituals, often feature a variety of postures, gestures, and 
motions that engage all aspects of the human person.  Thus, when Tracy says that the 
“appeal of any religious classic is a nonviolent appeal to our minds, hearts and 
imaginations, and through them to our will,” it would be important to add “to our bodies” 
to this list.13  Since much of the work being done in theological anthropology today takes 
seriously the role of human corporeality,14  Tracy’s call for theology to be in conversation 
with the situation would be greatly strengthened by taking account of this work. 
 A third critique of Tracy concerns the abstract way in which “context” functions 
in Tracy’s theology.  His methodological shift from common human experience to the 
contemporary situation marked an increased focus on the particularity of context for 
concrete human persons.  Clearly, Tracy is acutely aware of the role context plays in 
shaping the experience of individual persons.  People are formed by a variety of factors: 
                                                          
12 Robert John Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, Michael A. Arbib, eds., Neuroscience and 
the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1999); Warren S. Brown and Nancey C. Murphy, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and 
Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998) 
13 AI 177 
14 Inter alia, M. Shawn Copeland, Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2010); Marc Cortez, Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies: An Exercise in Christian Anthropology and 
Its Significance for the Mind/Body Debate (New York: T&T Clark, 2008); Molly C. Haslam, A 
Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability: Human Being as Mutuality and Response (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2012). 
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the time and location into which they are born, the language they first learn to speak, the 
traditions in which they are raised, and their gender, race, and ethnicity.15  Everyone has a 
concrete, particular context that is constitutive of their identity. 
 Tracy is correct in emphasizing “context” in his theological anthropology, but his 
treatment is almost entirely conceptual.  He rarely pays attention to the particulars of his 
own context and rarely explores the significance of context for other theologians.  Only 
once does he attend to his own context as “white, male, middle class, and academic,” 
admitting this social location shapes his process of doing theology.16  He even 
acknowledges that the critiques of these other theologians are ones he needs to hear.  Yet 
he quickly moves to summarize what is held in common by these various “others,” 
calling it the “hermeneutical practice” of the “mystical-prophetic.”  While the effort to 
categorize these perspectives makes sense from a systematic point of view, the diversity 
of ways of doing theology that are “different, even conflictually other” from Tracy’s are 
much more complex than he acknowledges.  Second, by describing these other ways of 
doing theology as “mystical-prophetic,” he distinguishes their way of doing theology 
from his own.  However, he has also claimed that the manifestation-proclamation 
dialectic in AI is “best construed theologically as mystical-prophetic,” meaning that this 
is not actually a way in which his theology differs from these others, thus creating 
confusion about what exactly he means by the phrase “mystical-prophetic.”17 
                                                          
15 In this last grouping, Tracy does note features that are intimately tied to human bodies, but without 
delving into the impact of such bodily features (or of bodiliness more generally).  Cf. PA 66 
16 DWO 6 
17 The term “mystical-prophetic” is Tracy’s appropriation of the “mystical-political” dimension of theology 
as articulated by Gustavo Gutierrez (David Tracy, “The Christian Option for the Poor,” in The Option for 
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 Indeed, Tracy’s engagement with what are often called “contextual,” theologies 
tends to treat them collectively, rather than engage with them individually, on their own 
terms.  Thus, though he frequently mentions “liberation, political, and feminist” 
theologies as important sources to consider, he rarely engages the particularities of these 
types of theologies.18 Grouping all these theologies together also suggests that he does 
not regard their individual perspective as terribly significant since they seem to come to 
the same mystical-prophetic conclusions.  In sum, it appears that context is important 
conceptually for Tracy, but predominantly in an abstract way. 
 The relatively greater emphasis he puts on fundamental and systematic theologies 
over practical theology also exacerbates this emphasis: at one point he intended for BRO 
and AI to be the first two volumes of a trilogy focusing on the three sub-disciplines, with 
a volume on practical theology to follow at a later date.  However the trajectory his work 
followed did not ultimately include this, with a couple articles somewhat filling the gap.  
Yet the heart of Tracy’s practical theology is his understanding of praxis, meaning 
practice that informs and is informed by theory.  His engagement with praxis tends to 
focus on the practice side of it, stating that practical theology is often caught up with 
concrete situations of praxis and particular social concerns.  Indeed, its orientation 
towards the public of society and its three interrelated realms emphasizes this role.  He 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Poor in Christian Theology, ed. Daniel G. Groody (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007), 120).  Cf. Claude Geffré and Gustavo Gutierrez, eds., The Mystical and Political Dimension of the 
Christian Faith (New York: Herder and Herder, 1974). 
18 Tracy is clearly engaged with some particular figures (e.g., Gustavo Gutierrez, Johann Baptist Metz, 
Sallie McFague, and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza), but the way he refers to these different types of 
theology often suggests that he sees these theologies as more closely aligned with one another than they 
really are. 
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has gone so far as to claim that the classics of praxis theologies will not be texts but 
events.19  Were Tracy more focused on practical theology, it seems conceivable that he 
might take particular contexts more seriously because of how practical theology is bound 
up with particular “situations of praxis.”  Nonetheless, the fact is that even fundamental 
and systematic theologies are bound up with particular situations as well, and so 
theologians ought to attend to their contexts more clearly. 
 
Trajectories for Further Development  
 Beyond these issues with Tracy’s anthropology, I think there are several further 
avenues of exploration for his anthropology.  Two in particular are significant currents in 
contemporary theological anthropology: (1) the broadening of an anthropocentric 
understanding of what it means to be a human creature to a more relational, 
interdependent understanding as emphasized by ecological approaches and (2) the 
ongoing research into disability theology that challenges a capacities-oriented 
understanding of the human person.  Tracy does not consider these two currents, but due 
to their relatively recent rise he cannot be faulted for that.  Nevertheless, I consider these 
issues to be fruitful conversation partners for Tracy’s anthropology because I think his 
work could make helpful contributions to them. 
 The challenge environmental theology or “eco-theology” raises for theological 
anthropology is how to understand human beings in relation to the rest of created reality.  
Anthropology often focuses on what makes humans distinct from the rest of creation to 
                                                          
19 AI 398 
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the detriment of what connects humans to creation.  In this way, the imago Dei, coupled 
with a narrow interpretation of Genesis 1:26-28,20 inculcates a sense of separation 
between the human and creation.  However, not only are humans closely related to other 
animals, but they are also dependent on their broader ecosystems for survival. 
 The issues raised by environmental theology and new developments in cosmology 
are important for further development in Tracy’s anthropology.  His interest in context as 
constitutive of the self and the anthropological constant of relationality could be 
broadened to include the ecosystem.  It would also be a way in which his conceptual use 
of context could be sharpened to include particulars, because the specific environmental 
issues, concerns, and possibilities that shape one’s situation vary depending on one’s 
location.  Living in a region suffering from deforestation might raise different questions 
from a coastal area plagued by recurrent flooding.  More broadly, the ways in which 
one’s culture or state engage the environment may vary based on political or economic 
power: wealthier countries often import food from far flung places while  poorer 
countries engage in cash crop agriculture that impoverish both the land and the people in 
order to trade with wealthier countries.  Accounting for these sorts of differences between 
ecosystems would contribute to a more robust contemporary anthropology. 
 Furthermore, attending to the environment could be productive for one’s 
understanding of sin.  Tracy applies the term “distortion” to talk about sin in 
                                                          
20 “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild 
animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ So God created humankind 
in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed them, 
and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over 
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.’” 
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communication, history, religion and the self; he could build on this approach and relate 
it to the environment as well.  Shifting and conflicting priorities, economic imbalances, 
and short-sighted, self-oriented thinking have all contributed to an environment that is out 
of balance and with which human beings have a troubled relationship.  “Sin” could also 
be enlarged to include the human-environment relationship and could inculcate more 
proactive reflection on human responsibility for and stewardship of our diverse 
ecosystems.   
 A second current in contemporary theological anthropology has been the rise of 
disability theology.  Spurred largely by Nancy Eiesland’s seminal The Disabled God: 
Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability,21 disability theology has developed into a 
profound challenge to the many theological anthropologies that operate on assumptions 
about how capacities define human existence.  Early work in this field focused on 
physical disabilities, but increasingly theologians have also addressed intellectual 
disabilities.22  Most recently, Molly Haslam has called for a rejection of “capacity-based 
anthropology,” considering instead that “we find our humanity in relationships of mutual 
responsiveness.”23  This shift grounds a theological anthropology that considers even 
those with profound intellectual disabilities24 to be fully human, not defectively human.   
                                                          
21 Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville, 
Abingdon Press, 1994) 
22 Cf. Sharon V. Betcher, Spirit and the Politics of Disablement (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007); 
Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology if Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos Press, 2008); Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological 
Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008) 
23 Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability, 9 
24 E.g. micro-encephalitis and severe Down Syndrome. 
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 The challenge of disability anthropology is that it highlights the problems with 
traditional discourse on the human person as a reasoning agent.  Several characteristics 
typically assumed of the human, such as symbolic reasoning, awareness of self-identity, 
and personal agency, may not be possible in those with profound disabilities.  While 
these conditions vary in type and severity, in each case they affect particular human 
beings.  Thus it requires some rethinking of what it means to be human if theology is to 
include them adequately in its understanding of what it means to be human. 
 Disability theology presents both opportunities and challenges for Tracy’s 
anthropology.  First, the biggest challenge is that Tracy places freedom as responsible 
agency at the heart of his anthropology.  Freedom is implicated in each of his 
anthropological constants.  To construe freedom in terms of agency assumes the 
individual has the capacity to actualize that agency.  Because individuals with profound 
intellectual disabilities may be lacking in this capacity, Tracy’s anthropology may be 
unwittingly excluding such persons.   
 Secondly, the four constants outlined here are often illuminated through capacity-
based assumptions.  Conversation presumes the ability of humans to use their reason, 
engage in communication with one another, and understand what the other is saying.  
Tradition presumes the passing on of beliefs, values, and practices to succeeding 
generations capable of understanding and performing them.  Reflection on limit-
experiences and situations presumes that one has a developed sense of the self and the 
ability to reflect on what these experiences mean for that self.  Tracy’s anthropology is 
bound up with assumptions about what the human is capable of doing, and these 
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capacities in turn disclose permanent characteristics of human existence that may be 
incarnated in diverse ways depending on one’s context.  Tracy’s anthropology to date is 
predicated on seeing the human in terms of capacities that reveal these characteristics.  
Because so many disability theologies argue against seeing the human in terms of 
capacities, this may present a difficulty when engaging Tracy’s thought. 
 At the same time, disability theologies would be a fruitful area for Tracy’s further 
consideration.  First, although the anthropological constants considered in this 
dissertation are disclosed through the examination of capacities, they do not necessarily 
need to be conceived of in this way.  Rather, disability theology might present a new way 
of understanding finitude, relationality, sin, and grace.  Central to Haslam’s argument is 
reconceiving of relationality in terms of mutual responsiveness, meaning that there are 
ways that those with profound intellectual disabilities do respond to others, even if that 
response is not necessarily a conscious or intentional response.  Mutual responsiveness 
highlights that there must be “a partner who responds to us and to whom one responds,” 
which helps to move relationality beyond a capacity to respond to the need for others.25  
Similarly, the experience of finitude need not be precisely the same in all persons; those 
with profound intellectual disabilities are limited in ways that others may not be, but all 
humans can be characterized by the fact that they are limited.  Moreover, all humans are 
finite in relation to the infinite God who has created them.  Finitude in this sense is not 
dependent on any capacity of the person but on the dependence of all on God.  Grace also 
need not presume that one’s reception of grace be an active ability in terms of something 
                                                          
25 Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability, 53 
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the human does; grace as a free gift from God presumes that in some way God has 
created or enabled the human to receive that grace.  Again, this rests more heavily on the 
relationship humans share with God than with some particular capacity the human 
exercises.   
 The major caveat for Tracy’s anthropology would be how to relate sin in ways 
that take disability theology seriously.  Sin typically presumes that the individual is 
responsible in some sense and thus able to enact one’s agency.  If someone does not 
possess agency as is normally conceived, it becomes difficult to consider them sinful, at 
least in the dimensions of personal or habitual sin.  It may be more meaningful to think of 
how they might be affected by inherited sin, given the way that it infects relationships 
with other persons and with one’s situation.  However, if persons are incapable of 
conceiving what sin is or of acting independently in such a way as to sin themselves, I’m 
not sure how to relate the constant of sin to those with profound intellectual disabilities.26 
 Lastly, engaging with disability theology might be a way for Tracy to consider 
human corporeality more seriously.  Eiesland’s text comes out of her own experiences of 
physical disabilities and the ways in which she was marginalized as a result.  She 
challenges religious persons to make proactive efforts to include disabled persons into the 
community beyond installing wheelchair ramps or handicapped bathroom stalls.  While 
these basics are necessary, disabled persons also need to be recognized as full members 
                                                          
26 Eiesland’s treatment of sin focuses on the problematic conflation of sin and disability (Eiesland, The 
Disabled God, 70-75).  Reynolds, on the other hand, focuses on God’s solidarity with human beings in our 
“weakness and brokenness” and how God redeems us from sin.  Within his thought, then, disability is seen 
as both tragic—it is involuntary and can cause suffering—and redemptive—God affirms human disability 
in the incarnation of Christ (Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 197, 210). 
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of the community.  Moreover those with intellectual disabilities, especially profound 
ones, often have physical aspects of their disabilities that require physical therapy or 
assistance.27  Because of the needs of disabled persons, disability theology does not 
relegate human corporeality to a background assumption.  By engaging with this field, 
Tracy’s anthropology would be better able to think about the role of the body in human 
existence.   
 
Summary 
 Most theologians have regarded David Tracy’s major theological contributions to 
be in the area of theological method, public theology, or hermeneutics. His theological 
anthropology, however, has received scant attention.  Nevertheless, his assumptions 
about what it means to be human are a significant, if implicit, factor in shaping his work, 
especially his theological method.   
 This dissertation has offered several interrelated arguments.  First, it has argued 
that a genealogical approach is the best way to interpret Tracy’s theology.  Doing so takes 
account of the important developments and shifts in his thought as well as the key 
conversation partners who often contribute to these changes.  A genealogical reading of 
Tracy also avoids the risk of restricting the ongoing conversation that comprises his work 
to one narrow period of time or one particular text.  The challenge of this reading is that it 
can make it difficult to make any fixed judgments about what Tracy thinks on particular 
topics.  However, as I have demonstrated, there are certain ideas, concepts, and 
                                                          
27 Haslam attributes her interest in the field to her experience as a physical therapist (Haslam, A 
Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability, 10). 
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formulations that remain relatively stable, and there are common themes and concerns 
that consistently permeate his thought.  A genealogical approach enables a fuller 
understanding of these underlying consistencies in his thought. 
 Second, this dissertation has employed the heuristic of “anthropological 
constants” as a means to frame Tracy’s anthropology.  Drawing on Schillebeeckx’s 
approach, the dissertation argues that finitude, relationality, sin, and grace present the key 
characteristics of what it means to be human in Tracy’s thought.  These constants recur 
over and over in Tracy’s corpus, suggesting that they are permanent concerns in his 
thought.  The ways in which these constants appear in Tracy’s thought are diverse and 
complex, but this dissertation has attempted to show they are indeed operative in his 
work. 
 Third, the dissertation has argued that distinctions between fundamental and 
systematic theology in Tracy’s work provide the structure for understanding these four 
constants.  Finitude and relationality, while not necessarily religious in any clear way, do 
have theological significance.  They are constants which present a locus for the 
interdisciplinary engagement that allows for the theological process of mutually critical 
correlation with fields such as sociology, biology, and philosophy.  Various fields 
understand finitude and relationality differently, and so entering into conversation with 
them can ultimately be fruitful for theology.  Sin and grace, however, have long been 
significant symbols in Christian theology for understanding the actual state of human 
existence and the relationship between God and humans.  Consideration of them outside 
of the Christian faith tradition would diffuse their symbolic meaning.  They are thus 
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systematic constants in the sense that they make sense within the symbol system of a 
particular faith.   
 Finally, building on these three arguments, this dissertation has claimed that 
Tracy’s anthropology offers assets, liabilities, and ways forward.  His conversational 
approach to examining what it means to be human and his consistent recourse to method 
offer an intriguing approach to theological anthropology.  At the same time, his lack of 
emphasis on the imago Dei, the human body, and the concrete realities of context and 
social location leave significant lacuna.  Two examples from recent contemporary 
approaches to anthropology, ecological and disability theologies, offer further avenues of 
exploration for Tracy.  More specifically, they offer new conversation partners that may 
contribute to new developments and insights for Tracy.   
 It is important to recognize that this text focuses heavily on expositing Tracy’s 
anthropology because he has not done this himself.  His sense of what it means to be 
human is often implicit and assumed.  Although the anthropological constants of finitude, 
relationality, sin, and grace were not articulated by Tracy, they have been useful in 
making explicit the key aspects of his anthropology.  While the assessment offered in this 
chapter is dependent on the adequacy of my interpretation of Tracy’s anthropology, I 
remain confident that this dissertation has given a fair and thorough reading of his work. 
 Perhaps the best way to summarize Tracy’s understanding of what it means to be 
human is to say that human beings are plural and ambiguous selves.  Human persons 
experience plurality in diverse ways: through contact with “others,” in their particular 
social contexts, within themselves, in the different commitments they make, and through 
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their encounter with the divine.  Human persons are also ambiguous beings, marked by 
the sinful inclination to reject their finitude and turn inward on themselves, but marked as 
well by the gift of God’s grace in Christ which commands and enables them to become 
more like Jesus.  Humans are finite, relational, sinful, and graced—anthropological 
constants which draw attention to human persons as fundamentally plural and ambiguous.  
For Tracy, plurality and ambiguity are “interruptions” that mitigate against any easy 
narrative of history that would ignore marginalized persons and forgotten sins.  
Recognizing that the human self is plural and ambiguous thus illuminates the complexity 
of human existence and resists any facile description of “human nature.” 
 Ultimately, the importance of an investigation of David Tracy’s theological 
anthropology is that it helps one to understand Tracy himself.  As one of the most 
influential theologians of the late 20th/early 21st centuries, a robust understanding of 
Tracy’s theology must account for his anthropology.  As he completes his work on 
naming God, it is also important to remain cognizant of how he names the human. 
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